CORDOBA RESEARCH PAPERS

Dialogue Processes after the 2011 Arab Uprisings

Abdel-Fattah Mady

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Cordoba Foundation of Geneva (CFG)

The Cordoba Foundation of Geneva (CFG) is a Swiss non-governmental non-profit organisation working on peace promotion. The CFG was established in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2002 to foster research and dialogue on peace issues, and to promote exchange between cultures and civilisations in the spirit that prevailed in 10th-centrury Cordoba. The Andalusian city called the "Capital of Spirit" remains an almost unique model for peaceful coexistence and for the cross-fertilisation of ideas. The CFG focuses on tensions and polarisations in all societies where Muslims live, and aims to enhance theoretical and practical conflict transformation resources in Muslim majority countries.

North Africa and West Asia in Transformation (NAWAT)

The NAWAT program was launched in 2010 within the framework of the so-called "Arab Spring" that led to new dynamics, new forms of political action and to a call for freedom, citizenship and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa region. Within this context, the interplay of religion and politics and the role of religiously inspired political actors are more critical than ever. In many countries of the region, disputes around religious and secular worldviews in politics are pervasive. The emergence of new political actors has a significant impact towards opportunities for peaceful transitions and pluralist societies or approaches leading to increased tensions.

Reinforcing mechanisms[1] for the transformation[2] of violent, or

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[1] Conflict transformation mechanism is a structure or process within society for ensuring that change occurs, and that differences and conflicts are addressed in a non-violent manner. The concept of citizenship is instrumental for such mechanisms, encapsulating the principles of civic state (Dawla Madanyah) including political pluralism, inclusiveness and human rights, and implying that citizens are the basic political entity or building bloc of the civic state.

[2] Conflict Transformation is changing the way of dealing with conflicts by empowering parties and enhancing mutual recognition so as to minimize the use of violence. It involves dealing with direct and indirect/structural causes and aspects of conflict.

potentially violent, political conflicts with a religious dimension, the program's objective is to contribute to peaceful coexistence between groups with different worldviews. Jointly implemented by the CFG and the "Religion-Politics-Conflict" desk of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the program aims at enhancing the capacity and networks of conflict transformation actors, developing a common and collective understanding of conflicts and supporting local transformation initiatives.

Acknowledgement

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Preface

This study concluded in November 2014. It aimed to examine dialogue processes conducted or initiated in four Arab Spring countries—Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt and Libya. Undoubtedly, no study can keep pace with the rapid acceleration of events in the Arab region in recent years.

Of these four countries, perhaps the most politically stable is Tunisia, in spite of its deteriorating security and economic status. The national dialogue has accomplished a successful transition of power to a democratically elected government, but Tunisia still needs more dialogue in order to tackle its economic, social and security problems. Moreover, Tunisia faces immense political, economic, security and external challenges. As a result of the government failing to fulfill its promises for economic improvement, it is also encountering conflicts between those who want to keep to the status quo and shield their economic privileges and those who aspire to actualize the revolution's demands and attain social justice for all impoverished and underprivileged classes. In a country that lacks any form of a transitional justice system, the judicial decree that annulled the confiscation of the estates of the toppled president and of his relatives, has led to a soaring fear of the influence of counterrevolutionary supporters. Moreover, the authority of the president has increased, even though the constitution has delegated vast authority to the government rather than the president. The political role played by the Tunisian General Labour Union has also increased, as it mobilizes the masses for factional demonstrations. The draft law on reconciliation in economic and financial areas (released July 2015) has also stoked public demonstrations, particularly in the Mineral Basin region and other districts in the south. In addition, social media and popular campaigns such as "Where's the oil?" have been launched, protesting how Tunisia's wealth is managed. Other major challenges include foreign intervention in Tunisian political affairs, suspicious funding gained by some political actors from regional powers, the repercussions of the events in Libya and Egypt, and the so-called war on terrorism.

In Yemen, the government was ousted and the national dialogue collapsed when the Ansar Allah group (known as

the Houthis) resorted to violence in September 2014. As shown in the study, the Houthis are the most challenging problem facing the implementation of the dialogue outputs. The Houthis, backed by the toppled president's military forces, seized Sana'a and Aden on the pretense of corruption and rising prices. This military intervention resulted in a devastating war (the seventh war stirred up by the Houthis), which was not confined to only a civil war but became a wide regional war. The Iranian support for Houthis has spurred the Saudi military intervention via a regional alliance aimed at containing Iranian influence.[1] As the war continues into 2015, several dialogue initiatives have failed (in Riyadh in May, in Geneva in June, and an initiative by the UN Security Council in September). There is no doubt that the Yemeni situation has had dire consequences. In addition to the destruction, displacement and human suffering caused by the wars, the conflict in Yemen has been transformed into a tribal, sectarian and regional conflict. Furthermore, the influence of Al-Qaeda has persisted and increased, along with other deep-rooted problems such as poverty, feeble state institutions, weapons circulation, and the Southern issue.

In Egypt, no dialogue initiative has been introduced in the last two years, although security problems, particularly in Sinai, have escalated, the economic status has deteriorated, and the political arena has reached a deadlock. The regime persists in a zero-sum conflict with the opposition, which not only includes the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, but also whoever does not line up with, and support, the regime; and even with those who suggest reconciliation or a dialogue! The regime has a twofold policy: to deploy an oppressive security force that excludes and represses all dissent, and to establish a political system that creates a one-man state, nurtures corruption, and confiscates political life. The regime utilizes several tools to promote such a policy inside Egypt and abroad. Firstly, the notion of the war against terror is used to justify repression of the opposition, to silence dissent, and to issue a series of laws that shackle political life, syndicate activism, student unions and civil society. Secondly, propaganda campaigns are used to air many fallacies via state-owned and privately owned media. Thirdly, a series of judicial sentences are issued against the opposition to give a false impression of the regime's respect for the

law and judicial rulings. Fourthly, promotion campaigns for massive economic projects are launched in order to gain popular support and to raise high expectations among the masses. The regime is also backed by foreign powers. It has formed a number of alliances with authoritarian regional and international countries that have always been antagonistic to the Arab Spring revolutions. The regime has also received financial and moral support from the West, with the latter reinstituting its double-standard policy regarding democracy in the Arab world. The so-called war on terrorism has helped the regime build its alliances and relations, as it embarks on creating the impression that it is the only country that can combat terrorism and revitalize religious discourse.

As indicated in the study, Libya has had its share of dialogue initiatives and of argument among dialogue initiators. Since the collapse of the Libyan-elected government, Libya has suffered from severe political divisions and persistent military conflicts in several cities. About a year ago, an international dialogue was initiated, led by the United Nations envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon. The dialogue aimed at a ceasefire and disarmament, and at establishing a national unity government in a transitional phase during which a constitution would be issued and stable institutions would be elected. The dialogue sessions started without representatives of the Tripoli's National Conference, who joined the dialogue later. In addition, in March 2015 Algeria called for another complementary dialogue round. However, Algeria's voice has never been heard. The UN envoy has declared that an agreement was drafted in September 2015, which stipulates the formation of a power-sharing government, with the Tobruk Parliament as the legislative authority. It will also establish the State Supreme Council, which will be tasked with giving opinions regarding bills sent by the government to the parliament. Such agreement is yet problematic; particularly since all the various parties must approve of it, exert their efforts to implement it, and agree on the method of forming the Supreme Council. Moreover, Libya faces other challenges that must be resolved, such as persistently ignoring the dialogue rounds of influential political actors; and the intervention by regional powers that support certain actors and their attempts to transform the conflict into a zero-sum game with the Islamic political actors of Tripoli, as well as their

attempts to utterly eradicate them, as was the case in Egypt. Furthermore, the influence of Al-Qaeda and ISIS has increased in Libya in the midst of persistent conflicts among political Factions. Other obstacles in the path to a Libyan state include weapons circulation and the domination of tribal and regional pride.

Therefore, the struggle of the Arab peoples for freedom and democratic institutions is being demolished through a set of negative practices, most important of which are: misunderstanding the peaceful message sent by the Arab youth; the violent war declared against moderate Islam; regional and international intervention; and the West's double standards. Such practices are the main reason for terrorism because they force the youth to join violent groups and force the entire region into the so-called war against terrorism, transforming the people's struggle for freedom into a zero-sum game where, inevitably, all is lost. Furthermore, protecting the old regimes' elites, rather than holding them accountable, will only lead to empowering the counterrevolutionary forces in the region and to re-establishing new authoritarian regimes, or to devastating civil and regional wars.

These four countries, among other Arab countries, will never overcome their crises until they start fulfilling the demands of the 2011 revolutions. This will be achieved only by fully understanding the essence of the conflict—the struggle for dignity, freedom, social justice, the rule of law, and other liberties—and by focusing on how to install values and the mechanisms that guarantee the enforcement of such goals. Any suggested dialogues must be attuned to the requirements and mechanisms of tackling these demands. Such dialogues must be based on democracy and human rights as strategic options that can salvage the region and the entire world from the dire consequences of war and from the collapse of the region's countries.

Abdel-Fattah Mady

Washington DC, November 1, 2015

Introduction

This study aims to understand and evaluate the different cases of dialogue that took place –or the attempts that some of the parties tried to exert so that a dialogue would take place– in the wake of democratic revolutions in four Arab countries, namely, Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt and Libya.

The study attempts to examine these dialogue processes at all stages, i.e. starting from the overall context of the dialogue, or the context within which the dialogue took place, as well as the design of the dialogue process and the dialogue outputs, and ending with the challenges that stood before the implementation of the dialogue outcomes, in addition to exploring the possibility of having other dialogues in the future.

All this analysis is continued further to include some suggestions for supporting and assisting the implementation of future initiatives for conflict transformation, peace promotion and enhancing democratization processes in the countries under study.

The study's methodology was based on the democratic regime transition approach; which is the approach that cares for analyzing the choices and attitudes of key actors during and throughout the process of transition to democracy, with a focus on the methods for introducing a revolutionary change.

Hence, the study is carried out to highlight the impact of these choices and attitudes on the process of change, while its analysis does not ignore the overall "context" of the determinants that interplayed before and after the revolutions, affecting those choices and attitudes. There is no doubt that the political actors' choices do not interact in a vacuum, and thus, the economic, social and political determinants would inevitability interact with each other; yet, without overruling the impact of the "human will" as a key factor in the matter, shaping the structure and flow of the process.

Data collection techniques included an in-depth observation of the underlying dialogue processes and attempts for dialogue

that took place in the countries under study. This was carried out through examining and comprehending the literature, reports and the preparatory work for the dialogues, in addition to the dialogue meetings and the relevant statements, as well as the writings and works of experts and commentators specialized in the affairs of these countries.

The study is divided into four sections and a conclusion, while each case study addresses a number of questions in four areas, namely:[2]

First, the general context and the explored possibility of dialogue: What is the general context in which the process of dialogue has taken place, or the context accompanying the call for dialogue? What are the attributes of the phase that followed the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in the countries under study? What are the initial interrelations that existed between the major parties? What is the extent of the ability of these parties to participate in a genuine effective dialogue? Why did the need for dialogue appear in the first place?

Second, the design of the dialogue process: Had there been a pre-developed strategy for dialogue; with clear objectives and specific means? Had the various core issues and interests of each party been identified? Had the measures to build confidence between the parties been identified? Had there been a clear structure to the process of dialogue? Had the necessary resources been identified for the dialogue, as well as the means of communication and the time frames? Had the effective governance procedures for ensuring effective governance for the dialogue been identified? Is there a role for a third party, be it local, regional or international? Had the dialogue used the assistance of experts?

Third, the implementation of the process of dialogue and its outputs: Has the dialogue been comprehensive and inclusive? How the dialogue sessions, its activities and deliberations took place? Had the parties of the dialogue adhered to the methodology that had already been designed? What ways were used to address difficult situations? What were the positions of each party towards the key issues? What was the role of the third

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party? Was this role neutral? How were the outputs of the dialogue developed? Had there been written documents that emerged as a result of the dialogue? How effective was the dialogue process, and how could this effectiveness be evaluated? What were the effects of the dialogue on the relations among the parties involved in the process of dialogue? Had the dialogue yielded common ground or common interests among the parties involved or had the dialogue revealed more conflict of views and confrontation among the parties? Had the dialogue led to specific change on the personal and the institutional levels for the various parties? Had the dialogue contributed to the transformation of conflicts and disputes? Had the dialogue consequently led to starting a political path to strengthen the democratic transition?

Fourth, the challenges of the dialogue process: What are the obstacles that emerged during and after the process of dialogue? Had there been certain obstacles that came from the parties that did not participate in the dialogue? Had the process of dialogue shown or revealed new obstacles that were not considered by the dialogue methodology designers? Had the resources formed an obstacle to the dialogue? To what extent is it possible to say that the overall context determinants represented a major obstacle to the dialogue? Was there internal or external pressure to abort the dialogue or to help it succeed?

It is worth mentioning that the Tunisian and Yemeni cases witnessed organized dialogue processes, and thus, both cases produced specific fruitful outputs. Moreover, these outputs found their way to implementation in Tunisia, while they could not be applied in Yemen till now. While Egypt and Libya did not witness true comprehensive dialogue processes, but only very limited conversational experiences. These experiments did not entail any considerable path for conflict transformation or the promotion of a transition towards democracy. Therefore, the study addressed the cases of Tunisia and Yemen linked to the afore-mentioned four axes, while the Egyptian and Libyan cases had been reviewed taking into account the overall context in which the so-called dialogue took place, as well as displaying the limited attempts for dialog that were made, together with

some suggestions from the researcher's side towards the establishment of a comprehensive dialogue in the future.

At the end of this study, I included a number of comparative conclusions that highlight the main results of the study and state the most elementary lessons learned from each dialogue process, as well as the most important focal points that can be utilized and built upon in the future towards proposing new initiatives to transform conflicts and promote the process of democratization.

Abdel-Fattah Mady

Alexandria, December 5, 2014

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1— Tunisia

Despite the brutality of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's regime, Tunisia has a considerably vital middle class and educational system. It also has a moderate Islamist stream in comparison to its counterparts in other countries, as well as responsible civil society organizations.[3] These factors, among others, contributed to initiating a successful dialogue as compared to the other three cases. Such a dialogue has yielded applicable results, despite all of the challenges encountered. This section addresses the questions posed regarding the general context of the dialogue, the dialogue organization and implementation, and the challenges.

1.1— The general context

1.1.1— Security

Tunisia has faced security problems following the ousting of the old regime, as in all similar cases. As a result of the inability of the post-revolution governments to make reforms to the security forces, a series of problems have occurred, including the assassination of the spokesperson of the Popular Front, Chokri Belaïd, in February 2013, and the left-wing parliament member and founder of the Popular Stream, Mohammed Al-Brahmi, in July 2013, followed by the bombing of a tank that killed eight soldiers in the Al-Sha'bney Mountains on the border with Algeria. As a result, the discourse of a "war against terror" and the vocabulary of Ben Ali's regime about security and order were heard once again. On October 25th, 2013, the National Union of the Syndicates of the Security Forces issued a statement, requesting the release of the security officers who were being prosecuted following the revolution.[4] In addition, Tunisia has suffered from human trafficking and organized crimes.[5]

Transitional President Mohamed Moncef Marzouki considered the counterrevolution inside and outside Tunisia and

the Jihadist Salafi groups to be responsible for the violence. Some members in the Constituent Council from the Al-Nahda party argue that the old regime has incited some of the Salafi activists to commit violence. Others believe that countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Algeria have penetrated the Salafi movements in order to interrupt the process of democratic transition. In the meantime, the opposition parties have accused Al-Nahda of ignoring the security problems, direct collusion with Salafis, or finding reinforcement from Salafis to combat secularists.[6]

The so-called "Jihadist Salafis" have become an active player in post-revolution Tunisian politics. Historically, such groups appeared in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the 1990s. Afterwards, some Jihadist fighters returned from Syria following the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. Such groups embrace extremist ideologies, and do not believe in borders separating the Muslim nations. They have also targeted police forces and foreign embassies. Their political presence has caused the escalation of Islamist-secular polarization, as secular parties have accused Al-Nahda of not dealing with Salafi parties.[7]

Among all of these security challenges, uncontrolled media in the aftermath of the revolution has, directly and indirectly, encouraged violence and established social fissures and political polarization.[8]

1.1.2— Transitional phase

During the transitional phase, Tunisia relied on the electoral legitimacy represented in electing transitional institutions (the Constituent National Assembly (CNA), a transitional president, and a transitional government).[9] The proportional representation that resulted from the first elections has negatively affected the Tunisian political realm, as it established electoral contestation in the transitional phase, whereas more agreement and cooperation were required.

Over time, the transitional legitimacy of elections declined

and lost credibility among cross-sections of society. This is a result of several incidents, such as the extension of the Constituent Assembly term, despite the stipulation of the document signed by 11 political parties on September 15th, 2011, that this was a non-extendible year beginning after the elections. In addition, the authorities of the Constituent Assembly (the Authorities Law was approved on December 2nd, 2013) were also disputed, as the council extended its authorities, which were limited to drafting the constitution and managing the interim phase, to encompass all functions of any parliament, such as determining the government's authority, supervising the government, voting for or against the government's legitimacy, and law enactment. The opposition parties refused such authorities and argued that the majority is forcing its will on the minority.[10]

During the transitional phase, the conflict over the constitution escalated. A series of draft constitutions were written without any agreement upon some pivotal issues, such as building a civil state, the state-religion relationship, the independence of the three powers, women's rights, liberties, and what was known as the Revolution Immunization Law.[11] The Constituent Assembly also failed to elect the nine members of the electoral organization.

Furthermore, Al-Jebali's government was criticized for its partisan formation and accused of the Islamization of bureaucratic institutions.[12] Another accusation made against Al-Nahda was that it lacked experience, although others saw that it was not actually ruling because of the great influence that the old regime had on many significant sectors, such as the judiciary and the media.[13]

The conflict between the government and its opposition escalated, due to the weakness of the government's economic performance and its inability to make crucial reforms and fulfill its promises regarding development and security. In addition, the government hesitated to decide on a system for transitional justice, which has created fault lines in Tunisia, as some called for gradual reforms, while others pushed for boycotting the old regime and moving forward to solve all highly serious issues,

and to take decisive measures regarding the economy.[14]

The ruling parties encountered internal problems, such as the agitation of Al-Nahda's grassroots members, resulting from the party's alliance with ideologically different parties. In addition, some MPs resigned from the alliance of the Al-Itihad and Al-Takatol parties and joined other parties or founded new ones.[15]

Some laws that the Constituent Assembly planned to issue caused new challenges. The opposition parties refused the government's attempts to issue a law that prohibits blasphemy or a law that gives Shari'a a constitutional form.[16] Enacting an isolation law to be applied to the members of the former ruling party represented a challenge for the elected institutions that faced pressures from two actors. The first was the revolutionary forces, the martyrs and the injured families who were calling for the isolation of the former regime's officials from political life. The second set of actors was the old regime, which reappeared in the Tunisian political realm and strongly opposed such a law.[17]

Other factors that helped deepen the government-opposition conflict included the political role of the Tunisian General Union for Labor (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*-the UGTT), as Al-Nahda accused the UGTT of agitating protests and sit-ins, and considered the UGTT as merely a wing of the leftist parties. Although the UGTT sided with the protests against the government, it agreed to conduct a dialogue and became the major mediator, as will be discussed, later.[18]

The national leagues for protecting the revolution, which were spontaneously formed in December 2010 to protect the revolution, were legalized in order to confront the counterrevolution and retain electoral legality. Yet, they became another disputable issue between the government and opposition. In addition, some parties were not satisfied with their proportional representation in the Constituent Assembly, and have since formed parallel entities. Many other civil associations were formed as a front for political and ideological parties.[19] Some have also talked about the foreign subsidies

granted to various television channels, such as France 24.[20]

1.1.3— Political divide and the reinstatement of the old regime

The revolution, which was initiated by the youth, was dominated by the traditional parties and politicians who were never able to consolidate the youth's demands and aspirations with an applicable revolutionary vision that could radically and crucially alter the power relations in politics, the economy, and society. The result was the feeble proportional representation of youth participating in the transitional phase, in addition to widening the gap between traditional politicians and young revolutionaries.

