Monthly Afghanistan News Roundup – January 2026
Fazelminallah Qazizai
Within the framework of the Fiqhi Pathways project implemented jointly by CPI-Geneva and the Swiss FDFA’s Peace and Human Rights Division, engagement with Deobandi scholars of or close to Taliban is pursued to promote governance in line with IHL and Islamic jurisprudence through Fiqhi dialogue exchanges. This monthly newsletter aims to keep track of the discussions and debates among scholars on issues of governance policies of the Taliban, especially in the areas of education, social policies, and statecraft and governance institutions.
1. Legal System: New Court Procedures Code Reshapes Judicial Framework
In a significant move toward formalising its judicial system, the Taliban’s Supreme Court issued a new Criminal Procedure Code (Asool-nama) in January 2026, signed by Supreme Leader Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada. Comprising 10 chapters and 119 articles, this document provides a unified legal text for courts, which have operated without a standardised framework since the annulment of the previous constitution and laws. The code establishes formal procedures for litigation, evidence, and verdicts, marking a shift from ad-hoc rulings toward institutionalized judicial governance.
The code introduces several structural changes to the judiciary. It legally requires adherence to the orders of the Supreme Leader in judicial matters, with non-compliance subject to penalties. It establishes the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence as the sole source of legal interpretation, and scholars who publicly advocate for other schools may face legal consequences. The code also expands the scope of discretionary punishment (ta’zir), granting judges wider authority in cases not explicitly covered by fixed Quranic punishments.
Regarding social regulations, the code includes provisions on gender interactions and public conduct. In cases of domestic disputes, Article 32 outlines specific evidentiary requirements, requiring visible injury for legal recognition of abuse. Some Afghan legal observers have noted that this places a high burden on victims.
The code represents an effort to consolidate judicial authority under a unified framework while reinforcing the primacy of the Hanafi school. For the Taliban leadership, this is part of a broader project to institutionalize their governance model. The codification addresses a practical need—courts previously lacked consistent procedures—while simultaneously embedding ideological controls within the legal structure.
What makes this significant for understanding Taliban governance is the move from informal justice to bureaucratized theocracy. By producing a written, standardized code, the leadership signals a long-term vision for state institutions, even as international recognition remains elusive. However, as the critiques from Afghan scholars make clear, the document’s legitimacy and acceptance among religious and legal circles remain deeply contested. The debates reflect an ongoing tension within Islamic scholarship between centralized authority and traditional principles of justice, equality, and scholarly consensus.
The code has, however, sparked notable discussions among religious scholars inside Afghanistan and outside Afghanistan. In a recent interview on MAAWJ TV, Dr. Fazel Hadi Wazin, an Islamic scholar, offered a mixed assessment:
“This Asool-nama has many positive articles but serious problems in its text and structure. It does not appear to have been written by legal and sharia experts. The positive point is that courts and judges will now have a single text to refer to, which will stop them from citing different sources for the same crime. However, if this Asool-nama is implemented without reforms, instead of bringing good, it will create more problems for our community.”1
Speaking on DW Dari, Qazi Zabihullah Ibrahimi, a former judge of the Appellate Court (Istenaf Court), delivered a sharp critique of the document’s foundations:
“The Asool-nama recently approved and signed by the Taliban’s Supreme Leader has a very weak basis in terms of reference (istanad) and inference (istinbat). Its authority derives from a decree of the leader, not from the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, its reference is not credible at all. This is not a law but a tarz-ul-amal (a guide for action). There are many problems within it. For example, it defines a mubtada (innovator in religion) as someone who does not follow the Hanafi school or is not Ahl al-Sunnah. But in Islamic scholarship, Ahl al-Sunnah does not label a fellow Muslim (Ahl al-Qibla) as mubtada simply for following a different school—that term is reserved for those who introduce new things into the religion itself.”
