Coming after the revolution in Tunisia, the revolution in Egypt confirms that the heart of the Arab nation is still beating, and that its body is able to stand upright even in a state of “brain weakness”, the stagnation of a considerable part of the political, intellectual and religious elites in the Arab world.
Egypt’s young people, released from the “ideological ghettos” and freed from the complex of fear, managed to set off the uprising and spark the popular revolution, in which every section of the Egyptian people came together, young and old, women and children, whatever their political leanings.
The young people in revolt have indeed succeeded in meeting a number of the conditions that specialists in civil resistance agree are necessary for a revolution to succeed:
1. The youth uprising brought millions of Egyptians onto the streets and gathered them in the squares of many Egyptian cities. This matters, because wide geographical spread across the whole country and decentralised mobilisation and organisation show that the Egyptian people are genuinely represented, and deprive the regime of the pretext of accusing small crowds of demonstrators of extremism, terrorism or serving foreign agendas.
2. The young protesters managed to impose non-violence as the method of political change. This stripped the Egyptian regime of the argument of violence it has so often used to justify harsh repression and to pounce on and crush demonstrators. It also won the sympathy of international public opinion and embarrassed the Arab governments that kept silent, and the Western governments, which were left with no option but to support the demonstrators, if only outwardly.
3. The organisers of the uprising succeeded in uniting the various sections of the people, the political forces and the trade unions around a single, very clear goal. This was reflected on the ground in the discourse of those speaking in the media, the slogans chanted by the demonstrators and the banners they carried.
4. The young demonstrators handled the regime’s provocations well: the withdrawal of the security forces, the attempt to spread terror and chaos among citizens, and the dispatch of remnants of the regime’s repressive forces in civilian clothes, accompanied by groups of mercenaries and professional criminals, to attack and intimidate the demonstrators. The demonstrators did not depart from the rules of non-violent civil resistance, and organised themselves into committees and teams to keep order, prevent infiltration and confront the baltagiya.
5. Those leading the uprising made skilful use of modern communication technologies to coordinate at home and communicate with the outside world, to get round the blackout imposed by the official media, and to prevent the regime from repressing the demonstrations out of the public eye.
But as we approach the end of the second week of the revolution, we must identify its weaknesses so that those concerned can address them.
The two main problems facing the Egyptian revolution are:
1. The inability to diversify the many tactics, means and mechanisms of non-violence and to use them in a sequence that responds to the situation on the ground and adapts to developments at home and abroad, and the reliance solely on sit-ins in squares and public places, which is only one of dozens of known mechanisms used in non-violent civil resistance.
2. The inability to translate the unity of the Egyptian street, in all its components, into a united collective leadership of the revolution that reflects the diversity of the crowds of demonstrators, has the legitimacy to speak with one voice on behalf of the masses in revolt, and is tasked with seizing the right moment to begin negotiations with the regime or with parts of it.
These are two essential conditions for the success of the Egyptian revolution, which will be achieved only when it manages to open a rift and bring about a shift of loyalty within the ranks of the political and administrative elites and the military and security forces loyal to the regime.
Such a rift occurred in Tunisia, and it was this, together with the active support of the United States for the army leadership, which withdrew its loyalty from Ben Ali, that led to the Tunisian president’s departure. Otherwise he was ready to kill thousands of Tunisians to keep his throne.
In the Egyptian case, the pressure of the masses has not yet reached the point where it can open a rift within the regime’s ranks. The young revolutionaries in Egypt must therefore review the strategy of the revolution they have ignited and adjust it as circumstances and developments on the ground dictate. If there is not enough flexibility in updating the revolutionary strategy, the Mubarak regime and its operations rooms will take advantage of this to develop their counter-revolutionary strategy and devise diabolical methods to split the ranks, strike at the revolution and bury it. They are experienced in this field, and they are not short of advisers among their patrons in Israel and the West in general.
Massive sit-ins in the squares are vital and must continue, but it is also necessary now to resort to other means, such as peaceful marches towards sensitive sites in the Egyptian capital. This would give the revolution new momentum, unsettle the regime and take away its initiative and its bet on time and on the gradual weakening of revolutionary momentum, which it believes will allow it to sidestep the people’s demands and rebuild its corrupt structures.
Such a step would also put the leadership of the Egyptian army to the test, face it with its responsibilities and force it to take a clear position and side with the party of its choice: the people or the regime. For many indicators suggest that military decision-making in Egypt is currently in the hands of a group of generals loyal to Mubarak and trained in American military schools. The apparent neutrality of the army is in reality support for the regime, made easier by the demonstrators’ discourse, which avoids antagonising the army and seeks to win it over.
This week in Egypt must be not only a “week of steadfastness” but also a “week of peaceful defiance”. Those leading the glorious Egyptian revolution must do everything in their power to prevent Tahrir Square, God forbid, from becoming a prison or a graveyard for the revolution.
The Egyptian revolution is condemned to succeed. Its failure, God forbid, would have catastrophic repercussions: it would open the way for the Mubarak regime to regain its might, take harsh revenge on the people of Egypt and crush anyone whose image was seen or whose voice was heard supporting the revolution, and it would demoralise all the Arab peoples for many decades to come.
Its success, on the other hand, will have a profound effect in reviving peoples, not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world.
Abbas Aroua
6 February 2011
Source: Al Jazeera Net