Such a gap was clearly felt in the political split that took place nearly two years after the revolution among the three main divisions of traditional parties and actors.[21] The first division included the ruling parties (Troika), i.e., Al-Nahda and its two allies (the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Bloc for Labor and Liberties). This bloc adhered to a political discourse that constantly confirmed electoral legitimacy and its resultant institutions. Both Al-Nahda and the Congress party refused to conduct a dialogue with Nedaa Tunis (the Call for Tunisia Party), as they considered that it had conspired against the revolution and that it was merely an extension of the former ruling party. However, the assassination of Al-Brahmi and the huge protests in Tunisia forced Al-Nahda to compromise and participate in dialogue.

As for the second bloc, it represented the opposition and was led by a party called "Nedaa Tunis" (the Call of Tunisia), which was founded by Baji Caid el Sebsi in 2012. The party included a combination of liberals, the old regime's officials, some left-wing activists and union representatives. Nedaa Tunis joined an alliance called "The Union for Tunisia," with the Social Path Party and the Republican Party,[22] in addition to a number of the dissolved ruling parties preceding the revolution, businessmen, and intellectual figures. Such a bloc had feeble

proportional representation in the Constituent Assembly, yet demanded consensual legitimacy.

Moreover, a third bloc was less influential and was represented by the Popular Front that included radical left parties (the Labor Party, the Democratic National Party and the Arab Nationalists). This Front had a sound influence on unions and human rights organizations, yet it had no influence on the Constituent Assembly and no grassroots. The Front also posed as a revolutionary power, although it had no specific vision or plans.[23]

Other factors undoubtedly helped to reinstate the former regime's political figures. A first factor would be the Islamic-secular conflict and contestation of the desired political regime, as well as the internal weaknesses of those parties. In addition, there was the despotic legacy of the political culture handed over by Ben Ali's regime, as parties were marginalized by what were called the "deep state's institutions" of the old regime. These deep state institutions have had the upper hand with the media, the financial realm and foreign relations. Some consider that the alliance of the secular parties and Mubarak's officials in Egypt reinforced the formation of a similar alliance in Tunisia, in addition to the support granted by foreign embassies to the opposition.[24]

1.1.4— The Egyptian spillover into Tunisia

Events in Egypt brought an end to the democratic path, following the military coup on July 3rd, 2013 that resulted in the ousting of the elected president, dissolution of the elected institutions and the suspension of the constitution. Such incidents had a great influence on events in Tunisia, as a "National Salvation Front" was formed on June 26th, 2013 in order to confront Nahda and its allies. The new alliance included the Popular Front, Nedaa Tunis, the Union for Tunisia, several socialist and liberal parties, an insubordination movement (Tamarud), and a number of civil and human rights organizations. This alliance managed to organize several

protests during the spring of 2013, and started an open strike in the hall of the Constituent Assembly.

The opposition blockaded the assembly in order to force its dissolution, as well as that of its resultant institutions, and to form a national provisional government. The opposition also demanded the formation of a committee for drafting the constitution and the dissolution of national leagues protecting the revolution, in addition to demanding military intervention, as was the case in Egypt. In turn, the majority in the Constituent Council enacted a similar sit-in inside the hall, which led to the suspension of the Constituent Assembly and the constitution, and increased political polarization.

Nevertheless, the Tunisian military remained impartial. Such a stand taken by the Tunisian military was undoubtedly different from that of the Egyptian military, as the latter was the institution that founded the Republic of Egypt post-1952, and has been considered an integral part of the political and economic realms of Egypt since then, in addition to being influential in foreign relations. Following the January 2011 revolution, the military dominated the transitional phase, making arrangements with the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies on the one hand, and forming alliances with their opponents post-June 30th, on the other hand. In Tunisia, a virtue of Al-Habib Bourguiba's reign was that he had never implicated the military in politics. Moreover, the Egyptian middle class was extremely inactive, as compared to the vital Tunisian middle class.[25]

Al-Nahda is utterly different from the Muslim Brotherhood political party of Egypt. Al-Nahda has never dominated the political realm in Tunisia. In addition, there were more vital discussions regarding the constitution, which was not the case in Egypt. More compromises were made during discussions,[26] completely unlike the Egyptian discussions where two constitutions were rapidly ratified: the first one by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies, and the other one by non-Islamic political actors.

1.1.5— The economic aspect

All such political situations have negatively affected the economy. Tunisia has been suffering from a considerable budget shortage as a result of the rise in wages and increased patrimonial aids. Despite the U.S. loan (500 million dollars) and other subsidies,[27] the economic crisis necessitated more austerity measures and more structural economic reforms.[28] The deteriorating security status has caused a consequent deterioration of tourism, investments, and foreign currency reserves. The increasing prices of commodities and fuel have led to further economic decline. The inability of successive governments to make developmental policies has created pressure to achieve political stability and continue the democratic transition.

To sum up, the former situations related to the general political and economic contexts have urged the political actors to realize the significance of conducting dialogue in order to resolve the political crisis, ratify a constitution, and issue an electoral law in order to achieve political stability and elect institutions that could tackle the economic, social and security challenges.

1.2— Dialogue formation

The dialogue in Tunisia required a mediator who had considerable credibility and could initiate dialogue among the rival parties, away from electoral contestation. Some of these features were found in the Labor Union (the UGTT), although the UGTT was motivated by some partisan considerations, and there was some distrust between Al-Nahda, as the most prominent party in political life, and the UGTT, during the first two years following the revolution. The mutual trust was rebuilt as they both realized the need for transcending the past and looking to the future.

As a result, the UGTT, which had a well-known history,[29]

offered to play the role of mediator so as to be able to rebuild confidence among all parties and form a four-power committee (called the quartet) that could use pressure to urge all parties to conduct a dialogue. The other three parties participating in the committee would be the Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade & Handicrafts, the Tunisian Bar Association, and the Tunisian Organization for Human Rights. Civil society would also play an incomparable role, as will be demonstrated later.

The process of dialogue formation was well accomplished. The UGTT was comprehensively aware of the Tunisian general political context, and of the current priorities. Thus, the UGTT successfully led the quartet, as it resulted in a sound structuring of dialogue and persuading most of the main political parties to attend. However, the quartet limited the dialogue to the 12 parties represented in the Constituent Assembly, irrespective of their proportional representation in the assembly. A representative of each party attended, except for the parties that refused to participate in the dialogue, Al-Waf'a and the Conference party. In practical tems, the dialogue participants did not nominate a candidate for prime minister without Al-Nahda's approval. Thus, there was a kind of compromise that balanced electoral legitimacy, represented by the Constituent Assembly and Al-Nahda on the one hand, and consensual legitimacy represented by dialogue, on the other hand.[30]

The dialogue sessions set out the main debatable issues, asked experts for help, and stated the priorities. The quartet reached a four-power initiative that had three main paths: the governmental path (forming a non-partisan technocratic government), the constitutional path, and the electoral path. Three committees were formed during the dialogue so as to implement the three paths. The quartet also set a deadline of four weeks.

International players had no direct role in the dialogue. The reason such dialogue achieved satisfactory results is that there was no direct or blunt foreign intervention, as was the case with Yemen and Egypt. Of course, no one can deny that there was some foreign presence behind the scenes, particularly from France. As a result, some international powers blocked the

subsidies dedicated to the democratic transition, in order to urge the parties to participate in the dialogue.[31] The stability of Tunisia was in the interests of most regional and international countries. Algeria, for instance, sought the stabilization of Tunisia, as it had concerns regarding its own internal security situation. Rashid Al-Ghannoushi and el Sebsi also paid several visits to Algeria. The European Union and the United States considered that the crisis in Tunisia might have negative spillovers and might also result in more illegal immigration to Europe. The Arab Gulf countries and the Jihadist organizations were generally the parties that might be most harmed by the dialogue.[32]

1.3— Implementation of the dialogue and its outcomes

The dialogue began on October 25th, 2013, amidst several positive factors that successfully contributed to its outcomes. Such factors included limited foreign interference, an impartial military, civil society mediations, and the moderate positions of Islamic and secular rivals. Al-Nahda accepted the dialogue as well as the UGTT as a mediator, in addition to revoking the amendments made in the regulations of the Constituent Assembly, in which the opposition never took part. The Prime Minister, Ali Al-Areed, also promised to resign. The road map declared on September 17th, 2013 was designed, and signed, by all political parties, except for the Conference and Al-Mahaba parties.[33]

The dialogue sessions were held in the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, as the participants were involved in long negotiations fostered by the quartet. The sessions were halted more than once because of differences amongst participants regarding prime ministerial nominations, in addition to the constant demands made by the opposition for dissolving the Constituent Assembly, and some debatable articles in the constitution and the election law. There were also differences among the participants regarding the judicial review

of the Constituent Council over the upcoming government and the Electoral Commission, after the High Court suspended the counting process of the candidates in September 2013.[34]

Although Al-Nahda accepted the quartet initiative during the opening session of the dialogue conference, the party's leaders voiced different views that raised questions regarding Al-Nahda's commitment to the initiative. Some believed that the initiative was a foundation for dialogue and that its articles were not obligatory but were posed solely for discussion. On the day talks began, the consultation council of Al-Nahda issued a statement demonstrating that Al-Nahda had accepted the initiative as a starting point for dialogue, which meant that they were not obligated to a prior commitment, and called for "the present government to continue its tasks until the Constituent Assembly accomplishes its missions."[35]

Al-Nahda agreed to step down, although at first it did not accept handing over power to a non-elected government. Al-Ghannoushi also wrote to Al-Nahda's grassroots, assuring them that the party had handed over power but still had authority,[36] considering that the upcoming government, from Al-Ghannoushi's point of view, would be restricted and limited until the elections begin. He also said, "Although Al-Nahda has compromised in numerous ways, it is still on the right path, not defeated, as long as we seek the interests of Tunisia. If we lose authority now, it shall return, yet if we lose Tunisia's security and stability, that will be our defeat."[37]

Al-Nahda also agreed that the constitution would contain guarantees for freedom of conscience, liberties for women, banning accusations of apostasy, and incitement of violence. Yet Al-Nahda insisted on retaining authority over the Constituent Assembly. The UGTT also supported this until the constitution was ratified and the election date set.[38] Al-Nahda managed to retain authority over the Constituent Assembly as a result of its adherence to displaying political flexibility and making compromises for the future, in addition to its commitment to democracy and retaining freely-elected institutions.

Critics have noted that the dialogue outcome was somehow

against Islamists, as the road map mostly reflected the interests of the opposition (a secular constitution and a technocratic government). In fact, Al-Nahda lost a relative proportion of its coherence as a result of its agitated grassroots. Some observers believed that Al-Ghannoushi's relative flexibility, pragmatic methods, and vision for gradual reform were the reasons for Al-Nahda making compromises. Others believe that the Egyptian scenario was another factor restricting Al-Nahda's maneuverability, which made it a voluntarily hand over power for fear of mirroring the Egyptian destiny.[39]

The dialogue also clearly demonstrated political fissures amongst the opposition, as the Salvation Front quarreled while nominating a prime minister and the Republican Party withdrew from the Union for Tunisia. The Popular Front's participation was restricted, as it had some conditions for accepting the outcomes, such as reconsidering the budget of 2014 and forming a committee to reconsider the posts appointed by the former Al-Nahda government. Some internal splits also appeared in Nedaa Tunis, and there were calls for reviving the Constitutional Assembly Party.[40]

Some political actors attempted to politicize the UGTT. On December 9th, 2013, el Sebsi demanded that the quartet should be a participant in, not a mediator of, the dialogue. The leftist leader, Hamma Hammami, demanded that the president of the UGTT, Hassan Al-Abbasy, should be nominated for the role of prime minister.[41]

The dialogue approved the inseparability of three paths, i.e. ratifying the constitution, electing the Independent High Authority for Elections, and changing the government. The outcomes of the dialogue were represented in the text of the quartet initiative, declared on December 23rd, 2013, which laid out the following measures:[42]

- Continuing the constituent council.
- Forming a government of efficient figures, headed by an independent figure, provided that the government's officials would not run for the upcoming elections to be held for electing the government. The government

should pledge to resign afterwards. The new government should have full authority, and should not accept a regulation against it unless signed by half of the Constituent Council members. A vote of no confidence should be ratified by at least two thirds of its members.

- Choosing the members of the Independent High Authority for Elections within one week.
- Enactment of the electoral law within two weeks.
- Setting the date for elections within two weeks.
- Ratifying the constitution within four weeks with the consultation of experts.
- Adherence to continuing the dialogue for discussion of any other debatable issues.

In fact, the short deadlines set in the dialogue were not sensible. There remained a number of undecided matters, such as setting the time for, and arrangements of, the elections, particularly following the enactment of the electoral law in May 2014, which dropped the Isolation Law that was issued for excluding the former regime's officials, stated the constituencies, and ratified the quota system, taking the highest remaining proportions into consideration. Each party had its own views regarding these issues.

Al-Nahda supported the choice of the inseparability of the three paths, the left wing was for conducting the parliamentary elections first, and Nedaa Tunis was for conducting the presidential elections first. However, it was decided that the parliamentary elections were to be conducted in October, with the presidential elections taking place in December 2014.

As for the prime minister, firstly, Ali Mostafa Al-Felaly (92-years-old) was nominated; then, Ahmed Al-Mastery, and Mohammed Al-Nasser. Finally, Mahdi Gomaa, who was the minister of petroleum in Al-Areed's government, was elected via voting that was not consensual, as nine parties voted for him, seven abstained, and the Republic Party withdrew. Some objected to voting for Gomaa as he was close to the ruling Troika bloc. Others also criticized the process of electing the prime minister by voting rather than through consensus.

1.4— Evaluation of the dialogue and post-dialogue challenges

The first accomplishment of the dialogue was that it showed that there were more common interests than differences between participants. Al-Ghannoushi and other moderate Islamists realized that the democratic path should continue and that it would be preferable for Al-Nahda to hand over power to an interim consensual government. In the meantime, el-Sebsi and several moderate secular parties realized that political Islam had become a social and political reality and that the best alternative to political chaos was dialogue and agreement.[43] Practice is surely the only way to prove how firm such stances are, to confirm the commitment to democracy and the constitution, and to present true political programs that are committed to the public interest.

Generally, the impact of the events in Egypt was positive for Tunisians, as Al-Nahda was urged to be moderate in its demands and to make some compromises. The instability and severe human rights violations in Egypt encouraged all parties in Tunisia, including the secularists, to consider the consequences of the whole transitional path being demolished.

Another accomplishment was that the dialogue was used by the Tunisians to resolve other issues, too. The dialogue participants agreed to conduct an economic dialogue in May 2014, as they concluded that all significant issues should be resolved via national agreement.

Critics argue that the dialogue overlooked the popular will and sent political debates out of the Constituent Assembly, which represented this popular will, to other realms. This was called "the custody or tutelage" of experts and political elites of the popular will.[44] This could be theoretically correct, yet the dialogue, encompassing all parties, in addition to those represented in the Constituent Assembly, was a political decision taken as a necessary measure, which was dictated by the general context. In my opinion, it was a decision that tackled

the negative spillover of conducting elections at an early stage without firstly resorting to broad agreement. This should be judged according to whether wide participation in dialogues and agreement managed to approach the main political goals, i.e., establishing the rule of law, liberties and institutionalization. We should be aware that many of the great achievements in the history of writing constitutions and nation building were actually a result of reaching agreements and making compromises.

It is inaccurate to claim that the dialogue was merely a partisan agreement that was conducted behind closed doors or that it was not a real agreement among social players. The parties participating in the dialogue were indeed a representation of the whole political spectrum, i.e., the most prominent civil society organizations in Tunisia pre- and post-revolution and some of the old regime's officials. Moreover, the impartial military represented positive support for such a democratic path, which was a significant indication that democracy would be guaranteed. It is also worth mentioning that the democratic path and its outcomes represent an agreement in a specific historical era. It is also a result of certain circumstances and, as such, it is a renewable contract that could be amended by future generations.

On the other hand, the dialogue legitimized the reinstatement of the old regime's officials and allowed them to participate in Tunisian political life, irrespective of the political isolation that could protect the revolution, as was desired by the revolutionary actors. In fact, had the demands for establishing the rule of law, the democratic institutions, liberties, and peaceful alternation of power been accomplished, there would never have been any need for protecting the revolution from the old regime's officials, and the people would be responsible for electing their rulers later, via democratic elections. In addition, a true democratic system will have self-corrective mechanisms, such as popular supervision, and most importantly, the mechanisms of dialogue and agreement upon the methods of improving the regime, its procedures and institutions. Had the old regime's officials attempted to restore the old patterns of authority, it would have posed a great threat to the revolution and Tunisia's future, as other revolutionary waves could be expected.

Tunisia still needs to implement the transitional justice system ratified by the Constituent Assembly in December 2013. Such a system will guarantee unveiling the truth and keeping records as a reminder of former violations, holding violators accountable and prosecuting them, providing compensation, institutional reform, reconciliation, and founding a commission for truth and dignity.[45] Other debatable issues were raised during the dialogue, providing challenges to the power-sharing government, such as: reconsidering the governmental posts appointed by the Troika government; dissolving the national leagues for protecting the revolution; restricting extremists' activities; impartiality of the government; the veto that might be used by the Constituent Council against, or for, some decisions made by the government; and the potential extortion by some parties of the government, i.e. supporting it in the case of success and opposing it in case of failure.

2— Yemen

Yemen has had its share of experiments in conducting dialogue over the last two decades. After Yemeni unity in 1990, reconstructing the Yemeni state was supposed to be initiated in accordance with a unified state structure, via a transitional phase. However, as a result of the mutual distrust between the two ruling parties, i.e. the General Popular Conference party and the Socialist party, this unifying process did not affect several institutions, such as the military, security forces and others. Several personal and partisan crises led to political dialogue, which resulted in "the Document of Pact and Agreement" which was signed in Jordan and included several methods for correcting the path of unity. However, such corrections were never enforced.

In 2004, the main opposition parties managed to form a national alliance, "Aleqaa Almushtarak" or "the Joint Gathering", as it opposed Saleh's regime and offered a comprehensive reform program aiming to build a modern democratic state.[46] The Aleqaa parties agreed that tackling the South's problems should be the main focus of the comprehensive political reform in Yemen. In 2005, they suggested "the Aleqaa Project of Political and Comprehensive National Reform."[47] This project included a clarification of the crises in Yemen as well as suggesting solutions, such as establishing a parliamentary regime and resolving the South's problems by a unified state via a decentralized local system.[48]

On the heels of the presidential elections in 2006, the crisis escalated, and the parties of Aleqaa had more demands. As a result, "the Preparatory Commission of National Dialogue" was formed, which issued a new document in 2009, "the National Salvation Document" which suggested that the state could decentralize, modelling a comprehensive and just solution for the South's problems in human rights and political aspects, so that authority and wealth could be shared with the South, in addition to banning neo-patrimonial regimes, corruption and despotism.[49]

2.1— The general context

2.1.1— Saleh's legacy

Ali Abdullah Saleh's despotic legacy burdened Yemen in many aspects, such as political corruption, bequeathal of power and posts, declining liberties, lack of the rule of law, as well as the dismantling of all social and economic reform attempts due to corruption and conflicts, deterioration of the economy and human development.

In addition, the revolution was also caused by security and military problems, as revealed by the occupation of the Yemeni islands in the Red Sea by Eritrea in 1996, establishing Yemeni-Saudi borders in a unsatisfactory way for most Yemenis in 2000, and Al-Qaeda activities that led Yemen into what was known as the war against terror. Afterwards, other security problems appeared: a Hashemite Zaidi armed group (the Houthi group) in 2004 and the regime's failure to deal with the Southern movement.[50] In addition, military units subordinate to the former president, such as the Republican Guards and the Central Security Forces, as well as family and tribal members appointed to governmental posts, resulted in political, tribal and military alliances against the interests of the state and its various institutions.[51]

Such a burdensome legacy is an obstacle in the Yemeni democratic transition. As the revolution flared up, the Yemeni rebels, like their counterparts in other Arab Spring countries, sought to oust the ruling regime and alter power relations in politics and society so as to build a modern state. However, the context in Yemen and internal and foreign reactions to the revolution have turned the demands for radical revolutionary change into merely negotiations between the old regime and its allies on the one hand, and the opposition parties on the other hand, in addition to marginalizing the rebellious Yemeni youth.

Such negotiations resulted in ratifying an initiative made by

the Cooperation Council for the Gulf Arab States, which brought an end to the conflict between the revolutionary actors and Saleh's regime, paving the way to a conference for a comprehensive national dialogue.

