Prospects for the democratic control of intelligence services in the Arab world

July 2007

1. Preamble

In the militarised Arab countries, it has become commonplace to say that it is the army that has a state, and not the other way round. But decades after political leaders failed to establish civilian primacy over the military, it is high time to stop merely describing or denouncing the military’s grip on the state. This discourse, outdated now that people have become aware of the military domination of the political system, in fact conceals the intellectual neglect of an opposition that to this day remains unable to present a concrete set of laws, institutions and mechanisms to control military power and counterbalance it without compromising national defence. Arab politicians are as poorly informed on these questions as ordinary citizens.

The security sector is much broader than the military institution, since it includes the gendarmerie, the police and paramilitary forces. However, as a priority and as a first step towards developing a concrete programme for cleaning up and reforming the security sector in the Arab world, this research project proposes to confine itself to the reform of the intelligence services in one of the following Arab countries: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt.

The reform of intelligence services has long been a subject of political science research in Western democracies. A growing number of studies have also been published in Eastern Europe since the end of the Soviet empire (an initial bibliography is attached to this project). In the Arab world, by contrast, where the mukhabarat rule through intimidating authoritarianism, the subject is practically taboo among political scientists and politicians alike. This means that the project requires three particular efforts:

i) To assimilate, from the existing literature, the definitions, categories, descriptions and analyses used in political science to characterise the structures, roles, tasks, organisation and activities of intelligence services, as well as the methods for their democratic control; ii) To characterise and document a) the structures, roles, tasks, organisation and activities of the intelligence services in an Arab country to be chosen, and b) the ways in which these services interact with the executive, legislative and judicial powers, using a descriptive (scientific) approach to guide this documentary effort; iii) To design an outline structure and organisation of intelligence, together with a model for its democratic control, suited to the chosen Arab country, and, taking into account the differences between the ideal outlined and the current realities of this institution, to propose a comprehensive, concrete and detailed plan of reforms to be undertaken.

This work will be beneficial in several ways. It will help fill the intellectual gap on the subject and, ultimately, make it possible to formulate an adequate, well-informed, clear-sighted and simple vision of the solution to the overriding political problem that is eating away at some Arab countries. The dissemination of this vision and this knowledge, through speeches, interviews, conferences, publications, popularisation and so on, will then help, first, to inform political leaders and citizens on this vital question and, finally, to force a debate on the subject.

2. Objectives of the research project

An objective is a concrete, measurable and time-bound result that one wishes to achieve. This project has eleven objectives.

Part one

1) Conduct a literature review of the different models (organisation, structure, roles, functioning and activities) of intelligence services in the following democracies: the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain, Canada, Norway, India, Hungary or Poland.

2) Conduct a literature review of the different models of democratic control of intelligence services in the democracies listed above. In each case, it will be necessary not only to specify in detail how executive control, parliamentary oversight, judicial control and supervision, and the accountability (muhasaba) exercised by the media and civil society operate, but also to indicate the relative weight of the different types of control.

3) Compile the norms and standards for the democratic oversight of security and intelligence services adopted by the following international organisations: the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), the European Union, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the OSCE, the OECD, the Summit of the Americas and the UNDP.

4) Draw up a comprehensive bibliography and webliography on the subject.

Part two

Choose a case study from among the following countries: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt. For the chosen country:

5) Describe rigorously the various intelligence bodies (structures, organisation, roles, functioning, activities), their main perceptions of risks and threats, the major social, cultural, ideological and political trends within this milieu, if any, and the conceptions of secrecy and information that prevail within the institution. Provide a history setting out these parameters from the birth of the first intelligence body to the present day.

6) Describe precisely, through a descriptive, documentary and non-polemical approach, how the various intelligence bodies interact with the civilian authorities (successive executives, parliaments and the judiciary). Identify precisely the main consumers of the intelligence services’ products (information and actions). Provide a history setting out these parameters from the birth of the first intelligence body to the present day.

7) Set out formally the interaction of the various intelligence bodies with the media, political parties, civil society and the population, as well as with public assets and the sphere of the economy and finance. Provide a history setting out these parameters from independence to the present day.

8) Describe exactly the main and most influential international cooperation arrangements (partners and areas of cooperation) of the intelligence services. Provide a history setting out these parameters from the birth of the first intelligence body to the present day.

9) Compile a complete documentary record of the legal framework within which the intelligence services operate (constitution, executive decrees, ordinances, ministerial directives and regulations, military code, codes of conduct, statutes, internal directives and regulations, penal code, etc.). Include the African normative documents in whose drafting the chosen country took part.

Part three

10) Conduct a literature review of intelligence reforms in countries in democratic transition (Argentina, South Africa, Bolivia, Chile, Peru) and in Eastern Europe, and of attempts at intelligence reform in West Africa. Identify the obstacles and problems encountered, as well as the approaches and techniques used to bring these reforms to fruition.

11) Assuming democratic change in the chosen Arab country, propose a model for the organisation of the services and a model for their democratic control, and then anticipate the problems specific to the chosen country that would arise in carrying these reforms through.

3. Methodology

The report to be produced at the end of the research will focus mainly on precise, factual elements and will avoid embarking on a broad historical overview or an overly general reflection on the military’s grip on political life.

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