Qazi Ibrahimi also strongly criticised the code’s classification of Muslims into four categories with different legal treatments:
“A second major problem is the categorizing of Muslims into four groups: scholars (ulama) would receive a message; the noble (ashraf) would be called by a judge and advised; the middle class (mutawasit) would be called and imprisoned; and the low class would face prison and punishment. This is not Islamic. In Islam, value is only determined by piety (taqwa). This Asool-nama will not be acceptable for Afghanistan and cannot provide justice.”2
Another former judge, Qazi Abdul Momin Zia Badakhsh, also speaking on DW Dari, framed his criticism around the core purpose of Islamic law:
“Fiqh is born out of the Quran and Sunnah. If fiqh does not grant human rights and preserve human dignity (karamat-e-insan), it means nothing. This Asool-nama is not connected to the soul of Islam. There are no categories among Muslims—not by rank, not by colour. All are equal.”3
In addition to these televised debates, discussions have also unfolded on social media. On platform X, Abdul-ur-Rahman Mahmod, a Kabul-based religious scholar with close ties with the Islamic Emirate, praised the code. He posted that the “the opposition don’t even understand the differences between Tazir (discretionary punishment) and Hadd (fixed punishment) for crimes like adultery, theft, and murder, Islamic law has prescribed specific punishment where a king and a beggar are equal” and praised its provisions on narcotics and human trafficking as aligned with Islamic principles.4
2. Diplomatic Engagements: Consolidating Regional Ties
January saw the Taliban administration continue its diplomatic push to solidify relations with regional powers, most notably India. In a significant development, an Indian technical delegation visited Kabul to discuss the reopening of the Indian Embassy. While formal recognition is not yet on the table, these talks represent a pragmatic shift, focusing on trade, humanitarian aid, and consular services for Afghan nationals.
This overture toward Delhi comes against a backdrop of strained relations with Pakistan. Armed clashes along the border in recent months and Pakistan’s continued public accusations that Kabul hosts anti-Pakistan militants have heightened regional tensions. Pakistan has reacted warily to the Kabul-Delhi talks, framing the growing relationship as a potential threat to its own national interests and openly questioning the Taliban’s diplomatic priorities.
For the landlocked Islamic Emirate, the engagement is driven by acute necessity. With key trade routes through Pakistan frequently closed or severely disrupted, Afghanistan faces urgent shortages, particularly in vital medicines and medical supplies. Securing an alternative trade and humanitarian corridor through India is therefore seen in Kabul as an economic and public health imperative, adding a layer of practical urgency to the diplomatic manoeuvring. This move is widely interpreted as an effort by New Delhi to maintain a strategic foothold and counterbalance Pakistan’s influence, indicating a careful regional recalibration in engagement with the Islamic Emirate.5
3. Security Challenges: ISIS-K’s Persistent Threat and Aerial Sovereignty
Security remained a primary concern. While the Taliban leadership consistently asserts that ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province) has been defeated, deprived of territorial control, and finished as a conventional force, ISIS-K demonstrated its enduring capacity as an active network. A high-profile attack on a restaurant frequented by foreign nationals in Kabul in mid-January, resulting in multiple casualties, underscored its ability to strike soft targets in the heart of the capital. This directly challenges the Taliban’s public security narrative and has fuelled rumours and anxiety in Kabul of potential further attacks in the city centre.
Separately, an unarmed US surveillance drone crashed in Wardak province. The recovery of the wreckage, which bore clear US manufacturing labels, provided tangible proof of persistent foreign aerial surveillance over Afghan airspace. The Taliban’s Defence Ministry condemned the incursion as a violation of sovereignty. In response, senior officials have repeatedly stated that securing the country’s airspace remains a critical vulnerability and have publicly emphasized an urgent national priority: acquiring modern technical knowledge and capabilities to monitor and defend Afghan skies.6
References:
- صحنهی امروز: هشدار از اعتراض به قوانین طالبان – Sahnaie Emroz
↩︎ - اصولنامه جزایی محاکم طالبان؛ آیا عدالت با طبقه بندی انسانها تامین میشود؟
↩︎ - اصولنامه جزایی محاکم طالبان؛ آیا عدالت با طبقه بندی انسانها تامین میشود؟
↩︎ - جزايي أصولنامه أو أفغان غرب پرستان. ↩︎
- Taliban diplomat to take charge of Afghan embassy in New Delhi ↩︎
- ISIL claims Kabul attack on Chinese restaurant that killed seven people
↩︎