2.1.2— The Gulf initiative

The Gulf Initiative was declared on April 3rd, 2011, following intervention by regional and international actors as mediators in the rebel-Saleh conflict. The aim, according to the initiators, was to reach an agreement among all parties to ensure a peaceful transition in Yemen. The initiative included a mechanism prepared under the supervision of the United Nations, according to Security Council Resolution no. 2014 (October 21st, 2011). After some delay, Saleh finally accepted the initiative. On November 23rd, 2011, the plan for a peaceful devolution of power was ratified in Riyadh, according to the Gulf initiative and its mechanisms. Saleh handed his post to his vice-president, Abdrabbou Mansour Hady, in exchange for granting Saleh and his family immunity against prosecution. Thereafter, the Yemeni House of Representatives ratified the immunity law, and Hady ran for president as the only candidate.[52]

In addition to procedures for peaceful devolution of power, the Gulf initiative included preparation for a comprehensive national dialogue that tackled other issues too, mainly the Southern problems, drafting a constitution, and the enactment of an electoral law. The initiative also stipulated that authority should be handed to an interim provisional government so as to run the transition through two transitional phases. The first phase was to end upon the devolution of power and to conduct snap elections for choosing a consensual president on February 21st, 2012. The second phase was to start following full devolution of power, unifying the military and the security forces under the same leadership and initiating a comprehensive national dialogue.

Following their ratification, the articles of the first phase in the initiative were implemented on time. On December 7th,

2011, Mohammed Salem Basenduh (a member of the Aleqaa) was charged with forming a power-sharing government with the General Popular Conference (the former ruling party) and the Aleqaa parties. The House of Representatives ratified the immunity law on January 21st, 2012. Presidential elections were held on time (February 21st, 2012), and Hady won 99.8% of the votes, with a turnout of 56% of total constituents.[53]

Supposedly, the second transitional phase would start, as it was to end in February 2014 with presidential and parliamentary elections following the drafting of a new constitution that included the dialogue output. During the second phase, and, according to S.C. Resolution no. 2051(2012), some proceedings were to be undertaken, such as restructuring the security forces and the military into a unified and professional entity, and ending all armed clashes, in preparation for the national dialogue. In accordance with the initiative mechanism, a presidential ordinance was issued on July 14th, 2012, that stipulated establishing "the Technical Commission for Preparing the Comprehensive National Conference,"[54] as its tasks and authorities were determined. Abdel Kareem Al-Eryany, the vice-president of the Conference Party, was appointed head of the committee.

As the initiative mechanisms determined the parties participating in the national dialogue, all Yemeni political actors, including the revolutionary ones, the social activists, women's rights advocates, and civil society organizations, such as the political parties, the young activists, the Southern movements, and the Houthis, were included. The subjects of discussion in the national dialogue included constitutional reform, the state structure, the political regime, the electoral system, the Southern turbulence, national conciliation, and transitional justice, in addition to decisions on the priorities for reconstruction, and permanent economic and social development.

The Gulf initiative actually overlooked stipulating a method that could eradicate the roots of the Yemeni conflicts. While it appeared as if it aimed at bring an end to the violence, even if it was a fragile solution, it actually reinstated the old regime rather

than altering the essence of the pattern of authority. Consequently, it contradicted the revolutionary demands and would even lead to more political fissures in the future. It should be mentioned here that merely signing an initiative is not a guarantee that conflicts would end. Some studies have indicated that only one third of all negotiations in the aftermath of civil wars between 1945 and 1993 have led to a settled peace.[55]

Some international organizations have criticized the immunity granted to Saleh and his allies. According to Amnesty International, the immunity law issued later was a violation of Yemen's international commitments, including the treaty against torture. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has confirmed that such a law exempted violators from legal persecution only inside Yemen, not internationally.[56]

2.1.3— Major actors

Since the beginning of the Yemeni state, there have been several political players, mainly the Aleqaa parties. Among those parties is the Reform Party, the main opposition Islamic alliance, which includes various political blocs, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and other activists closer to the Salafi stream, and tribal leaders. This alliance has been close to the most prominent businessmen in Yemen, as it was the most organized and influential entity. The alliance participated in the revolution and was represented in decision-making circles and the power-sharing government. The other participant in Aleqaa was the Socialist Party, which expressed its concern over some presidential ordinances regarding governmental posts in the most crucial bureaucratic institutions. In a statement issued on September 12th, 2012, the Socialist Party also warned of political exclusion and violations of the balance of the power-sharing government.[57]

While the former ruling party, the General Popular Congress, has escaped the Egyptian and Tunisian destinies, it no longer autocratically controls Yemen's authority and wealth. In addition, a division of the military institution that supported the Conference party has abandoned it. However, the former ruling

party also remains a major political player in Yemen. The former president has retained his financial powers and influence, in addition to leading the party and preventing all attempts that have aimed at internal reform. Some local, regional and international players were eager to sustain the role played by the former ruling party so as to maintain the balance among the major political actors.[58]

As for the Houthis, they previously fought in six wars against the Yemeni regime, from 2004 to 2010, gaining sympathy from some political and social actors, as some of its members were assassinated. Although some of the Houthis participated in the revolution, they have also engaged in armed confrontations in many fronts during and after the revolution, especially with the tribes of the Reform party. They have also engaged in clashes with other tribes that opposed what they considered an expansion for the Houthis in Sa'da governorate and other surrounding districts. As a result of such confrontations, several political, civil and tribal actors have opposed the Houthis.[59] The Houthis' behavior has been condemned by foreign players too, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, because they received support from Iran. Although the Houthis have refused the Gulf initiative and considered it a US-Saudi conspiracy against the revolution, they have participated in the dialogue as shall be shown herein below.

In addition to the armed Houthis, there are other politically driven armed groups, such as Al-Qaeda, some armed Southern movements, and influential and wealthy tribes that support political parties.

In 2007, the Southern turbulence started, as veteran and civil organizations arranged for a series of social protests calling for North-South separation. This was a result of Yemen's suffering from political fissures caused by pivotal issues, such as the Southern turbulence and less significant issues, such as leadership and political representation. Yemen was also penetrated by regional powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which made Yemen part of a larger conflict.[60] All these situations were reflected in the proportional representation of the Southern movements in the dialogue, as well as their participants, as shall be shown later.

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There is no doubt that young Yemeni rebels are considered a rising power, as was the case in all Arab Spring revolutions. However, because traditional powers took control after the revolution, the young rebels were not represented in a unified political bloc. Rather, they were scattered among political parties and civil organizations of various affiliations, in addition to young politicians who worked independently. Moreover, they had different points of view regarding the most significant issues. Some opposed settlement with the former regime and demanded justice for those killed during the revolution. Others supported settlement and believed in political reconciliation, whereas the rest of them thought that it was necessary to retain the revolution until the end of the transitional phase.[61]

In this political context, new alliances were formed among formerly conflicting powers, mainly the former president's alliance, the remaining officials of his regime, the Houthis, and some members of the Southern movements demanding North-South separation. Some analysts noted that attempts to establish a unified alliance of these parties have been supported by Iran. Meanwhile, a conference was held in October 2011 for Yemen's tribes, sponsored by Saudi Arabia, aiming at establishing a unified front to face Iranian intervention in Yemen.[62]

2.2— Formation of the dialogue

In this general context, all formalities were theoretically complete regarding the organization and methodology of the dialogue. The internal system of the conference laid out a comprehensive agenda for the dialogue, encompassing all significant issues for Yemen's future in nine issues for discussion. Unlike Tunisia, where the transitional priorities were represented by three main issues, leaving the others for a later phase, the Yemeni dialogue table included all important issues. Some argue that this broad agenda made it hard for the participants to deeply discuss the different issues at hand.[63] The internal system allocated the participants into nine teams, each of which focused on an issue according to the schedule:

Southern turbulence, Sa'da problems, national reconciliation & transitional justice, good governance, nation-building, institutionalization of the military and security forces, rights and liberties, independence of the specialized authorities, and comprehensive, integrated and permanent development.

Regarding representation, all traditional political actors participated in the dialogue, as well as new parties that had not yet been integrated into the political realm, or had not signed the initiative; nonetheless, these still had great influence on the grassroots movements, such as the Southern movements, the Houthis, young activists, and women. Headed by President Hady, as suggested by the representative of the UN secretary-general, Jamal ben Omar, the conference seats were allocated so as to warrant equal parity of the North and the South, in addition to 30% given to women's representation and at least 20% for the young activists.[64]

During the preparation stage, some factions of the South stipulated that the North-South dialogue should take place outside Yemen, supervised by regional and international actors. However, most political actors rejected this request, and the North and the South were equally represented (50/50) in the Southern team and in all discussions in the conference. The share of the Southern movements was 75% in the group that discussed the Southern turbulence.[65]

Although the president was assigned to choose the members, the conference had its clear mechanisms of follow-up, governance and implementation of the dialogue output. There were two mechanisms of the utmost importance. The first was "the consensual committee," which included the president, the heads of the nine teams, and several members appointed by the president. Its task was to reconcile the members who had differences regarding various issues, to suggest solutions for such issues, to coordinate the outputs from the teams, to explain the conference internal system, and to follow-up with the implementation of the conference resolutions. The second mechanism was "the standards and order committee," which included seven impartial judiciary and administrative officials, as chosen by the president to decide on cases violating the

conference order or constant absence from the sessions and to consider members' complaints about any intimidating, threatening or abusive acts.[66]

As stated in the internal system, decisions should be made upon the consent of at least 90% of the attendees. Any agreement difficult to reach would be taken to the consensual committee. If the percentage was difficult to attain, it would be taken to the president as the chairman of the conference to make a decision convenient for most parties. Such a system helped prevent any participant from controlling the decision-making process. It also helped prevent the majority from forcing their will on other participants, as well as the minority from hindering the dialogue.[67]

To organize the discussions and sessions, a method was utilized that enabled each party to submit its written vision regarding the roots and contents of the issues under discussion. This facilitated the formation of a common vision to be discussed. In the second stage, each party suggested their solutions and approaches to tackling the main issues. This method saved much time and verbal communication, helping to rebuild confidence and lessen tension among various participants. It also produced a significant theoretical aggregation of all participants' visions regarding the roots of the problems and their solutions. However, this did not prevent undeclared parallel discussions outside the dialogue sessions held in order to reach agreement on the most significant issues.[68]

2.3— Dialogue implementation

The dialogue lasted for nearly ten months (March 2013-January 2014), supervised by Jamal Ben Omar and the ten countries fostering the initiative (the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Oman). As set forth, participants numbered 565 according to the dialogue mechanisms. While the president was of Southern origin, he was able to persuade many of the influential Yemeni political actors to attend the dialogue

sessions. He was also able to replace any of the attendees who showed inflexibility during the dialogue as well as to isolate other actors who expressed extremist views.[69] The pressure exerted by some regional and international players helped prompt Southern actors to attend the dialogue sessions. Nonetheless, other Southern factions who were living abroad, such as the proponents of the former president Ali Salem Al-Baid who was supported by Iran, refused to participate in the national dialogue, and used force against military camps located in the South during the dialogue proceedings.[70]

The output of the conference was inscribed in a document of 350 pages, entitled "The Document of the Comprehensive National Dialogue." It included all statements issued by the conference participants, the drafts and final reports made by the nine teams, a warranty document for implementing the dialogue output, the final statement and other texts, statements and documents.

The Southern turbulence was an issue of great interest at the conference, although other issues were also considered extremely important.[71] Following the protracted dialogue sessions, there was agreement among participants regarding all issues save one, the federal state. The members of that assigned team had differences regarding the number of provinces that would form such a federal state. Various visions were presented during the conference:

- a full separation that would be granted immediately or after a period of being part of a federal state followed by a referendum on self-determination (the Southern movements' vision);

- a federal union while the South retained the right to self-determination (Al-Haq party's vision) ;

- a federal union of two provinces as a beginning of a transitional phase wherein radical changes are made in the regime, establishing a transitional government as the North and the South would share equal power, governmental posts and parliamentary representation, provided that such a parliament would decide the final

formation of the federal state (the Socialist Party's vision);

- a multi-provincial federal state while the South retains the right to share power and wealth equally with the North, in order to retain North-South unity (the vision of the General Popular Conference Party, the Reform Party, the Nasseri Popular Organization, the Justice and Development Party, the Social National Party, several civil society activists, independent young activists, independent women's rights advocates, and President Hady and a division of his allies);

- and a united state enforcing a fully authorized local government where wealth and power could be equally distributed and the perils of separation into federal states be avoided (the vision of Salafi Al-Rashad Party, the National Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, among others).

Following protracted discussions, interventions and pressures, on September 10th, 2013, the international mediator, ben Omar, who played a vital part in the Southern dispute, suggested forming a sixteen-member team to study the turbulence (eight from the North and eight from the South). Although the team held 32 meetings during the period September 10th to December 21st, 2013, they did not reach an agreement about the number of federal state provinces, resulting in the president forming and heading a committee tasked to decide the number of provinces and to study the choice of six provinces (four in the North and two in the South), as well as the choice of two provinces or any other choice.

After examining several suggestions, the presidential committee chose the suggestion of six provinces, with San'a as an independent administrative capital city, as proposed by the General Popular Conference party and the Reform Yemeni Assembly. Two documents were issued, "The Southern Solution Document" and "the Final Document for the Number of Federal State Provinces," which was signed by most participants. The two documents represented the North-South consensual democracy, where the majority was not the only principle to

which it adhered, but a territorial-demographic balance was also considered. Fifty percent of the federal parliament seats, as well as the posts in the federal government, the military leadership, the security forces, the judiciary and high diplomatic institutions were all reserved for the South.[72] The advocates of the federal state believed that this conclusion was a result of the current circumstances, as there was no alternative for separation, but there were several methods to handle its consequences.[73]

The conference also ratified Southern representation during the first electoral term, following the ratification of the federal constitution by 50% of all leadership in the executive, legislative and judicial entities, including the military and the security institutions. The president or the prime minister is responsible for the appointments in the posts of those institutions. Such a percentage was applied during the first three years following unity, a main reason for the conflict leading to the 1994 war.[74]

Nevertheless, the choice of a federal state has been widely criticized. The pro-separation movement in the South believed that such a choice would enable the North to take over the federal legislative power (including the House of Representatives, the Federal Council and the National Association). The Houthis refused to sign the provinces document, as they assumed it would divide Yemen into a rich area and a poor one, although the real reason might have been the absence of a marine passage in the province dedicated to them.

The federation, while having some merits, would not be the perfect solution for Yemen, as the Yemeni state, political and judicial institutions are fragile, in addition to its limited economic powers, the deeply rooted social and political conflicts, and the fissures inside the military institutions. Critics claim that unless a centralized state is formed before resorting to the federal choice, Yemen would be ruptured into several sectarian and regional areas. In fact, the Southern turbulence is mainly concerned with the North-South sharing of equal power and wealth, looted properties and land, and the forced layoffs after the 1994 war. These problems represent human rights violations, and hence, they do not need to be discussed only in a

national dialogue; they also need governmental applicable ordinances and financial powers to apply to them.[75] Such an action could be enforced via some arrangements that grant the South a preferable status in regards to the distribution of authority on a centralized level, in addition to a reinforced local government based on the standards of wealth allocation and finding a fair solution for the financial and administrative problems for the South.[76]

According to Abdelwahab Al-Sherafy, unlike all federations that were based upon reunification of fragmented provinces in one federal state, the suggested Yemeni federal state is based upon fragmenting a unified state that has no institutional, administrative or political structure that would help establish a new coherent structure.[77] Thus, there were some concerns that the power-sharing method would reinforce the fragmented status of Yemen, leading to some negative consequences, such as reinforcing the mentality of preferring some regional affiliations while denying Yemeni national identity, as well as filling high governmental positions according to geographic considerations, rather than to efficiency or qualifications. The perils of such a mentality are at their peak in terms of the military.[78]

Abdullah Al-Faqeeh also noted the decision to choose the federal state during the conference was an early decision, and that it found no resistance by the participants; in addition, the decision of choosing six provinces for the federal state was an early decision too. President Hady had mentioned the six provinces on a number of occasions before the outset of the dialogue conference.[79]

Regarding Sa'da's problems, the conference ratified 59 articles concerning the solutions, including "warranty of freedom of doctrine, intellect, practice of rites, in addition to prohibition of forcing or obstructing such practice, besides the state must be impartial, as it is not allowed to adopt, financially or morally support or facilitate any doctrine or intellect, all according to the constitution and the law." The solution also included "regulating the school syllabus, as well as the religious and indigenous education to be supervised by the concerned state institution," "stipulating constitutional articles that ban

acquiring any designated foreign subsidies and considering it a crime of high treason," "planning a five-year developmental program and budget for Sa'da and other severely aggrieved governorates and districts," "the return of the displaced inhabitants to their homes without any previous provisions, in addition to appropriately compensating them," "prohibiting and incriminating the utilization of the military in internal conflicts," "disarming all parties, groups and individuals of all heavy and medium-caliber armament that were looted or stolen from official institutions," and "banning the ownership of heavy and medium-caliber armament via trade, and such armament should exclusively belong to the state institutions while the law regulates the ownership of personal weapons." The document has also confirmed "the issues of revenge and conflicts resulting from Sa'da wars should be tackled via the transitional justice system and the national reconciliation."[80] Such solutions would certainly need enormous financing, while many of them would depend on the institutionalization process and consolidating the rule of law.

Except for the Southern disturbances and Sa'da's problems, much of the conference output might be considered as generally balancing the interests of the traditional powers who attempt to retain the status quo and the civil actors who aspire to build a modern democratic state. For instance, the document ratified the right of the Northern conventional powers to retain their economic interests in the oil industry, as it confirmed that the administration of the oil and gas sources, such as granting the oil exploration and service development contracts, are a responsibility of the district that produces oil, not of the province or the federal state.[81]

Through the change of the electoral system from the majority system to the proportional system, political parties were favored over the traditional tribal players. However, such a system needs other elements, such as democratic parties and warranties for non-dominant party leaders on the electoral lists, etc. Although most participants have suggested adopting the parliamentary regime, the team concerned with nation-building adopted the presidential regime, provided that it would be

reviewed after two electoral terms and that a transformation into a parliamentary regime would be considered. Some considered that suggestion as being put forward in favor of President Hady's interests.[82] Most successful transitions during the last decades have adopted the parliamentary regime while others have adopted the hybrid approach as the most successful regime to combat an autocratic and despotic legacy.[83]

Women have also acquired at least a 30% representation in each of the following: the committee tasked to draft the constitution; leadership of the independent associations; seats in the elected legislative entities; and all party electoral lists. In addition, a national high commission for mothers and children as well as an association for protecting women and children from social and domestic violence will be established, as will a restructuring of the women's national committee. The constitution will also include an article stipulating that "the state shall take all legal measures that empower women to practice their political rights and participation in the public sphere according to the constitution."[84]

During the dialogue, some have suggested that a law should be enacted to ban the covert U.S. drone and air strikes following US raids against Al-Qaeda in Yemen in July and August 2013, i.e. during the conference, as these strikes helped Al-Qaeda gain sympathy and resulted in protests against President Hady and his government, as they violated Yemen's sovereignty.[85]

2.4— Dialogue evaluation and challenges

Firstly, it is worth mentioning that several factors resulted in conducting this successful comprehensive dialogue. On an international level, the Security Council resolution no. 2051 obliged various parties to participate in the dialogue, as the resolution represented a restraint on those who intended to hinder the dialogue.[86] Pressures were also exerted by international and regional players who had interests in Yemen's stability. Such international and regional players had an interest in implementing the conference resolutions, as contained in

article 6 of the Security Council resolution no. 2051, which indicated that the Council was willing to take more procedures, including the arrangements of article 41 in the UN charter, as it allowed for imposing sanctions on those who attempted to hinder the Council's resolutions.

Inside Yemen, the main factors that contributed to the success of the dialogue included the lack of extreme political duality. The dialogue was not conducted by two political rivals, but rather by several influential political and social parties that were nearly equal in power. Participation of new actors, such as the young activists, women, the Houthis, Salafis and the Southern movements, also reinforced the chances of success.[87] In addition, some believed that a consensual president who kept equal distance with all actors was a factor of success in the dialogue.[88]

Conducting a dialogue as a principle is definitely a better way to change and to resolve disputes than resorting to violence. Unlike the other Arab national dialogues, the Yemeni dialogue assembled all political and social actors, the ruling and the opposition parties (except for those who refused to attend), in addition to non-political actors, such as civil society, young activists, women, the Jewish community, and marginalized citizens,[89] on the assumption that all those actors were actually willing to respond to the revolutionary demands for change.

Nevertheless, the traditional elites and political actors, as well as President Hady and his allies, took over the prominent committees in the conference.[90] Still, there is no doubt that the main warranty for implementing the dialogue output, included in the constitution, is having the political will to implement the outcomes that would save Yemen from chaos, encourage development, and help build a modern democratic state.

Meanwhile, several obstacles and challenges still face the implementation of the conference. All effort should be exerted to handle such challenges in future dialogues. The challenges of the utmost importance are explored in the following sections.

2.4.1— The Houthis

A recent and most dangerous obstacle hindering the implementation of the dialogue outputs is the Houthis. Although the dialogue document was issued while Yemen was expecting the Houthis to adhere to its contents, the Houthis were taking over Sa'da and other areas at the same time. They are now behind all events taking place in the capital city, particularly on September 21st, 2014, and are partners of the president and his government.

In fact, the Houthis attended the dialogue sessions aiming to attain some political gains, particularly political legitimacy as a political actor and to take over one of the six provinces in the federal state. However, they considered such gains as merely limited gains, compared to their bitter opponent, the Reform Party, which gained great influence in decision-making circles and has allied itself with the former commander of the northern military area, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar. Therefore, the Houthis have concerns that conducting free elections might reinforce the Reform Party's domination. That is why they have resorted to the use of force and popular mobilization to achieve goals that they might not gain via the negotiation table.

In fact, the Houthis actually managed to alter the balance of power when they participated in the events of San'a. As the province dedicated to them in the federal state lacked resources and outlets, they headed for the Al-Jawf area where energy resources are abundant. They also sought to acquire the Midy harbor. However, such a use of force may eventually lead to a sectarian war that would waste all political gains and even unite their opponents against them. That situation would become much more complicated if foreign actors intervened in the conflict.[91]

Regional and international actors could play a significant role in Yemen's factions reaching an agreement, only if such actors focused on building a democratic civil state in Yemen, halting their own intervention in Yemen's internal affairs, and barring support of certain political factions. However, such a

role is highly unlikely to be played, considering the stances taken by such regional and international players towards Yemen.

2.4.2— Hady

A second challenge that hinders the implementation of the dialogue output is President Hady himself. Hady was able to dissolve two prominent military institutions, the Republican Guards, commanded by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president's son, and the first military squad, commanded by Ali Mohsen. However, many tasks still had to be accomplished in order to turn the security forces and the military into impartial professional institutions, to integrate tribal leaders into the national security forces, to enforce civil supervision over the armed forces, and to form national security strategies.[92]

In fact, some would consider that the dialogue has increased Hady's legitimacy and popularity. Analysts have observed that Hady's legitimacy might pose some danger to the conference output, including postponing the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as affect the persistence of a power-sharing government, which puts the whole process into question.[93]

Several ordinances issued by the president after the dialogue have caused some problems. For instance, immediately after President Hady formed the committee tasked to draft the constitution, on March 8th, 2014, several political actors, including the Social Party, the independent young activists, and some political leaders of the Reform party, opposed such a declaration as neglecting their representation in the constitution committee. The Conference Party, the Reform Party, and women activists had the highest proportional representation in the committee. Hady decreased the number of the committee members from 30 to 17, upon the consultation of the agreement committee. He also chose only one expert in the field of constitutional law, but one who had not worked in his field of expertise for ten years, unlike what was stipulated in the dialogue document. Hady assigned the committee to supervise the referendum on the constitution, as well as to start awareness

campaigns. He also granted the committee an extendable year to complete drafting the constitution, while the document had previously specified a period of three months.

Some political actors felt that extending the deadline dedicated for the committee was aimed mainly at "shaping a situation where all disputing political parties face a fait accompli by extending the transitional phase so that Hady would ensure his authority for a period of time longer than expected."[94]

Others believed that the conference deviated from its main goal which was finding solutions for the essential issues, as its goals became "training and propagating a new political elite who were led by president Hady, finding methods to empower such elite to have the upper hand on the Yemeni realm, and extending and perpetuating itself in power."[95] Abdullah Al-Faqih's opinion was that such a political elite could successfully delay transitions, calling for dissolving the power-sharing government formed according to the Gulf initiative and its executive mechanism; this would then result in dissolving the elected House of Representatives and the appointed Upper House of the Yemeni Parliament, the Shura Council (which were extended upon the initiative until the end of the transitional phase), so that President Hady could form a new government, a House of Representatives and a Shura council of the dialogue participants. The political elite also suggested the formation of a five-year constituent phase, in which the newly formed institution would establish the desired federal state.[96]

When the political elite did not manage to enforce such suggestions, they agreed upon an open extension of the presidential term, until a new president is inaugurated according to the still-undrafted constitution. However, as the presidential term was to end on February 21st, 2014, the president was granted the right to practice his constitutional authority of forming the government "in a fashion that would ensure efficiency, integrity and national partnership." The Shura Council, which had formal authority and 111 members, gained a larger membership in order to represent all the dialogue participants, and the same proportions were considered in order to dedicate 50% of the seats for the Southern actors. The same

applied to "the consensual committee," which was turned into a national association wherein all dialogue participants were represented according to the same proportion, so that the committee could follow the implementation of the dialogue output as well as the tasks of the constitution committee.[97]

2.4.3— Representation

Although the dialogue conference was more representative of the social actors than the political ones, including the government, the House of Representatives and the Shura Council, the Southern representation is not complete solely by the representation of some Southern factions. In addition, had the twenty points that were mostly related to the Southern problems prepared by the technical preparatory committee not been applied, questions might have arisen regarding an ability to implement the dialogue outcomes concerned with the Southern issue. Moreover, Southern public figures who were Saleh's allies have participated in the dialogue, while others have disappeared from the process.[98]

Some scholars have suggested that the conference granted more representation to the armed factions, while other issues concerning unarmed factions were not granted enough attention in the discussions, despite their historical importance since the reign of the Imams. Furthermore, the Conference Party and its allies, inside and outside Yemen, had different intentions, as it was not confirmed that the party and its allies sought political reform or aimed to change the corrupt regime created by the party itself decades ago.

2.4.4— Other challenges

Other challenges that hinder the implementation of the dialogue outcomes include the fragility of the state, the circulation of weapons, divisions inside the military, lack of financial compensation for the families of those killed and wounded during the revolution, and reconstruction of the areas the

suffered during the war. Other internal factions were not willing to implement some of the outcomes, such as the stance taken by the Conference Party against the transitional justice system and the national conciliation, as well as the stance taken by the Reform party, General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar and their allied tribes regarding the Sa'da problems (i.e. before the Houthis had compromised in this regard).

Yemen also suffered from severe economic decline in its exchange rate regarding the monetary reserve in the Central Bank, as this was used to cover the expenses of security and services, the GDP of all industrial sectors, oil production, and consequently the national income. Also exacerbating the problem was the decline in tourism, fisheries production, and other services, as well as financial and administrative corruption.[99]

Adel Al-Shoga', professor of literary criticism at San'a University, suggested that there is another challenge caused by Islamic groups, in that he believed that they were an obstacle hindering any dialogue that could eventually lead to participation in the civil state. He also suggested that the principle of building a civil state, as demanded by the Islamic parties, was a sham because such parties believe that a civil state is in contradiction with Islam. In addition, he believes that Islamists refuse equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as gender equality.[100]

However, the conference has never exerted the required effort to benefit from the tribal elements of Yemen. This might explain the tribes' alignment with the Houthi leaders. Tribes could play a crucial part in national reconciliation in many regards. As the central government is fragile, the tribes might be influential in establishing security. The system of tribal values and traditions that has been in place for centuries has helped contain crises and conflicts. It not only checked the custom of seeking revenge; it also implemented the principles of tolerance, justice and integrity that form a basis for any real reconciliation.

The Yemeni tribes have long experience as mediators who resolve disputes via a system of tribal customs. A study has

shown that 90% of the disputes in Yemen have been resolved by tribal intervention. The government has also sought the mediation of the Yemeni tribes to persuade Al-Qaeda to retreat from the Rade' area, as the military had failed to throw them out in January 2012. Tribal leaders managed to free 73 armed men in Abyan in April 2013;[101] the tribal mediators include the leader of the Hashed tribe, Sheikh Sadeq Al-Ahmar, who is said to be a member of the Reform Party, and Sheikh Al-Bekeli Mohammed Abu Lahoom, the leader of the Justice and Development Party. Additionally, many tribesmen have offered to help with the process of nation-building.[102]

In the end, it is worth mentioning that the most important issue for the average Yemeni citizen is to avoid war and bloodshed. A fruit salesman put it very clearly when he said, "We only want the dialogue participants to do their best and avoid wars. I'm not asking them to improve my living, (but) war is much worse."[103]

3— Egypt

Mubarak's legacy is a heavy burden, as the president had wide constitutional powers without any substantial mechanisms for accountability. Through a 'state of emergency', exceptional courts, and policies of incitement and intimidation, his government repressed the opposition and secured the regime under his dictatorship. Domination through legislative processes and rigged elections has long been the regime's tool for hindering the activities of other political parties and civil society organisations. Considerations about national and local security have played a pivotal role in sustaining the status quo. Egypt's wealth was employed in programmes that enriched the wealthy and impoverished the poor, in addition to spreading the cultivation of corruption and impairing bureaucratic institutions.[104]

Egypt had witnessed several coordination attempts among the opposition before the outbreak of the January 25th 2011 revolution, but they could not urge the ruling regime towards genuine reform. The most prominent attempt was the 'Kefaya' movement against hereditary rule, as well as the activities of the National Association for Change (NAC), which assembled the Egyptian opposition against the regime. Together, they formed a momentum against the regime and contributed to the outbreak of the January 2011 revolution. Although the NAC had assembled the Islamic, liberal and left-wing streams upon a minimum set of shared points of agreement, the coordination had not reached the necessary level of maturity, and suffered from internal splits between the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and the liberal and left-wing streams on the other hand.

Yet, following the revolution, the traditional political actors reappeared on the political scene, playing out their out-dated suspicions and mistrust. Therefore, the first and second transitional phases did not witness any real attempts at dialogue or conciliation.

The following sections examine the prominent challenges and obstacles that hinder productive political dialogue in Egypt

in the aftermath of the revolution, along with the efforts exerted regarding this issue, and followed by a number of recommendations for achieving a comprehensive dialogue in Egypt.

3.1— Challenges for the dialogue

In this section I shall analyse the political situation, which resulted in the absence of any kind of serious dialogue, the collapse of the democratic transition, and the outbreak of various forms of violence.

3.1.1— The first transitional phase

The failed democratic transition during the period from February 11, 2011 to June 30, 2013 can be understood through the study of three major developments: the policies and positions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the conduct of elections without a minimal agreement on the rules of the game, and the positions of the major political actors.

The SCAF

The first mistake committed during the first transitional period was the domination by the SCAF of the management of the transition. In successful democratic transitions where the army had played a role in the old regimes, the army's role was limited either to leveling the political field for actual democratic elections (Portugal in the 1970s and Sudan in the 1980s) or to the handover of power to civilian actors so that they started running the transitional period and agreed upon the constitutional, legislative, and institutional frameworks.In [105] such cases, no political parties politicized the army or allied with it against opponents or urged it to overthrow the elected institutions.

In Egypt, the SCAF has never shown any signs that might prove that its members (the high-ranked generals of Mubarak's regime) had understood the revolutionary state in Egypt, as it aimed at changing the essence of practicing authority and empowering the masses and the youth.

Moreover, a number of intellectuals and politicians had thought that the army was the only institution able to create a balance among the political actors, and that there was no threat from the army handling the transition. The SCAF's leaders had also thought that they were the only entity able to efficiently manage and rule a society where politics had been autocratic for decades. Those assumptions might be partially correct yet the military junta was expected to lead Egypt towards a true democratic transition, which was never accomplished.[106]

It is worth mentioning that, following the downfall of the old regime, the political transition in Egypt had differed from that of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe.[107] The SCAF had managed to defuse the revolution on February 11th, 2011, and then to protect the rest of the old regime from total collapse. The SCAF first asked protesters to leave the streets and go home in order to restore stability and security. Then, it directed the transitional process in a way that demolished the democratic transition (or that the army had become the greatest threat to democracy, as Marina Ottawa wrote).[108] Asef Bayat also claimed that by imposing a state of non-violence the army had halted the struggle for achieving political freedom. According to Bayat, "violence" meant the continuation of a struggle that aimed at more than simply restoring the patterns of authority that preceded January 25th.[109]

The head of the former regime was overthrown in a short period. Immediately afterwards, a discourse about constitutional and political reforms began. However, the suggested reforms were to be carried out via the existing institutions and by the leadership of the SCAF on behalf of the revolution. In fact, the revolutionary actors did not possess the power to effect change while the institutions and powers of the old regime persisted and obtained regional and international support. As a result, there was no essential political change, and the old institutions and

networks remained in the hands of traditional political actors. In addition, about 12,000 persons were prosecuted in military courts during this transitional period.[110]

The political fiasco of the SCAF was shown through the pattern of management of the transitional period, which resulted from the perplexing roadmap set by the generals following the downfall of Mubarak. The SCAF formed a committee for the amendment of the constitution that lacked balance in its membership. Then, the committee persistently passed their amendments via popular plebiscites without engaging in any actual dialogue. The SCAF also issued the March Constitutional Declaration, as well as all other complementary laws, unilaterally.[111]

At that time, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to realize the potential results of the roadmap. They refused to listen to any advice in this regard. They had mobilized most of the Islamic current behind the roadmap. Thus, they all departed from the national consensus that existed before the formation of the constitutional amendment committee. Unfortunately, most Islamists had associated the constitutional amendment on the one hand with the presence of article (2) in the 1971 constitution and the deterrence of an "imaginary secular" attack on the other hand. All of these developments contributed to the deepening suspicion and mistrust among the political actors. As will be clarified later in this work, the failure and riskiness of the roadmap was not anodyne.

Comparatively speaking, in most successful democratic transitions, the voters have not been asked to go to the polls only weeks following the downfall of the old regime. It was not because of the lack of preparedness of the police forces to secure order on the roads and in the electoral ballots, nor was it because of the lack of readiness of the new parties to reach out or mobilize the masses. The real reason was not to spread political conflicts to the masses before reaching consensus among political actors.[112]

The SCAF had failed to set security policies and exposed Egypt to unprecedented risks in many respects, as security was

not accomplished. The risks spread and began to affect the military institution itself as a result of its involvement in the conflict among the rebels and the deaths of many protesters during the events that took place in the districts of ElAbassya and Maspiro, Mohammed Mahmoud, and during the crackdown of the Tahrir Square sit-in on December 17.

The SCAF also chose to have a fragile government with no actual powers, and it was unable to tackle social demands. The generals never took measures to root out the old regime's supporters inside the state institutions, particularly those involved in corruption. The generals also failed to handle the trials of the top leaders of the old regime, which led to more anger. Thus, the Egyptians never felt that the revolution had any effect on their lives.

However, following the change in the military leadership upon the election of the civilian president and the severe polarization that emerged among political factions after the constitutional declaration of president Muhammad Morsi, the new military leadership managed to alter this negative perception of the military, so political actors and public figures demanded the interference of the army again to overthrow Morsi and his government.

Hasty Elections

The second mistake was that immediately after the downfall of the old regime's leader on February 11th 2011, the political actors had contested for the purpose of fulfilling their partisan agendas. There was a widespread impression among almost all political actors that gains should be reaped now or never. Accordingly, a precept of political contestation was established during this foundational period, and it became a zero-sum game among parties that were not able to understand the requirements of democratic transition in the wake of a revolution.

Following the literature on democratic transition, the term "electoral revolution" refers to a kind of revolution or uprising that had taken place at the outset of the new millennium.[113] The

term refers to limiting democracy as well as the revolutionary demands to electing new executive and legislative institutions instead of taking care of all other well-known pillars of democracy. It refers also to the impetuosity in conducting elections upon confused constitutional and legal bases, as the required consensus or agreement has not been reached. Usually, the winners of such elections would be the traditional elites and powers due to their networks, influence, and resources. The only outcome could have been elections that might complicate the political scene and contribute to demolishing revolutionary and democratic demands.[114]

The road map framed by the SCAF had helped establish this kind of contestation among political parties during the transitional period. Since the referendum of March 2011 had taken place, the whole society had been engaging in fruitless debates concerning issues that were irrelevant to building a truly democratic system. This had occurred instead of initiating actual dialogues concerning the demands of the Egyptian revolution: which were the transition from autocracy into true democracy as well as empowering people and changing the pattern of practicing authority.[115]

The same mistake was repeated when the political elites assumed that holding elections was the solution. Following the plebiscite on the constitutional amendments, the parliamentary, presidential elections, and the plebiscite on the 2012 constitution were conducted. The problem with these elections did not lie with the principle of holding elections per se but in the impetuosity of having elections without setting—through a considerable degree of consensus and participation—the rules of the game (i.e. all required election legislations and procedures and all related legal and judicial guarantees).

It was also a blunder to compare the Egyptian situation (which involved a transitional period and a state of severe political polarization) to that of other established democratic countries where a political culture was established, and to believe that it is normal to resort to the polls to settle controversial issues. In addition, democracy is not simply a

matter of elections, as elections are one pillar of democracy, and they are part of the last stage, as Robert Dahl noted.[116] Since 1991, more than 30 presidents have been ousted in periodical elections in sub-Saharan Africa, yet democracy does not exist in many countries in the region.[117]

The rules of the game were issued in Egypt by the will of only one actor and amidst political conflict with no actual dialogue or peaceable discussions. That actor was the SCAF, along with some political actors, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamic allies. All these actors never realized that distorted rules would not result in the construction of a democratic state. The most dangerous result would be that the rules could deepen the crisis and cultivate mistrust among the masses toward democracy and the revolution as a whole, which actually happened. For example, the gaps in the law on parliamentary elections and the weakness of the judicial institutions were used by opponents of the revolution to dissolve the first elected parliament, as the courts had become an arena for settling political conflicts created by the political elites.[118]

Political forces' choices

The third mistake came from the two major political actors, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the elected president on the one hand and the civil forces on the other hand. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the largest political group in Egypt, it had intended during this period to commit to a reform program and had not clashed with the police and military. The silent language of the Muslim Brotherhood, as expressed to the revolutionary groups, showed that, once executive and legislative bodies were elected, the revolution had come to its end, and that it was time to end all types of protest and to resume the normal routine of life.

The main problem was that the MB dominated, or so they thought, the management of the transitional period without the need for any associates from other political factions. Moreover, once its candidate for presidency assumed power as the first

civilian president in Egypt's history, he was unable to rule or run the state through an actual national partnership, or even in a transparent way.

During his first weeks in office and before complications arose, the president committed two essential mistakes that contradicted what he had pledged before his inauguration. First, he did not appoint "a qualified public figure" as prime minister, as pledged in the "Vermont pact". [119] Second, he was unable to achieve a degree of consensus regarding the constitution. After the problems emerged, the national dialogue for which the president had called did not achieve any tangible results, as will be shown herein.

The president was unable and unwilling to mobilize the non-Islamist political actors behind him or find support among them through their participation in bearing responsibility for the burdensome legacy of the former regime. Instead, it all ended with the escalation of a political impasse. In addition to the deterioration of the economy and the increase in social protests, the security issue was complicated. There were also protests inside the police force itself. A strategic zone in Egypt (Port Said) witnessed a civil sedition. The political polarization increased to include the Islamic faction itself.

As for the constitution, it was apparent that the president had considered that the ratification of the constitution would warrant a solution for all the effects resulting from the constitutional declaration issued in November 2012. This was a great mistake, as Egypt was going through a transitional period in which elections could never settle the political conflicts caused by the elites. As noted, the holding of elections to settle the disagreements among the political actors deepened the political rift, as it spread the conflicts to the masses. Furthermore, the elites tried to find support from the masses to put pressure on their opponents and urge them to engage in confrontations that could have caused unresolvable violence.

Moreover, the president and the MB continued to underestimate the popular protests taking place on the streets. They thought that time could assuage people's agitation and that

legitimacy was limited to the election results. The MB's conception was that it could rely on the notion of the majority versus the opposition, despite the massive revolutionary sense that was strongly felt on the streets and the resistance from state institutions against change and against the president himself.

As for the opposition, they were mistaken when they escalated their demands to the maximum without having a comprehensive vision or conducting an appraisal of all potential consequences. Their first mistake was demanding the repeal of the constitution, although they had participated in the plebiscite. Then they asked to overthrow the legitimacy of all elections and the first elected civil president in Egypt's history. Their second devastating mistake was finding support in the army, thus politicizing the military, which demolished the whole democratic path, similar to situations in other countries.[120]

One of the catastrophic mistakes of both sides (the government and the opposition during the reign of the elected president) was resorting to the masses and mobilizing the proponents of each side as a show of strength or to impose a certain point of view, which led to violent acts that were unprecedented in the modern history of Egypt.

Here, we must never overlook the role of the revolution's opponents, who penetrated the revolution's lines and served as spoilers, sowing the seeds of discord among protestors, spreading chaos and eventually urging the masses to express animosity toward the revolution itself and to seek the emergence of a strongman who, from their point of view, could achieve a state of security and stability, which actually took place during the following stage.

Comparatively speaking, the failure of politicians to achieve political agreement and to end polarization actually paved the way for direct or indirect interference by the army to fill the political void, thus achieving security for a while but delaying the pace of the transitional process for years, if not halting it. That was what happened in June 2013.

3.1.2— The Second Transitional Phase

Since the coup of July 3, 2013, Egypt has witnessed an escalation of unprecedented violence by the new regime.

Here, the challenges encountered by the current regime shall be examined, as they might pave the way for a new revolutionary wave that would have more radical means and goals than the January 25 revolution.

The post-June 30 regime has made several mistakes that could be either the beginning of complete political chaos or preparation for a new revolutionary wave.

The first mistake was the politicization of the military. It is possible that the military could have urged the conflicting parties to engage in national dialogue and foster comprehensive political reconciliation, but this never took place. Instead, the army aligned itself with the non-Islamist actors against the Islamic faction, utilized an exclusive policy, and militarized society by empowering the minister of defense, so he could occupy the president's position. Moreover, the regime appointed retired military generals to various official and executive posts and granted the security institutions the freedom to manipulate formal institutions, civil society, unions, the media, and universities.

No doubt that Egypt's military involvement in politics has many negative repercussions; it jeopardizes democratic transition on the one hand, and Egyptian and Arab national security on the other hand. There are only few military governments in Third World countries. What is common now is the civilian control of the armed forces through gradual mechanisms and means that have led eventually to strengthening both the army and democracy like what has happened in Spain, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea as well as other countries.[121]

The second mistake was the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood's political misconduct was tackled. It is known that all other political actors, including the military junta, have made mistakes. Thus, it was a blunder to utilize a zero-sum game with the entire Islamist faction and hold them accountable for the

mistakes committed during the first transitional stage.

There is no doubt that the security solution chosen by the regime to address the crisis will not be able to yield the desired results; rather, it will lead to more bloodshed.[122] The cases of countries such as Turkey, Algeria, and Libya are of great significance, as the Islamist factions were strongly defeated but withstood conflict and made even more powerful reappearances.

It would be also a mistake to compare today's situation to that of the 1990s in Egypt, when the circumstances of the violent groups were greatly different. Such violent groups worked secretly and had no grass roots, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. Although the Islamists today are being oppressed, they still have a wide range of grass roots. Had the Egyptian squares been opened for them and the security forces been impartial, such grass roots would have taken over the streets. Had impartial democratic elections been conducted, the Islamists would have gained a great proportion of the Egyptians' votes.

In addition, the assumption that any political path would be able to exclude an entire political stream was utterly unrealistic. The right-wing actors, for instance, were never able to exclude the left wing, and vice versa. The consequences of excluding a political rival normally include the outbreak of civil war or severe political conflicts. All civil wars that have occurred throughout history were actually a result of excluding a political rival, such as the cases of El Salvador, Sudan, and Somalia, among others.[123]

In all civil wars, the targeted political stream has never disappeared, despite the assumption that one party could eliminate the other. In some cases, the targeted political stream would gain independence as a new state, as in the cases of South Sudan, East Timor, and others. Normally, civil wars lead to division in the military, the total destruction of the army, or even to the separation of a faction forming its own state, foreign intervention, or a combination of these results, in addition to a deteriorated economy for decades.

Among the mistakes committed during the post-June 30

phase is the persistence of the roadmap declared on July 8, 2013, with its three major steps. The first step was the ratification of a flawed new constitution by a committee appointed by the ruling regime. The constitution was not compatible with the standards included in any given democratic constitution regarding the method by which it was written and its content that addressed the ruling regime.[124] The constitution legalized the will of unelected institutions (i.e., the army, the judiciary, and the police) over that of the elected ones. The new constitution also allowed for various interpretations of some articles, and referred some vital issues to the interim president, such as the electoral system law and the representation of women, young people, and Christians in the parliament.

Moreover, the constitution was violated in many respects. The ruling regime adopted a security solution to deal with the opposition. As a result, thousands were killed and tens of thousands were detained, as mentioned previously. The interim president also issued a presidential decree in September 2013 that extended provisional detention without restrictions, a measure that was not contained in the 2012 constitution. The consequences of the decree included the extension of detention periods, as the detainees were not considered under arrest for political reasons. The interim president also issued the protest law, which restricted the right to engage in peaceful protest stipulated in the constitutions of both 2012 and 2014.

The referendum on the 2014 constitution left no choices for the people, so freedom of choice as a significant value was not fulfilled. Rather, the referendum was forced on the people, practically rather than legally, as the only choice. No media campaigns were allowed for those who opposed the constitution or those boycotting the referendum. The media constantly distorted the truth about those who had different points of view by accusing them of treason or of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, there was no clear alternative to the constitution, as was the case for any referendum conducted.

The second step was the presidential elections, which were conducted with no real contestation among various candidates,

resulting from the propaganda campaigns in favor of the minister of defense. The elections actually violated all standards of democratic elections.

3.2— Attempts at conducting dialogue

There have been several attempts at conducting dialogue during the last three years. However, none of them has led to actual comprehensive dialogue.

3.2.1— Dialogue initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood

The first and most comprehensive attempt was the dialogue initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood and started before the outbreak of the January Revolution, under the title "Together we start building: Dialogue for Egypt." The fifth round took place on 16 March 2011 in the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters (before the foundation of the Freedom and Justice Party), i.e. a few days after the downfall of Mubarak. The purpose of this round was to discuss and think about the crises of Egypt. Almost all major party leaders of all political streams, in addition to several public figures, attended. The Muslim Brotherhood suggested some main principles for reform regarding eight issues: human development, the political crisis, public liberties, the economic crisis, the social aspect, the agriculture aspect, foreign policy, and police reform. The Muslim Brotherhood had also discussed forming a committee to examine the idea of forming a consensual electoral list. It was further decided to form a committee for drafting a document, which would be the base of any joint electoral programme.

In another meeting that took place in the Wafd party headquarters on 14 June 2011, the parties agreed that the document would be the basis of what was known as the 'Democratic Alliance.' After this, meetings were held in the headquarters of several political parties, until the document was finally ratified during a meeting in the Wafd headquarters. The

plan was that the document would include two parts: the first contained the main general principles that could be agreed upon by all parties as a basis for building the democratic regime; the second contained some urgent procedures to be undertaken in the short term. Thereupon, it was agreed that the second part would be excluded, and some of its general principles would be included as basic principles. It is worth mentioning that adopting the main values and principles as a basis of building the democratic regime was an idea initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place.

They also agreed upon a bill concerning Egypt's People's Assembly that guaranteed a broad representation of all political parties and actors. The bill's aim was to prevent any penetration by political money, clannishness or the remnants of the former regime. Then, it was to be submitted to the SCAF who would authorise it. Instead, a document was issued under the title of 'The National Democratic Alliance for Egypt' in July 2011, and became a basis upon which an electoral alliance was built consisting of 16 political parties, including the Freedom and Justice party, the Wafd party, the socialist El-Karama party, Al-Noor party and the liberal El-Ghad party. Later, the Wafd and Al-Noor withdrew as a result of a disagreement about the representative quota in the alliance electoral lists.[125]

It is important to highlight three significant elements in this document: Firstly, the document clearly confirmed that the parties disapproved of the military junta taking over the issuance of a bill concerning the People's Assembly. It was mentioned in the body of the document that the Democratic Alliance confirmed that:

> They adhere to the basic principles of the bill of the parliament that was submitted to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the cabinet. Such principles give precedence to conducting elections that applied the unconditional closed quota list, as it allowed the political parties electoral lists, and the independent candidates' electoral lists, to participate, for the purpose of realising equal opportunities among citizens. The alliance parties condemned

the stand taken by the cabinet, as it issued a bill concerning the parliament without consulting any of the political parties… although the SCAF declared that it was necessary to conduct societal dialogue before issuing such a bill.[126]

The document never made the SCAF accountable, as the political parties believed then that the government was independent from the military junta. Later, this was proved to be wrong: the cabinet was merely a secretariat working for the interests of the military junta.

Secondly, the document asserted that the alliance parties were certain that "great goals and great expectations are not to be fulfilled by merely one faction or one party, as all efforts should be combined and all actors should be united so that the revolution could pass those crossroads,"[127] However, the short-sighted political parties abandoned this goal as they rushed into fulfilling their own interests when elections approached. This showed that the impetuous conduct of elections had a negative effect on the dialogue attempts.

Thirdly, the alliance parties agreed that the document should contain "the basic general principles upon which all sectors of the Egyptian society could agree, and that represented the main structure of the free and just democratic regime for which successive generations had fought, so that such principles could inspire the constituent committee to be elected by the upcoming parliament for drafting the constitution."[128] Despite the significance of these principles, the political parties later disagreed upon whether they were obligatory for the constituent committee. Apparently, the document aimed at containing principles that would merely act as guidance for the constituent committee. However, some political actors aimed at making them supra-constitutional principles. This was also the aim of the military junta in their statement issued a few days after the issuance of the alliance document for democracy, as shall be shown later.

As for the contents of the document, it is worth noting that the document had settled several controversial issues, which

unfortunately made a reappearance in the political parties' discussions, before and during the drafting of the 2012 constitution, and even after its ratification. These agreed principles included:[129]

- Islamic Sharia is the main source of legislation while preserving the rights of non-Muslims to refer to their legislations in case of personal statute.

- Moral values and principles are the basis for building a human being and citizenship is the basis for building the society.

- Adhering to the nation's agreed maxims, identity and spiritual values established by the divine religions.

- The Armed Forces protect the security, independence and safety of our homeland.

- Adherence to human rights in accordance with international charters and pacts that do not conflict with the principles of Islamic Sharia or the Arab identity.

- The right to transfer power via free and impartial public suffrage.

- Freedom to form political parties by giving notice, provided that they are not religious, military, or sectarian parties.

- The judicial authority is the only entity to determine what contradicts the constitution, the law, the public order, morals, and the main values of society, or what is considered a violation of adhering to peaceful activities.

- The police force is a civil institution that works for safeguarding society and the people, it shall submit to judicial and civil control, and shall adhere to human rights. The police budget shall submit to transparency procedures and social control.

- In addition, there were also articles regarding the realms of the judiciary, military, police, universities, unions, economy, social justice, reviving the Islamic endowment (waqf) system, and founding an institution for the Islamic alms taxes.

It is also worth noting that this document refers to principles of future foreign policy including "reconsidering the method and mechanisms of economic integration… to agree upon new productive mechanisms," "re-building Egypt's regional relations on the basis of cooperation and integration," "holding strategic talks with Iran and Turkey regarding the future of the region," "reconsidering the Peace Process with Israel," and "strengthening Egypt's relations with the Nile Basin countries". No doubt that these principles are legitimate. However, Egypt's democratic transition, as many other transitions, should have focused on one central goal: demolishing the pillars of the old regime and transiting power to a democratically elected government.[130]

This is no doubt that such an initiative had come close to achieving many of the required agreements of the earlier stage. However, it failed to understand some issues. As put forth in this study, the leaders of the alliance parties could not foresee the peril which would result from the SCAF's policy of domination or the danger of overstepping the inclusion of all political actors during the nation-building stage.

The most important criticism of this dialogue is that the parties concerned gradually lost focus on the main issue, regarding reaching an agreement upon the values and principles of the upcoming democratic regime. Instead, they were focusing on the elections and quotas specified for each party in the alliance electoral lists. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders refused the idea of having supra-constitutional principles in the constitution, as shall be shown later. In general, such mistakes wasted a historical opportunity that could have changed the democratic transition in Egypt and in the whole region.

3.2.2— Dialogue conducted by the SCAF

The Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf, initiated the second attempt to conduct dialogue when he called for a national dialogue discussing Egypt's future. The first and last session was on 29 March 2011, attended by nearly 150 public figures, among

whom were two leaders of the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party. The attendance of these two figure raised criticism by the other participants, and the government decided to transfer the upcoming rounds to the civil society, as well as to delegate the running of them to the former Prime Minister, Abd El Aziz Hegazi. Then on 19 April 2011 the vice Prime Minister, Yehia El-Gamal, declared the formation of a committee under the title: 'the National Accordance Dialogue'. The General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of the SCAF, was appointed as an assistant reporter for the committee. The aim of the committee was to reach a national understanding concerning the main contents of the constitution. However, this idea, as well as the committee, was stillborn.

The SCAF immediately called for talks regarding 'the Ruling Principles of Forming the Constituent Committee for the Constitution', on 12 July 2011. In one of the articles of a statement issued under the title "a Statement to the Nation," the SCAF declared that it intended to prepare a document of ruling principles and standards for selecting the members of the constituent committee for drafting the upcoming Egyptian constitution.[131] Further they declared the intention to issue them with "a constitutional declaration'," following an agreement among the political parties and actors, to ensure they did not leave room for one faction to control the preparation of the constitution. The vice Prime Minister, Ali al-Selmy, headed these talks from 8 to 25 August 2011. Many people participated including officially authorised, political parties such as: the National Association for Change, revolutionary movements and coalitions, labour unions and syndicates, human rights and feminist organisations, Sufi entities, the Islamic legislative association, Islamic Group, and several public figures.

The result of these meetings was a document that was widely known by the name 'Ali al-Selmy's document'. Al-Selmy stated that the idea of agreement upon these principles was the result of the 5th round of talks, which the Muslim Brotherhood called under the aforementioned title 'Dialogue for Egypt'. This suggested an agreement whereby the initiative should include "the basic principles that we believe represent a

subject of consensus by all Egyptian society to achieve stability, hoping that they are accepted by Egyptians, in order to be proof that Egypt is moving forward to stability and development."[132] This was also Osama El-Ghazaly Harb's opinion.[133]

This document was severely criticised, as many believed that it deprived the people and future generations of their will. A second criticism of the document was that it ratified the authority of the military junta as being higher than that of the constituent committee, and determined a special status for the armed forces in articles no. 9 and 10. Although the document was amended and re-issued on 16 November 2011, after cancelling the two articles stipulating a special status for the military junta, the Islamic parties persisted with their objections, and through popular pressure managed to quash the document, so that it was considered merely a guiding non-obligatory document.

It is worth noting three significant issues here. The first issue concerns the idea of reaching an agreement upon ruling principles for the transitional phase; this was not the problem per se, rather the problem was in how the political elites and actors interpreted such principles and their function during the transitional phase. The fact was that any agreements reached were merely agreements for the purpose of that historical moment, and to be normally developed and amended via future agreements and talks. In addition, it should be noted that the Egypt constitution of 1923 also has supra-constitutional principles.

Secondly, this crisis had demolished the agreements reached in the document of the democratic alliance for Egypt, and broadened the gap between Islamist and other political actors. Unfortunately, vast sectors of the Islamic current assumed that the ruling principles would hinder the application of Islamic Sharia, and that they would establish the pillars of a secular state, during a time when the Islamists thought that they were the new rulers of Egypt. On the other hand, a vast sector of liberal and leftist streams considered that the Islamists' fear of the obligations of the principles was a clear indication that they intended to establish a theocratic state. Unfortunately, the

dialogue halted and the elections overtook the political parties, who took it upon themselves to follow their own paths, seeking only parliamentary seats.

When the results of the election indicated a relatively high vote in favour of the Islamists, severe polarisation increased, as the Muslim Brotherhood became the majority with a result of 222 parliamentary seats for their party. This accounted for nearly 43% of the votes of those participating in the elections of the People's Assembly during the period from 28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood achieved 105 seats, i.e. 58% of total elected members in the upper house of the Egyptian parliament (the Shura Council), for the election conducted during the period from 28 January 2012 to 22 February 2012. The Salafi Al-Noor Party acquired 112 seats (22% of voters in the People's Assembly), and 45 seats (25% in the Shura Council) respectively.[134]

The third issue concerned civil-military relations, as the SCAF should have presented this issue on the dialogue, rather than trying to pass a document that guaranteed special status for the military institution with no actual discussions. Unfortunately, this caused a delay in tackling civil-military relations, in addition to deepening the gap between the SCAF and the revolutionary actors. When the constituent committee was tasked with writing the 2012 constitution, the SCAF succeeded in passing the articles it sought via understandings with the Muslim Brotherhood.[135] Therefore, certain sectors of political actors were agitated, particularly: the youth; revolutionary movements and parties; and several public figures. As for the liberal and leftist parties, they were furious about the constitutional articles concerning identity and liberties.

It is worth noting here that during the summer of 2011, the military junta commenced holding meetings with the young revolutionary actors, which were called the dialogue rounds, as each meeting would be attended by a number of members of the SCAF and a thousand young people in one of the theatres owned by the armed forces. Many people criticised the way the SCAF was holding the dialogue, as the invitations to such meetings would arrive to the targeted people 48 hours before the

appointment. Many also refused to respond to this method of invitation which was stated as follows: 'We require the attendance of 10 persons from any group called a revolutionary movement'. They considered it to be a sort of a media campaign and a fragmentation of their revolutionary alignment. The revolutionary parties and movements also criticised such invitations through objecting to the context in which they occurred. During that period, the rebels were prosecuted in military courts; in addition there was widespread misuse of power by the military and police forces.

Some political actors agreed to participate in these talks, including the Muslim Brotherhood, several young people from the National Association for Change and the Revolution Trustee Council. Groups which refused the invitation were the Kefaya movement, April 6th movement, the coalition of the rebel youths, Maspero Youth Union, the Egyptian Socialist Party (under construction), Freedom and Justice Youths, and many others.[136]

3.2.3— The Vermont Meeting

On the heels of the second round of the presidential elections of 17-18 June 2012, and following the delay in declaring the results, the Islamic and civil revolutionary forces were concerned about the intentions of the SCAF, and about the possibility of their declaring the former regime candidate as a winner. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood members called for a meeting with all the revolutionary forces, and several political leaders and actors accepted their invitation to meet in the Vermont Hotel in Cairo on 20-21 June, three days before the official declaration of the election results. Following several discussions, the Vermont document was issued to declare the following principles:[137]

- Confirmation on national partnership regarding an independent public figure to be appointed as prime minister.
- The presidential team and the national power-sharing government would include all political

streams.

- Formation of a risk management team to tackle the current situation, including national public figures.

- Guarantee of the finalisation of procedures concerning complete devolution of authority to the elected president and his team and government.

- Refusing the complementary constitutional declaration[138] which would have established a military state and deprived the president of his authorities.

- Refusing the resolution issued by the SCAF to dissolve the parliament, and refusing the resolution for forming a national defence council.

- Exerting efforts to balance the membership of the foundational constituent assembly while guaranteeing to draft a constitution that would be accepted by all Egyptians.

- Transparency and intelligibility regarding all changes witnessed in the political realm.

In the wake of Morsi's inauguration, Egypt had witnessed conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which the president would adhere to the Vermont principles. It could be said that the president had totally ignored them after he claimed authority, particularly concerning the appointment of the prime minister, the presidential team, the constituent assembly and transparency of rule.

3.2.4— Dialogue conducted by Morsi

The constitution was another factor of polarisation inside and outside the constituent assembly: this was formed twice. During this time, some figures were overtly calling for sustaining the military junta's rule, including Osama El-Ghazaly Harb who was leader of the 'liberal' Front Party at that point.[139]

The constitution issue caused controversy about the formation of the constituent assembly. This assembly was chosen by the elected parliament. Mostly made up of Islamists, it had begun its tasks on 3 March 2012. However, on 10 April 2012 the administrative judicial court dissolved the assembly on the pretext that its formation was incompatible with article no. 60 of the constitutional declaration issued by the SCAF on 30 March 2011. Both houses of the elected parliament formed a new constituent assembly on 13 June 2012, after the Muslim Brotherhood and the civil forces agreed upon sharing membership in the new assembly. In the meantime, the administrative court had referred the claims for dissolving the constituent assembly to the supreme constitutional court, which had only 45 days to start studying the case according to the law. The constituent assembly finished its tasks on 30 November 2012, after the civil political forces had withdrawn from its sessions. President Morsi also issued a new constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012 with the purpose of granting immunity to the constituent assembly and the Shura House, in addition to all the resolutions issued by the president. The civil political forces' reaction to the constitutional declaration was to establish an opposition front: the National Salvation Front (NSF). This opposition included many liberal and leftist political parties and movements and was able to mobilise people to demonstrate at the presidential palace on 4-5 December 2012 in order to overthrow the constitutional declaration.

The presidential institution called for holding a dialogue with these opposition political forces regarding the constitution on 8 December 2012. The NSF refused the invitation and demanded a delay in the date for the referendum, planned for 15 December 2012 .. However, the dialogue started, with participation from the president's Islamist supporters, in addition to a few liberal public figures such as Ayman Nour, Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat and Ramy Lakkah. The presidential institution declared that 54 political parties, movements, and public figures had participated in the dialogue. The dialogue concluded in the annulment of the constitutional declaration of 9 December 2012, and maintained the date decided for the referendum.

In the meantime, the crisis escalated: on 12 December 2012 the military called for a 'national dialogue', described as 'the gathering dialogue'. The NSF accepted the invitation, but the military withdrew the invitation because of what it described as a poor response to the invitation.

As the annulment of the constitutional declaration represented a compromise granted by the president, the NSF invited its supporters to participate in the referendum and to vote against the constitution. Although nearly 64% of voters had ratified the constitution, the NSF had not adhered to the democratic logic, and commenced demanding the overthrow of the new constitution in which it had participated via the plebiscite. Next, the NSF added a new goal, which was the overthrow of the elected president and conducting early elections. Following this, an insubordinate movement was formed called 'Tamarod', and many people called for intervention by the army to overthrow the president. The opposition managed to mobilise millions of protesters on 30 June 2013. The army then intervened, deposed the president, dissolved the Shura House, suspended the constitution, and planned a new road map.

3.2.5— Initiatives following 30 June 2013

After 30 June, most initiatives were directed at achieving a comprehensive national reconciliation that would bring an end to the zero-sum game caused by the road map declared on 3 July 2013 and 8 July 2013.

One of these initiatives was suggested by the former Prime Minister, Hesham Qandil, on 25 July 2013. The initiative included three stages: starting with calming measures; followed by an agreement about the general principles for negotiating details later on; and ending with a new road map that adhered to legitimacy. The regime refused the initiative. Then on 27 July 2013 there was another initiative made by a number of public figures, known as Selim El-Awa's initiative. This was based on the 2012 constitution, and suggested that the president should

delegate all of his authority to a new interim government that gained consensus. Then, representative elections would be held to elect a government, followed by presidential elections, in addition to the amendment of some articles in the constitution.[140]

Several public figures from Alexandria City proposed another initiative on 12 August 2013 called "the February-12th-Initiative." This initiative was based on two stages. The first involved mutual trust-building procedures that included a halt to taking activists into detention, of incitement by the regime, and of escalation on the streets by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. The second stage would include a call for round-table talks to plan the political path again, after the president had delegated his authorities to a Prime Minister appointed by consent. The consensual government would amend the constitution, prepare for the elections, and form a national committee to set up a transitional justice system. It would receive all cases of human rights violation that were committed before and after 25 January 2011 and after 30 June 2013, and make a pact of media honour. The institution of Al-Azhar made an attempt to gather all these initiatives into one, and an invitation was sent to all local initiators to attend a meeting with Al-Azhar officials on 14 August 2013. However, the regime had chosen that day to crackdown on the Rabia and Al-Nahda sit-ins; hence, the meeting was never held.

Some international powers tried to mediate, such as the African Union Panel of the Wise, the High Representative of the European Union, and an international delegation that included: the assistant of the American Secretary of State, William Burns; the delegate of the European Union, Bernardino Leon; the Qatari minister of foreign affairs, Khalid Al Attiya; and the UAE minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah bin Zayed. The delegation held a meeting that concluded without achieving any fruitful results. Their mission was to persuade the Muslim Brotherhood to accept the road map in return for the release of some of the detained activists, to maintain the legal and political status of the Muslim Brotherhood and their political party, to reopen the television channels that had been banned, and to allow the

candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood to run for representative elections. The presidential institution declared on 7 August 2013 recorded the failure of these international efforts and held the Muslim Brotherhood accountable.

After the crackdown on the sit-ins, an initiative was made by the then vice prime minister, Ziad Bahaa Eldin, on 21 August 2013. This included several principles, such as renouncing violence, continuation of the road map, participation by all political actors, and refusal of the political exclusion of any current. However, the government never considered this initiative. On 5 October 2013, Ahmed Kamal Abu Al-Magd proposed another initiative that involved a constitutional solution. Later, Hassan Nafea proposed an initiative on 17 October 2013, which was re-proposed on 4 February 2014.

The latter initiative included several procedures as a preliminary step towards comprehensive national conciliation via a membership-limited panel of the wise, mutual appeasement that aimed to: halt the demonstrations and the media escalation; release political leaders from detention; form an impartial fact-finding committee; and find a mechanism that would guarantee participation by all political forces in the representative and presidential elections. The Civilised Alternative Party (Al-Badel Al-Hadary Party) made a suggestion concerning holding a plebiscite for the road map.[141]

The interim president, Adly Mansour, declared that the door to conciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood was closed because of what he claimed was an escalation of violent and terrorist acts caused by them.[142] Then the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist group, and anyone who suggested conciliation with them would face distrust and accusation. After the election of a new president there was no real indication that the regime wanted to talk or to reconcile. It is worth noting here that the immense human rights violations in Egypt following 3 July 2013, which represented a precedent in Egypt's modern history, caused complications in the situation in Egypt, as well as placing obstacles to conducting any serious dialogue or reconciliation.

3.3— Concluding remarks

It is noted that all initiatives made following 30 June were merely initiatives for resolving the political crisis. Accordingly, they were never intended to represent a comprehensive dialogue. However, actual dialogue could be conducted if the political forces, whose interest was in defending the principles and demands of the January-25th-revolution, had a single vision that expressed their interests and standpoints correctly. It is important therefore to think about selecting an impartial mediator from among public figures, human rights organisations, and civil society, to determine five elements:

1. The dangers of the current path, concentrating on:
   - The dangers of continuing the government's zero-sum game on the Egyptian social structure and the future of democracy and liberties.
   - The dangers of politicising the military for Egyptian and Arab national security, and for its unity in a region that is riddled with massive foreign challenges.
   - The dangers of the civil political parties not realising that the Islamist stream could not be excluded, as it is an integral part of the societal structure.
   - The dangers of the Islamist current not realising that its duty is to find partners from other currents to cooperate in achieving a mutual national agenda.
   - The dangers of military leaders not realising that the events of 2011 in Egypt represented a real revolution against despotism and corruption, and that the revolution would never come to an end unless it led to establishing a modern state, democratic institutions, and an elected civil government in which the army, or any other non-elected institution, would never have the upper hand over the elected government.[143]
   - The dangers of the international and regional actors, who support the Egyptian regime, not realising that Egypt

and the entire region would never stabilise unless a real change was achieved in Egypt, and that the revolutionary spirit in Egypt is still alive: new alliances will be formed and will change the existing political equation again.

2. The nature of the revolutionary change, especially the likely violence, the importance of concentrating on the strategic goal in post-revolution stages, the peril of contesting and conducting prompt elections before reaching concurrence, etc.

3. The basic principles of any political path in the future, which must include the prohibition of bloodshed, and putting a halt to all kinds of incitement and hatred. It must form a democratic, united front during the stage of institutionalisation and the period from electoral contestation to the stage of post-institutionalisation. The priority must be to build an alternative democratic regime, with values, institutions and mechanisms made answerable to other partisan agendas, avoiding the politicisation of institutions that must not be politicised, such as the military, religious institutions, judicial institutions, the media, and the bureaucratic institutions, etc.

4. Determining the essential issues that need actual discussions, most importantly: building a modern democratic state and civil-military relations; establishing a transitional justice system; searching for mechanisms that solve the problem of religion and politics in a way that guarantees the utilisation of religious values in urging people to work and participate; avoiding the manipulation of religion to acquire political gains; finding mechanisms to fortify political parties and civil society; solving the security issues in Sinai and on Egypt's borders; and finally drafting strategies to accomplish real development and social justice, to develop deprived and neglected areas of the country.

4— Libya

There are two pivotal issues to address in comprehending the possible success of any dialogue to be conducted in Libya. First, Muammar Gaddafi has left the burden of a despotic legacy, which represents a main reason for what the country is going through. This legacy complicates the transitional period, and it is difficult to tackle the situation in a short period or without vast national reconciliation among rational political actors. Second, the violent mode of change via mass demonstrations and sedition by elements in the armed forces is the most common mode for changing totalitarian regimes, yet it is also the most difficult one to manage.[144] The conflict in Libya was not between the ruling authority and the opposition regarding specific policies that could be a matter of debate or discussion; instead, it was a conflict between the regime and its opponents for survival, as has been the case in most totalitarian regimes, specifically in Africa and Asia. It was the survival of the regime and annihilation of the opposition set against the victory of the opposition and the collapse of the regime.[145]

Although revolutions are an opportunity for comprehensive change, many cases have shown that the mode of revolutionary change could negatively affect the nation-building process, add immense obstacles to transition, and, in most cases, lead to the introduction of new authoritarian regimes, the failure of transition, and domination by new military leaders or armed groups, as demonstrated by cases in several African countries.[146] Democratization, which many thought would start as soon as the head of the old regime was overthrown, is a complicated process, as it rearranges the rules of political contestation, changes the existing power relations, systems, and structures, and increases the degree of uncertainty. The primary results of that process in the short term were political and social problems.[147] A hasty change or incorrect transformation could lead to political violence or a sort of unfinished democratic change that results in several problems.[148]

The high cost of such a change is realized as soon as the

regime is overthrown because of the accumulated feelings of distrust among political actors, in addition to the lack of political experience. In similar cases, there was a need for an impartial international mediator, which depends mainly on the geopolitical situation of the country. If the stabilization of such a country favors the interests of regional and international actors, the transitional process is more likely to succeed. If the interests of the regional and international countries favor intervention, armed conflicts are likely to be extended, as in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Congo, Angola, Sri Lanka, and El Salvador, among others.

Because the Libyan case has not witnessed any actual dialogue, this section of the study shall address the challenges encountered in the transitional path in Libya, the feeble attempts to conduct a national dialogue, and recommendations for conducting comprehensive dialogue.

4.1— Challenges

4.1.1— Elections amidst armed conflicts

After the overthrow of Gaddafi, an unelected council [the Transitional National Council (TNC)] ruled Libya, formed in Benghazi as a representative entity of the revolution of February 2011. Thus, the TNC chose a roadmap that started with conducting elections. This choice was the first serious mistake made during the transitional phase. The TNC issued a Constitutional Declaration as the basis of rule for a specific interval of time that would end two years later (by the end of 2013, when Libya would have ratified its permanent constitution and elected its permanent legislative and executive institutions).[149] What was the problem with such a path? Why did it fail to reach its goal?

The main problem in a transitional process that starts with conducting elections in countries that are still fumbling to escape a despotic legacy is that the elections cultivate the principle of

contestation during the stage of institutionalization and create relative weights in elections for the political actors, which increases distrust and polarization among the political actors. In addition, there is difficulty in adhering to electoral entitlements in reality because of the immense challenges encountered.

This is what took place in Libya, as the TNC was unable to adhere to its promises. In March 2012, the TNC amended article 30 of the Constitutional Declaration (which included the roadmap) and decided to form a committee of sixty members instead of a Constituent Assembly chosen by the TNC. Thus, the TNC deprived the General National Conference (GNC) of its constitutional authority. This change enraged many actors, so the TNC made another change to article 30 to guarantee equity in parliamentary seats among the three provinces (Barqa, Fezzan, and Tripoli) and to stipulate that the committee members should be elected by the Libyans, not appointed by the parliament. The latter amendment occurred before the elections of the GNC were conducted on July 7, 2012, and in response to regional pressure, particularly from supporters of the separation of the Barqa province and the Benghazi protests. The amendment put a halt to the crisis at that time but increased contestation among the political actors rather than encouraging them to meet, engage in dialogue, and reach agreement on pivotal issues.[150]

It was also difficult to adhere to all the entitlements set by the Constitutional Declaration and its amendments following the election of the GNC, as the GNC reconsidered the amendments in article 30 and assigned a committee to conduct societal dialogue to discuss the formation of a constituent entity. It was a good step, and it could have led to a broad national dialogue and to actual political agreement. However, the dialogue halted when the GNC decided to choose a commission to prepare the constitution via elections. The GNC authorized the decision with the consent of only 87 members out of the 97 who attended the session, though the total number of members was 200 members! Once again, the political elites chose disagreement on the fateful issue of the constitution, either by abstaining from attendance at conference sessions or by continuing to make decisions regardless of low attendance.

On more hazardous grounds, the GNC granted itself the authority to approve or reject a draft constitution written by the 60-member committee, in addition to the right to put the constitution to a plebiscite. This created a contradiction and granted the elected conference authority over another elected entity that was supposed to be a constituent entity. In addition, the conference reserved the right to amend the constitution.

As was the case in Egypt, it is normal for such a conflict to be referred to the courts to address the constitutional confusion. The High Court accepted the claim submitted by several activists to reject the constitutional amendments, and the court issued a verdict stating that the third amendment to the Constitutional Declaration was unconstitutional because of the lack of the necessary legal quorum. The GNC issued a new law on July 20, 2013 regarding the election of the constituent entity tasked with wording the draft constitution, ratifying the principle of electing the constituent entity and allocating the seats equally among the three provinces.[151]

Because of the constitutional confusion, Libyans have headed to the polls three times since the former regime was overthrown: the first time was in July 2012 to elect 200 members of the GNC, which acted as an interim parliament during a legally stated period of eighteen months. The electoral system specified 80 seats for political parties and blocs and 120 seats for independent candidates. The second time was in March 2013 to elect the constituent entity for drafting the constitution. The third time was in June 2014 to elect 200 MPs of the parliament that would succeed the GNC. This time, a majority system was authorized rather than a hybrid system.

On more hazardous grounds, the elections were held amidst violent armed conflicts and before the disarmament of the armed battalions.[152] In addition, they were held four days following an important military operation waged by one of the retired military leaders in Benghazi against what he called extremist Islamists, as he also called for dissolving the GNC, assuming that it had conspired with a group of armed Sharia supporters. This was not advisable, as democratic elections can never be held amidst armed conflict or the diffusion of weapons and lack of security.

This is a main criterion for democratic elections.[153]

The result of the elections was the relative apportionment of political parties such that the civil actors came first and the Islamist actors came second. It is notable that the confidence of the masses in the elections as a mechanism of settling political conflict during the transitional stages faded. In the third elections, as a result of the security collapse and lack of preparedness, a lower percentage of voter participation was registered, and according to the high commission of elections, nearly 1.5 million voters registered to vote out of 3.4 million of those entitled to vote, representing nearly half of those who registered in the first elections (2.8 million voters). The masses realized that the path taken was wrong when the elites insisted on holding elections before reaching compromises.

4.1.2— Gaddafi's legacy

As stated previously, Gaddafi has bequeathed a burdensome legacy that represents a main reason for the confusion and chaos from which Libya suffers and hinders a successful transition to democracy. Gaddafi has bequeathed a society with no law, politics, national army, or real development. In addition, he has bequeathed vast violations of human rights, the painful consequences of the Law of Ownership;[154] the squandering of public wealth in international wars; requests by Chad to unveil the truth of such wars and compensate it for waging a war against it, in addition to revealing the truth about the 2003 Lockerbie deal; the case of the children who were injected with the AIDS virus; and Lebanon's demands to reveal the truth about Imam Mousa AlSadr's disappearance, among other things. He also bequeathed the problem of the displaced, inside and outside Libya, after the February revolution conflicts. Some have estimated that 500,000 to a million persons were displaced into surrounding Arab and African countries.[155]

Things became more complicated as a result of the spillovers of the method utilized by the transitional administration to tackle Gaddafi's legacy, which was shown

later in the so-called Political Isolation Law authorized (No. 13 / 2013) approved by the GNC on May 5, 2013 that acquired a majority of 164 votes for the law and four votes against it out of 200 votes following the siege by militants of several ministries and the GNC building. The siege was not lifted until the law had been authorized. The law was also made constitutionally immune by amending the constitutional declaration to prevent judicial review of the Isolation Law.

The law banned – for ten years – the following from occupying any high positions in political, administrative, judicial, diplomatic, and educational positions, as well as memberships on boards of directors and administrative, financial, executive, and supervisory positions in wholly or partially publically owned entities inside or outside Libya: all those who occupied a military, political, or administrative position from 1969 to 2011, those who were business partners of Gaddafi's family, chairmen of student unions, those who occupied the position of a manager or a researcher at the World Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, civilians who had cooperated with the security institutions, those who glorified Gaddafi's regime in the media or via direct speech, those who fought against the February revolution by incitement or financial aid, those who violated human rights inside or outside Libya in favor of the regime, those involved in the looting of people's wealth, those who utilized religious speech to grant Gaddafi's rule legality, and those engaged in scientific, artistic, intellectual, religious, cultural, or social activities that aimed at glorifying Gaddafi and his regime.[156]

An analyst has commented on this law, stating that the law assumed that anyone related to Gaddafi's regime was morally unchangeable. In fact, political actors never realized the perils of such a law, as the Justice and Development Party, the political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, considered it a preventive procedure, not a punishment, and it was issued to protect the revolution. Others saw that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic fundamentalists were the ones benefiting from the law, as they had been banned from participating in the public sphere during Gaddafi's reign. Moreover, some have considered that

there were some personal goals behind the law, such as the identification of their opponents and acquisition of political gains, mainly the exclusion of the faction led by Mahmoud Gebril and his allies.[157]

Geographical vicinity plays a role regarding this issue, as the law was ratified, and there was a similar discussion in Egypt and Tunisia regarding how to tackle the remnants of the old regime. Egypt had enacted a similar law in 2011, which was annulled later by the High Constitutional Court. In Tunisia, the Constituent Council ratified a law that caused less exclusion in 2013 but was repealed after the uproar in Libya.

In Libya, many observers have considered it the worst method to address the issue,[158] and the law had already led to many negative results, mainly social division and deepening of the conflicts among the political actors and incitement by warlords harmed by the law to fight against any process of national reconciliation and to sabotage all efforts at disarmament and the achievement of peace.[159] In addition, the law led to the building of political blocs among the political actors harmed by the law with the officials remaining from the old regime rather than protecting the revolution.

The law had never guaranteed elimination of the violations. On the contrary, it risked causing a cycle of revenge and retaliation. As a result, the head of the committee tasked to define the isolation criteria, Mohammed Younis AlTomy, resigned, as the committee was tasked with stating the criteria of the Isolation Law, when he realized that some had manipulated the criteria to utilize them against their opponents.[160] In addition, it could have led to confusion among many of the vital institutions, such as the judiciary, as it was estimated that nearly half of the judges would be isolated upon the application of such a law.[161]

In fact, the comprehensive purge followed in Libya was the absolute opposite of the comprehensive transitional justice system that had proved successful in many other cases and that was based upon unveiling and announcing the truth. Such a system has also been based upon a program of recognizing

damages and paying compensation, judicial prosecutions, holding important officials accountable, along with all those who committed war crimes, while including them in comprehensive national reconciliation programs, and radical reform of the state institutions (security, the judiciary, the media, and bureaucratic institutions) to guarantee that such violations would never reoccur. This requires holding a comprehensive national dialogue that Libya has not able to achieve to date, as shall be shown below.[162]

Although the national conference utilized another solution, which was the foundation of "the High Institution for Applying the National and Impartial Criteria," until the constitution was ratified, to verify the background of anyone nominated for a leading position (with the right to appeal in court), the high institution never succeeded because of the lack of national agreement upon the method, as well as objections by some to the way in which such criteria were set. "The Committee of Truth and Conciliation" that submitted reports to the GNC and worked as an independent entity encountered many challenges, as it never worked in a comprehensive and integral system of transitional justice, which, in turn, would have needed radical reform in the state institutions. The committee suffered from the lack or destruction of evidence because of weak institutions and the absence of a suitable legal framework. Some raised doubts about the ability of the committee to accomplish its mission, as its head, Hussein AlBoaeshy, had previously worked as the chairman of the High Court during Gaddafi's reign, and he resigned before the revolution, but the Isolation Law did not exclude him.[163]

4.1.3— The militants and armed cities

The militants, the armed militias, and the spread of weapons are the most important challenges that hinder dialogue in Libya, as it has been estimated that millions of weapons are in the hands of militants. There have been penetrations of such armed militias by some opportunists and criminals who escaped from prison

after the February 2011 revolution and whose interests were in conflict with state stability.[164]

The number of armed rebels against Gaddafi was estimated at 40,000 across Libya. Now the number has escalated to be include more than 200,000 armed men (nearly 3% of Libya's population). The main reason for this was the official recognition that they received from the state that paid their salaries, in addition to the weak programs used to integrate them into the official police forces and army. These official forces were weak in the first place, as they worked in loose coordination with unofficial militants who were strongly supported by tribal and religious forces.[165]

Moreover, some cities and areas now own heavy weapons and huge financial capabilities, mainly Misrata, Alzentan, AlZawya, the Tebbo groups in the South, the Islamic groups in the cities of Derna, Benghazi, Ejdabiya, and the central area in Sert. Fighters have taken over the armories in these areas and acquired subsidies from foreign countries. Some cities have their own prisons, check-points, and attempts to open Arab and foreign consulates, as in the case of Misrata. In the East, a group that called itself the federal stream allied with an armed force that took over the oil harbors in Albouraiqa, Alsedrah, and Ras Lanov.[166] In addition, such armed militias are reported to have committed violations, and some have reported grave transgressions committed by Misrata rebels when they entered Tawerghaa and Beni Walid, among other areas.[167]

All of the aforementioned issues are related to the weak sovereignty of law in Libya, as today there are two governments, two parliaments, and several competing armed battalions.[168] The situation has been aggravated by two laws enacted by the NTC under pressure in April 2011 that granted immunity against prosecution to rebels who committed human rights violations during the revolution as acts of "necessity."[169] There have been many other examples of the lack of the sovereignty of law, including the revolutionary council in AlZentan refusing the extradition of Seif El-Islam Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court or to be prosecuted in the courts of Tripoli. Moreover, the armed militants imposed a siege on the GNC to

urge them to issue the Isolation Law and kidnapped the prime minister for several hours in October 2013.[170]

Amidst utter collapse and the lack of authority and law, some tribal and historical rivalry among cities and tribes reappeared on the political scene, including the rivalry between Misrata and Beni Walid, which some have traced back to the 1920s, as Misrata held Beni Walid accountable for the assassination of the fighter Ramadan AlSwehly. When Beni Walid refused to submit to the decision made by the GNC to extradite accused persons, Misrata battalions imposed a siege on the city for 25 days that ended with the fall of the city and the murder of hundreds of people.[171] Many other old non-political conflicts have reemerged regarding land, historical, or ethnic grievances, such as the conflict on Nafusa Mountain over the lands between the AlZentan and AlMashashya tribes. Unfortunately, such old conflicts have been revived by those whose interest is to agitate Libya or by narrow-minded elites in the absence of the state or any attempt to gather all parties around a real reconciliation table.

4.1.4— External factors

External challenges have hindered any national reconciliation. With weak border surveillance, Libya itself has suffered as foreign fighters from Arab and other countries have joined some of the warring factions, in addition to transporting weapons to the interior of Libya to reach those factions. Similarly, the surrounding countries have suffered from the opening of the borders as the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and tobacco and illegal immigration have increased. As a result of the smuggling of Libyan weapons to other countries in particular, many spillovers have occurred in the neighboring countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mali. The Al-Qaeda organization in Morocco benefited from the smuggling of weapons from Libya and the opening of borders without surveillance. New fighters from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other countries north of Mali have joined the conflict, and the foundation of the Azawad state

was declared in Mali, which required the interference of France and NATO as they waged what they call the war against terrorism.

The effect of geographical vicinity has also been manifested in the spillover of Egyptian events on the situation in Libya. The zero-sum game that began in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013 had an immediate impact on the situation in Libya via what was called "the Honor Operation" led by General Khalifa Haftar against the militants of the Islamist movement in Libya because they were accused of killing hundreds of military leaders and forcing hundreds to retire, in addition to all the side-effects, particularly the indecisive international position regarding the operation.[172] Moreover, the Islamists focused on defending themselves and other groups that depend on the exclusion of others and do not accept peaceful compromise.[173]

Nevertheless, the situation in Libya was more complicated than that of Egypt, as there was unity in the Egyptian army; there have been various militants in Libya and the diffusion of weapons, in addition to the role of the Libyan tribes in supporting armed groups. It is apparent from recent Egyptian movements that Egypt and its allies in the Arab Gulf countries have adopted a security choice to deal with the Libyan situation. In a conference involving countries neighboring Libya, the Egyptian recommendation focused on tackling the Libyan crisis by utilizing an initiative to collect weapons without seeking to provide a comprehensive and integral vision for a national dialogue in which collecting weapons would be one of the pillars.

The Egyptian events caused the escalation of severe tension between Islamists and non-Islamists in Libya, as one of its manifestations was the dismissal of Islamists from Zeidan's government in January 2014 following the support given by Zeidan to the new Egyptian regime and his visit to Egypt in September 2013. It is notable that Zeidan urged the Egyptians to vote for Sisi a few days after Sisi's statement that the source of terrorism in Egypt was Libya and that he blamed NATO for leaving Libya without eliminating terrorism and extremists.[174]

The House of Representatives in Libya, which resides in Tobruk[175], gained immense support from the Egyptian authorities. In addition, the chair of the Libyan parliament, Saleh Oquaila, and the chief of the general staff of the Libyan army, General Abdel Razeq Alzannoury, visited Egypt in August 2014. The subjects announced fordiscussion included giving the Libyan army the necessary training and technical consultation. Afterwards, the Libyan prime minister of the House of Representatives, Abdullah AlThanny, visited Egypt in October 2014 to discuss combating terrorism, coordinating security and military efforts to achieve order on the terrestrial border between the two countries, and Egypt's contribution to the rehabilitation and training of the Libyan national army. Some Libyan and international actors[176] have accused Egypt and the UAE of participating, along with Haftar's militants, in military operations, although this has been denied by Egypt several times. There is no doubt that, if Egypt and Arab intervention in Libya has happened, such a policy would lead the two countries into a dark tunnel of conflicts and security issues, as well as a deepening of the Libyan conflicts.

4.2— Dialogue attempts

In the last few years, several invitations and initiatives to conduct dialogue have been introduced, and some have argued that Libya has suffered from the huge number of initiatives and the contradictions among them. Others, both inside and outside Libya, have also initiated actions to conduct a dialogue; however, such attempts have never resulted in a comprehensive dialogue.

The Council of the Wise Libyans and Advisers is one of the parties that has mediated some conflicts, as it was selected by sheikhs and notables from the Libyan cities. The council was able to mediate and resolve local conflicts, addressing areas of tension in Benghazi, Nafusa Mountain, and others, and it ended several armed clashes between the Alzentan and Almashaysha tribes in December 2012 following their land dispute and

accusations against Almashaysha of supporting Gaddafi. The council halted the conflict following the murder of 300 persons and urged the two parties to sign a code of behavior and form a board of arbitration.[177] The council has also mediated the release of a number of detainees from the districts of Gheryan and Reshfana, as well as the exchange of detainees between the two parties in September 2014.[178] The council has requested that political parties suspend their activities during the transitional stage and asked the GNC to form a limited government as a crisis government.

In August 2014, the council suggested an initiative to resolve the military conflict that included declaring Tripoli and Benghazi arms-free cities and determining a timeframe for implementing the articles of the initiative, with the parties in conflict turning over the disputed locations. The initiative would start with the declaration of a cease-fire by all disputing parties, and then the council would start a dialogue with all parties aimed at finding a solution that guarantees state power and turning over of all state locations to the concerned entities, such as the ministries of the interior, customs, and harbors, as well as turning over military camps to the chief of staff. The initiative also included the suspension of all media campaigns broadcasted by the TV channels of the parties in conflict.[179]

Other civil society organizations have contributed to actual achievements, such as Libya Without Borders, which has mediated and contributed to halting the clashes in Zowara and other areas. The National Accord and Conciliation Association has also provided aid for underprivileged areas and expanded its activities in the south. In addition, the Feminist Abu Selim Movement cultivated the resistance culture before the outbreak of the revolution and has worked as a pressure group to defend women's rights.[180]

On August 25, 2013, the Libyan Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, announced the launch of an initiative for a national dialogue that would encompass several issues, mainly national reconciliation, disarmament, and other economic and social issues. The cabinet also decided to establish an association to prepare the dialogue formation.[181] Inspired by the Yemeni and Tunisian experiments,

"the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission"[182] was established in August 2013. The commission included a number of intellectually and politically independent members and aimed to foster dialogue independently of the official political process be creating opportunities for all social factions to express their opinions regarding the future of Libya. The commission stated that the Libyan state would provide logistical and financial support for preparing for the dialogue without any intervention from the official administration or forcing any instructions on the work of the preparatory commission. It also stated that the mission of the United Nations team was only to provide technical aid, including international experience, as well as technical training.[183]

The commission's view was that the first phase of the talks would produce a national pact that reflected the national accord, the shared national values and principles, the bases of peaceful conduct, and the sought-after democratic regime. The second phase would involve a strategic dialogue on significant issues, such as security, national reconciliation, transitional justice, development, the distribution of public wealth, construction, etc.[184] The commission also noted that it would invite the constituent committee responsible for drafting the constitution to be an observer in the dialogue sessions.[185]

In April 2014, the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission, with a consultant team of 75 members and a technical committee, announced nine sections of society that would have 300 representatives to represent them in the dialogue sessions, including civil society, rebels, political parties, tribal notables and sheikhs, independent public figures, Libyan cultural minorities (Amazigh, Tebbu, etc.), state institutions, Libyans abroad as well as others who have been chosen on a basis that guarantees a comprehensive and balanced participation for all sections of society. Women and youth's representation would be guaranteed by a minimum percentage of 30% for each. The committee has set a three-month period for each phase.[186]

Some efforts were also exerted by the Libyan Council of Notables and Men of Wisdom, which declared a plan for

reconciliation, stating that it was initiated by the "rebels of Misrata city." The plan included a calming period of 24 months, divided into three phases and fostered by the legislative and executive entities, in addition to a popular plebiscite on the initiative.[187] Other attempts at conducting dialogue were initiated, such as the national concordance program, the national dialogue initiative, and the national allies' initiative for conciliation, among others.

The Libyan city of Ghadames witnessed what is known as the Ghadames dialogue on September 29, 2014, fostered by the United Nations delegation to Libya and its head, Bernardino Leon, based on the principle that the Libyan Representative House held in Tobruk was a legal entity, as it was a product of the elections conducted on June 25, 2014, and on the principle that the Constitutional Declaration and its amendments should be respected and considered a higher reference for solving all constitutional and legal disputes. Therefore, the dialogue was limited to the parties supporting the House of Representatives, without any participation by other political parties or armed organizations, such as the Dawn of Libya Forces in the western area and the Benghazi Rebels Consultation Council.[188] Before holding the dialogue sessions, Leon mentioned Security Council Resolution No. 2174, issued on August 27, 2014, for the purpose of adhering to the output of the dialogue.

The House of Representatives and the chief of staff accepted the dialogue. The chief of staff also accepted the cease-fire initiative, provided that the Dawn of Libya organization and the Rebels Consultation Council would halt their military operations. However, the Benghazi Rebels Consultation Council rejected the dialogue and all foreign intervention, believing that the aim of the dialogue was to exclude the rebels.[189] The Dawn of Libya forces announced that they refused to halt military operations before the disarmament of what they called "the counterrevolution." The political parties that supported the Dawn of Libya took no clear stand out of fear of accusations of supporting the military operations or abandonment of the military achievements that had taken place on the ground. The Justice and Development Party declared a moderate position, as

it supported the House of the Expounding of Islamic Law ('*Ifta*'), which demanded a delay of the dialogue until the legality of the Libyan House of Representatives was decided by the High Court.[190]

There is no doubt that the process could never be comprehensive, as the United Nations acknowledged the House of Representatives as the entity that represented full legality, while the legality of the parliament was not full because the Libyan High Court was still looking into the case after members of the national conference and political public figures and parties appealed the legality of the House of Representatives regarding the way of handing out the authority, the location where its sessions were held, the constitutionality of the election law, and the constitutional amendment that established a third transitional stage.[191] It was apparent that there was some Western and international concern that the High Court would decide that such laws and amendments were unconstitutional and that the GNC, dominated by the Islamists, would regain legitimacy.

A former international delegate, Tareq Metry, invited all political, societal, and military actors to engage in dialogue immediately before the elections to the House of Representatives in June. However, the national actors' alliance and the political and military actors who supported the parliament declined the invitation, as they considered it an attempt to save the Islamist parties that were to be defeated in the elections.

Moreover, a conference was held in Madrid in September 2014 with the participation of more than 20 countries and national organizations, such as the UN, the European Union, and the League of Arab States. The organizers of the conference announced that it aimed at finding a route to support dialogue among the Libyan parties and avoiding turning Libya into a conflict area that would threaten the region's security.[192] Others believed that considering the conference an initiative for dialogue was not possible for two reasons. The first reason was that the Tripoli team was not invited to the conference, and the second was that the objective of the supporters of AlThenny's government from Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia was to turn the conference into a platform for granting legality to

AlThenny's government and to the war against terror (i.e., fighting the AlHassy government and the Dawn of Libya forces).[193]

Tunisia has attempted to mediate in the Libyan crisis, as several thousand Libyans have sought protection in Tunisia. Tunisia has also suffered from weapons smuggling and fundamentalists crossing the Libyan border into Tunisia. Therefore, Tunisia has an interest in Libya's stability. In April 2014, Tunisia invited all Libyan parties to participate in dialogue; however, some Libyans, such as the head of the national actors' alliance, Mahmoud Gebril, declined the invitation, as he believed that the dialogue would aim at ratifying events on the ground.[194] Monssef AlMarzuqi and Rashed AlGhannoushi tried to assemble all the conflicting parties. A Tunisian initiative was also fostered by the UN; however, it was halted because some other Arab countries chose a military solution before conducting a dialogue, as stated by the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs.[195] Algeria has also offered to mediate, like Tunisia, as it refuses foreign intervention.[196]

Meetings are held regularly by the Conference of Neighboring Countries of Libya, attended by all ministers of foreign affairs of those countries, as well as those of African Union countries, the European Union, and the UN, aimed at discussing all possible solutions to the conflict in Libya. Their last meeting was held in Cairo in August 2014. It is notable that such meetings have been ineffective because of the different points of view of the neighboring countries regarding how to resolve the crisis. Algeria saw the necessity of conducting a dialogue and seeking a peaceful solution through participation by all parties, including the Dawn of Libya forces, in addressing security on its borders with Libya.[197] Egypt saw the necessity of resorting to a military solution, as it has signed a military accord with AlThenny's government.[198] The European Union, in turn, suffered from the various points of view from inside, as France has urged other parties to intervene militarily because of its historical association with southern Libya, which is rich in wealth and located on the borders of France's old colonies.

In fact, the foreign intervention to mediate was a double-

edged sword, as intervention might be preferred if the foreign actors had an interest in the stabilization of the country, if they urged all parties to negotiate, or if they offered technical support, training, and consultation in specific respects. In other cases, foreign intervention has been harmful, as it aimed at establishing certain conditions, giving preference to a certain party over others, or smuggling weapons to one of the parties in conflict. Some news outlets have reported that weapons from Qatar and Turkey have been smuggled to Islamist armed groups and from the UAE to civil factions.

As indicated, the foreign intervention in Yemen achieved some positive results when the various parties were urged to conduct a dialogue, but the outcomes and the prospect of carrying out such results have clashed with the rivalry among regional and international actors for political influence in Yemen, which hindered the transitional path. In Tunisia, the mediator was a national party, which led to the achievement of an applicable national accordance.

The Libyan case has been more complex than the others, as the foreign intervention started in the early stages via Security Council Resolution no. 1973, which stipulated an air embargo area and allowed for military intervention by NATO. As soon as the regime was ousted, Libya and the armed political forces were free to interact internally. There was also some mystery regarding the part played by France and its support for the civil factions, as well as the American role. In Libya, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the foreign actors demolished the old regime with no real support for building an alternative one, in contrast to the cases of Japan and Germany.

4.3— Requirements for a comprehensive dialogue

As stated, it is apparent that, despite the immense despotic legacy of the old regime and its responsibility for the current challenges, the ways used to overcome such challenges were partially responsible for the failure of the transitional path. Other countries have experienced the same hardships but were able to

overcome them when the political leaders and elites had a more comprehensive view and skills to deal with the internal and external challenges.

The proponents of the Libyan revolution were unable to offer a comprehensive view for the regime after the ousting of the old one. The goal of ousting Gaddafi united all political actors, yet as soon as the regime was ousted, these actors not only disagreed on a proposed alternative regime that guaranteed the building of a modern state in Libya but also suffered from internal conflicts and divisions. It was also apparent that the actors who tried to mediate the Libyan conflict were numerous with no real attempts at coordination.

The prevalence of the victor mentality, the lack of political experience, the assumptions by each faction that it is the only party capable of protecting the revolution and, hence, the inability of the political elites to rearrange their priorities or to search for mutual interests, the selective and limited comprehension of history and reality,[199] and perhaps the seeking of personal interests by some are all factors that have deepened the splits and hindered any efforts to achieve homogeneity and coherence.

These actors still have opportunities to save Libya. The first way is time-tested, as it involves alliances that transcend narrow affiliations, whether they are tribal, regional, or ideological, to reach a mutual accord regarding institutionalizing the basis of a democratic regime, including its acknowledged principles, values, and institutions, as it would guarantee the foundation of the rule of law, liberties, institutions, and citizenship during a transitional stage where there is no contestation for positions of authority. This type of governance is the first brick in the democratic foundation, as it allows all parties to act according to the rule of law and state institutions, as well as to promote their programs and ideas and settle issues of dispute. Societies such as India, Malaysia, Poland, and Spain, among others, have experienced this way of building broad national alliances.[200]

The second way is to conduct a comprehensive national dialogue that would found the basis of a democratic regime

during the transitional stage via transitional arrangements where there is no contestation for positions of authority. During the dialogue, disputed issues should be settled, and all arrangements should be taken to avoid the reemergence of armed conflicts. The following recommendation might contribute to conducting the desired dialogue:

- Support should be given to efforts to form a consolidated national committee of all local mediators in the political realm, such as the Council of the Libyan Wise-men & Advisers, the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission, the Libyan Council of the Notables, and all civil society organizations to act as a united national mediator that can gain the trust of most conflicting parties in Libya in coordination with the UN to form a joint preparatory commission to prepare for a broad national dialogue.

- Helping Libya conduct a national dialogue based upon five main principles: common understanding, broad national accord, rearranging of priorities, synchronized dialogue components, recalling of all positive aspects of tribal elements, such as the values of justice, fairness, and brotherhood and the experiences gained from intervention by tribes as mediators for settling internal conflicts.

- The following two tasks should be effected during clear time intervals: the first task is building the national institutions of the army and the police forces and building the institutions of the sovereignty of law in accordance with a comprehensive vision for the desired democratic regime that is based upon accord, not competition, during the institutionalization stage. The second task is building a comprehensive system of transitional justice that aims at unveiling the truth, addressing damages resulting from the old regime, holding officials accountable for misconduct, reforming state institutions while allowing for the participation of those who worked with the former regime provided that

they support the demands of the February revolution, and submitting all human rights violations that occurred after the ousting of the former regime to a national reconciliation committee that works under to the transitional justice system.

Urging international society, all international organizations, and regional countries to support one goal in Libya (in addition to offering humanitarian aid): a complete halt in helping any military faction and instead supporting efforts to build the rule of law and democratic institutions in Libya, considering that such a state is the only guarantee of stabilizing the entire region and ending illegal migration to Europe.

Conclusion

This study has examined both the process of dialogues and the attempted dialogues in the MENA region, namely, Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt and Libya, following the outbreak of democratic uprisings. This conclusion considers two areas of final thoughts: the overall democratic transitional processes, and the dialogues already conducted in the four countries.

1— General remarks on democratic transitions

1. The process of transition to democracy, and building dialogue and consensus in Arab Spring countries have stumbled for certain fundamental reasons; the most important of which is that the forces of the revolution did not assume power at this stage of the revolutions, together with the continuation of the conflict between these revolutionary forces and the forces of counter-revolution.

    The leaders of the old regimes fell, but the key actors and the main pillars of these regimes have continued to operate within the state's institutions, its security, its judicial and administrative systems as well as its media institutions.

2. The revolutionary forces could not assume power because the Arab revolutions' path turned quickly - as soon as the old regimes had fallen - to start addressing the demands of the pre-revolutionary era, i.e. reform, amending constitutions and laws (or replacing them), the conduct of elections as early as possible so as to enable the election of presidents, parliaments and governments to replace the former ones. There had been a lot of effort exerted in this direction rather than mobilizing every possible effort to convert the demands of revolutions into reality by changing the existing power pattern and the nature of power relations within the society by dismantling the bonds of tyranny in all institutions and sectors, while enabling broader segments of the people to exercise this newly-shared authority.

3. The early competition between the forces of the revolution over electoral gains, during the reconstruction of the nation and the start-up phase, was a fatal error. This situation has created some partisan relative weightings on the political scene, and it divided society into those on the government side and those aligned with the opposition. This situation also revived old differences among the various political actors, and thus, allowed the forces of counter-revolution to challenge the Arab Spring revolutions and force themselves into the transitional phase as a key actor; though this stage requires greater participation and consensus building among the revolutionaries and within the society.

This situation is what the terminology and the literature of democratic transition has been calling the "electoral revolutions." These electoral revolutions are in fact nothing but factors aborting the revolutions and a way to discard and demolish the revolutionary demands. The element that was required during the transitional stages was basically "dialogue" and "consensus building", to be utilized as the most appropriate methods to enable the wider segments of the public to participate and promote the rule of law and the state of institutions, as well as citizenship and social justice, in addition to the culture of accountability, responsibility and confronting corruption and tyranny.

4. The timing and method of dealing with the legacy of the old regimes and other critical files led to adverse effects. The political isolation laws and radical foreign policies, as well as opening up many complex issues, led to antagonizing the alliance that was affected inside these countries as well as antagonizing the equivalent bloc of forces that stood against these revolutions abroad. And thus, by having all that confluence of factors, the negative impact was apparent; although the four countries under study have seen somewhat different paths between total isolation of the old regime, as in the case of Libya, or full immunity to its members, as in Yemen. Yet, the common

denominator, which groups together all these countries, is the inability of these revolutions to choose the most appropriate and the historically best tested method, which is the "transitional justice" system. The "Transitional Justice" system is the best possible tool to achieve several objectives all together (to uncover the truth and ensure recognition, accountability and prosecuting the violators of human rights, reparations, introducing a real radical reform, as well as reconciliation).

5. The forces of the revolution, and the ones dreaming of change, came to the scene without any experience in the ways of politics and the conditions of the political process. Therefore, they could not grasp the fundamental differences between the task of toppling the old regime on one hand and the regulations, requirements and methods of building an alternative system. For this reason, these revolutionary forces have not yet been able to accomplish two main tasks; first, they did not sustain the mobilization to revolutionize large segments of the masses behind the demands of the revolutions, while the efforts made for fighting the revolution continue with many different approaches and tools. Second, the forces of the revolution did not strive to have a genuine internal organization and to move towards the formation of a strong entity (or entities) that would reflect the discourse of the revolution and its demands, and thus, leading this revolution towards achieving its objectives.

6. After the public squares in each of the Arab revolutions countries witnessed a strong alliance that was transient above ideologies and narrow affiliations in order to eliminate the old regime, these squares once again witnessed the separation of the revolutionaries and were left open to be occupied by the conventional political forces, parties and movements, which had opposed the old regimes in the past. Still, these traditional opposition forces never had real revolutionary visions for radical change. Moreover, the integration of the forces of the revolution, the rising youth groups and other social forces in these traditional parties remained very weak in most cases, and thus,

the traditional parties have not experienced any material change in their leadership and internal elites.

7. Some regional and international powers did not find their interests compatible with the establishment of national independent systems and strong democratic institutions in the Arab countries. And it is for this reason that the forces of counter-revolution received strong regional and international support, or at least managed to ensure the external powers remained neutral and did not interfere against the grave human rights violations that have been committed before and after the revolutions.

In addition, the counter-revolutions found a new ally with the recent re-entry and re-functioning of some businessmen and traditional forces in society. Media tools were also used to distort the revolutions and revolutionaries. A huge number of people were persuaded to side with the counter-revolution and stand against the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The media managed to mobilize with the use of the vocabulary and discourse of the old regimes, talking about "stability" and "security" as the ultimate goal.

8. All of the previous interactions, coupled with the developments that led to transforming the Arab revolutions for dignity, freedom and social justice into a conflict between the "Islamists" on the one hand, and the "liberals or civic advocates" on the other hand, allowed the interplay of many factors that contributed to escalating this conflict; of the most important of which were the negative attitudes and behaviors of all parties that represent these two currents, as well as the disinformation and smearing campaigns in the media and so on.

Consequently, this evolution allowed the counter-revolutionary forces at all levels to manipulate the situation and use the term "*war on terror*" as a tool to confront the revolutions, as well as portraying the conflict in more than one Arab country as a struggle for the values that they advocate against the forces of darkness, militancy and terrorism.

This discourse appeared after the counter-revolutionary forces had achieved breakthroughs that made them influential even among the ranks of the forces of the Arab Spring, and after the alliance between the counter-revolution and some liberal and leftist forces against other forces that are said to be affiliated to the "Islamic movement" and the forces of other revolution of all currents; basically the youth groups, as well as the newly emerging movements and political parties.

9. The developments that occurred in the course of the Arab revolutions are not strange, shocking or astonishing; it is a fact that there is no "*revolution*" that is not accompanied by its "*counter-revolution.*" The outcome of the interactions between the forces of revolution and those of the counter-revolution in a certain country are, in the end, the harvest and net result of the choices and behaviors of each party.

Hence, the developments that are occurring are not inevitable or arising from an inextricable defect in the Arab genes. It is important here to remember that despite the fact that the victory of the revolutions and the movements aspiring for political change seems distant from fulfillment at the moment in some Arab countries, it also seemed too far-fetched to be reached in other countries, such as South Africa, South Korea, Poland, Portugal, Chile and others.

2— Remarks on dialogue processes in the case studies

1. The developments of the transitional stages, particularly given the turmoil of the political paths taken, in addition to other factors (e.g., security and economic deterioration) have led, in the case studies, to the urgent need for conducting dialogue. However, developments in these countries have resulted in numerous paths. While two organized dialogues took place in Tunisia and Yemen, numerous attempts and initiatives for

conducting dialogue in Libya were in vain. In Egypt, no real attempt at dialogue was conducted to save the country.

2. Foreign actors had various roles in the dialogues. However, their presence in Yemen played a crucial role in urging all parties to participate in the dialogue.[201] The absence of such players in the Tunisian case led to the independence of local political actors who were able to reach a national accord.

Foreign intervention in Libya and Egypt was an obstacle to a democratic path, as certain political actors in the Egyptian realm gained great support in their conflict with the Islamists. Post-June 30th human rights violations were not the targets of any political pressure by international society for the purpose of urging the political forces to take a moderate stand.

In Libya, the situation became worse, as foreign financial and moral support was granted to most political forces in conflict. The role played by the international mediator was weak, as the international powers lacked the political will to resolve the Libyan conflicts.

No doubt any real attempt to support dialogue in the MENA region could never ignore the foreign factor. International mediators could provide training and materials necessary for mediation, dialogue, confidence building and communication.[202]

3. A significant part could be played by raising awareness, political education, the vitality of the middle class, and the work of civil society regarding the prospects for dialogue within the countries under study. Compared to the other cases, Tunisia has had a relatively positive experience. The inability of civil society to positively mediate, negotiate or contribute to raising awareness regarding the perils of the transitional stage was a result of the old legacy of despotism, which dominated and demolished the civil society, as was the case in Libya. Thus, political education and programs to empower society, as well as the consolidation of civil society, could gain more significance in this regard.

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4. The success or failure of dialogue was usually dependent on the various roles played by military institutions. The impartial role played by the Tunisian military institution was a significant factor that led to the dialogue. In contrast, the politicization of the Egyptian military played a negative part, as the political actors resorted to agreements, bargaining, or alliances with the military institution rather than turning to dialogue to tackle civil-military relations and consolidate the rule of law and the state institutions.

In Yemen, politicizing the military institution was the legacy of the former president, exacerbating the split inside the institution itself after the revolution. Moreover, the armed Houthis hindering the national dialogue could lead to taking the political process to the streets and the outbreak of armed conflicts again. Foreign subsidies granted to the armed actors in Yemen also led to more complications.

The Libyan scene looked more complicated, as the old army was completely dissolved, weapons were prevalent, and each party had gained foreign support. The success of any dialogue depends on the neutralization of the foreign actors. The leaders of the armed battalions and militants must accept, via wide international pressure, participation in a comprehensive political conciliation, which would hopefully result in the disarmament of such groups, building a national army, police, and democratic state.

5. The Islamists' role has varied in the countries under study. The Tunisian Nahda Party has played a flexible and moderate role, as they never aimed at domination. They paid much attention to building a state of law and liberties as their first priority. In contrast, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood worked unilaterally, unable to find partners in other political streams. The Salafi forces have joined the political realm, which led to greater polarization regarding sharia, ignoring other priorities, such as building a state of law and liberties. The Islamic-secular polarization has escalated as a result of the alliance between the

Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis; as the former became more right wing, all attempted dialogues were futile.

In Yemen, the Reform Party continued to work jointly with other political actors. However, there were two serious issues: the sectarian Houthis and the Al-Qaeda presence in Yemen. In Libya, many negative factors have impacted the Islamists' political performance, namely the prevalence of arms, the impact of Egyptian events on Libya, foreign intervention supporting some Islamist parties, as well as the feeble political experience of the Islamists and the divisions among them.

6. The dialogue processes in Tunisia and in Yemen were both systematically planned, yet each had completely different comprehensive agendas. The Tunisian talks took heed of the priorities of the transitional phase, as the discussions included three main issues: the constitutions, the elections and the government. The participants agreed upon a mechanism for conducting the dialogue so as to delay issues of great interest, such as the economy, till a later stage. In Yemen, the dialogue was comprehensive and planned so as to discuss all serious issues, such as the turmoil in the Southern areas, the Houthis, and building a modern state.

In Egypt, all attempted dialogues were usually dominated by the party calling for the meeting, whether the military junta or the elected president, so that they would control the proceedings as well as the general formalities.

In Libya, such instances were numerous, yet none of them was sufficiently comprehensive of all concerned parties. All the main participants in the Libyan dialogues had great confidence in the mediators who suggested such uncoordinated initiatives. In addition, Libya's significant geostrategic position was yet another obstacle to conducting talks among the regional and international actors.

7. The cases of Yemen and Tunisia differ regarding the parties' participation in the dialogues, as well as in the efficiency of such participants in implementing their outputs. In Yemen, the

dialogue was conducted by the old regime, the revolutionary actors and the regional and international players, i.e., the Gulf countries and the Security Council. Some of the participants were armed groups, such as the Houthis, the Conference Party, and Saleh's alliance. However, the implementation of the outcomes was difficult due to the lack of two main elements. The first was related to the political will of the regional and international players to support Yemen in building a state of law, establishing its political institutions and consolidating liberties. Yemen's crucial problems became more complicated, as they included turmoil in the Southern areas, the Houthis, Al-Qaeda, the foreign intervention by the Gulf countries, Iran, and the United States, in addition to some internal problems, such as tribal affiliation, the army division, the security issues, Saleh's influence and networks, and deteriorating economic and social situations. The second element was the question about how such parties could disarm violent groups or establish a national army. It was proven that Yemen lacked those elements needed to tackle the crisis.

In Tunisia, the talks were conducted by several political actors after the restoration of the old regime's leaders in new alliances with the left wing, the unions, and the liberals (Nedaa Tunis Party). The demands for a system of transitional justice were the main issues of discussion, although the immunity for revolutionaries and the isolation of the old regime were discarded during the dialogue. However, achieving the aims of a transitional justice system requires serious discussion, simultaneously preserving the first round outcomes of the dialogue. Such discussions might encounter some challenges, considering the fact that the parliamentary majority in Tunisia (Nedaa Tunis) could attempt to hinder any accusations of the old regime's leaders.

8. The Egyptian and Libyan attempts to conduct dialogue were negatively affected by the methods and timing of tackling the old regime's legacy and other issues of interest. In Egypt, the attempt to enact the isolation law, as well as attempts to reconsider foreign policy regarding certain complicated issues,

such as Egypt's relation with the United States and the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord, led to an alliance of the old regime's activists against the revolutionaries, and their eventually gaining the support of regional and international players. As a result, the fight for democracy had turned into a zero-sum game between two parties, and hence, conducting real dialogue was a great challenge. In addition, any party that would call for conducting dialogue with the Islamists after June 30th would face accusations of inappropriateness and treason.

In Libya, the Political Isolation Law was the cause of more complications. The old regime's leaders had formed a bloc against that law; hence, the fight for nation-building and democratization turned into a severe conflict between two fronts, and attempt to conduct dialogue turned into a zero-sum game as well. As set forth here, other factors also led to this predicament.

The Egyptian and Libyan situations lacked the opportunities to choose the most convenient and time-tested way—the system of transitional justice—as it could attain several goals in one strike, including unveiling the truth, holding actors accountable, prosecuting those accused of human rights violations, and working towards compensation, actual institutional reforms, and conciliation.

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جلال أمين، *ماذا حدث للمصرين؟* (القاهرة: دار الشروق، عدة طبعات)، وكذا عماد الدين شاهين، "حصيلة التحركات من أجل الديمقراطية: حالة مصر"، في: علي خليفة الكواري وعبدالفتاح ماضي، *الديمقراطية المتعثرة: مسار التحركات العربية الراهنة من أجل الديمقراطية* (بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، 2014)، 130–118، وعبدالفتاح ماضي، "انتخابات 2005 الرئاسية في مصر"، *المجلة العربية للعلوم السياسية*، بيروت: الجمعية العربية للعلوم السياسية ومركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، عدد 18، ربيع 2008.

[105] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "التوافق أولا وليس الدستور أو الانتخابات"، *الجزيرة.نت*، 23 يونيو 2011
http://abdelfattahmady.net/opinion-articles/aljzeera/207-23-6-2011.htm

[106] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "الثورة المصرية والحاجة للتشاور والتوافق"، *الجزيرة.نت*، 23 مايو 2011
http://abdelfattahmady.net/opinion-articles/aljzeera/206-23-5-2011.html
وكذا عماد الدين شاهين، مرجع سابق 135 – 137

[107] Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, ed., *Civil Resistance & Power*

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Available at: http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=524 (Aug 11, 2014).

[110] *Daily News*, May 25, 2014

http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/25/40000-arrests-related-political-turmoil-since-morsis-ouster-wiki-thawra/

[111] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "ثلاثة أسباب أخرى لرفض التعديلات الدستورية"، 27 مارس 2011، موقع الكاتب،

http://www.abdelfattahmady.net/opinion-articles/misc/306-const-changes.html

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[113] See: Josh McCrain, When do Revolutions Lead to Democracy? The Conflict between Democracy and Governance in Georgia and Tunisia, *A MA thesis* submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013, Valerie Bunce, Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 17, Number 4, October 2006, pp. 5-18, Josephine T. Andrews, The Democratic Revolution, *A PhD Dissertation* submitted in University of California, Davis, 2009, Katya Kalandadze and Mitchell A. Orenstein, "Electoral Protests and Democratization: Beyond the Color Revolutions," *Comparative Political Studies*, March 1, 2012 45: 312-340, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions," *Communist and Postcommunist Studies*, 39, no. 3 (September 2006): 283¬304 and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Electoral Revolutions," *Society*, Nov/Dec.1997, vol. 35, issue 1: 61-65.

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[115] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "ثلاثة أسباب أخرى لرفض التعديلات"، *موقع الكاتب* (www.abdelfattahmady.net).
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[121] Abdel–Fattah Mady, "Revolutions and Military–Civilian Relations," *Journal of Democracy*, Ahram Institute, Cairo, Issue 46, April 2012. For more details on the Civilian control of the armed forces: *Publications of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces* – DCAF (www.dcaf.ch/Publications).

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[123] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "خطورة سياسة الإقصاء وصم الآذان"، 6 ديسمبر 2013، *موقع الكاتب* (www.abdelfattahmady.net).

[124] انظر لمزيد من التفاصيل: عبدالفتاح ماضي، ليس دستور الثورة الدائم، 11 ديسمبر 2013، *موقع الكاتب* (www.abdelfattahmady.net).

[125] قطب العربي، الحوار والمصالحة في مصر: ضرورات الداخل وتدخلات الخارج، *مركز الجزيرة للدراسات*، 26 مارس 2014.

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http://www.masress.com/alwafd/67996

[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid.

[130] See:

علي خليفة الكواري وعبدالفتاح ماضي، *نحو كتلة تاريخية ديمقراطية في البلدان العربية* (مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، 2010).

[131] The text of the statement is available at: State Information Service, Egypt: http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=49328#. VOT2–Ma4lo4

[132] علي السلمي، "الحقيقة في قضية المبادئ الأساسية للدستور،" *الأهرام*، 9 نوفمبر 2011.

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[133] أسامة الغزالي حرب، "الوثيقة الكاشفة"، *الأهرام*، 17 أغسطس 2011.

http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/17/162760.html

[134] The Judicial Committee for Elections, Egypt

http://parliament2011.elections.eg

[135] See the articles on the military institution in the Constitution of 2012.

[136] *الشرق الأوسط*، 2 يونيو 2011.

[137] وائل قنديل،" معاهدة فيرمونت بين الرئيس أو القوى الوطنية،" *الشروق*، 7 يوليو 2012.

[138]   The text of this declaration is available in Arabic at:

www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=2211#.U6QH PJSSySo

[139] حوار أسامة الغزالي حرب مع *الشروق*، 29 سبتمبر 2014.

[140] *المصري اليوم*، 27 يوليو 2013.

[141] *اليوم السابع*، 4 فبراير 2014.

[142] الأهرام، 4 فبراير 2014،

http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/256736.aspx

[143] ولو عدنا قليلا إلى التاريخ لوجدنا أن الثورات الكبرى نجحت عندما قام الثوار بتغيير نمط ممارسة السلطة وتمكين الجماهير من المشاركة في السلطة. ففي انجلترا وفرنسا نجحت الموجات الثورية عندما انتقلت السلطة (والتي تعني ببساطة صنع القرارات والسياسات التي تنظم شئون جميع قطاعات المجتمع بما يحقق المصلحة العامة وأولويات المجتمع) من نمطها القديم إلى نمط جديد تماما، أي عندما انتقلت السلطة من يد فئة صغيرة (كانت تعمل لمصالحها الضيقة) إلى طبقات متعددة من الشعب (التي صارت تعمل لأجل فئات أوسع من المجتمع سياسيا واقتصاديا). انظر:

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Profile Books, 2013), 7–11.

[144] James L. Payne, 2005, "the Prospects for Democracy in High-Violence Societies," the Spring 2005 issue of *The Independent Review*

http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=524

[145] See:

عبدالفتاح ماضي، "الديمقراطية الآن والتنافس غدا"، جريدة *البديل*، القاهرة، 18 أبريل 2008

www.abdelfattahmady.net

Michael Bratton and Nicholas De Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 1995. 460, and Doh Chull Shin, "Review Article: On the Third Wave of Democratization, A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research, World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1994), 142.

[146] See: Richard Snyder, "Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives," in Houchang E.Chehabi and Juan Linz (eds.) *Sultanistic Regimes* (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

[147] IDEA, *Democracy conflict and Human Security*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 8.

[148] Snyder, Ibid.

[149] الإعلان الدستوري، أغسطس 2011.

[150] *ليبيا: عملية انتقالية دون خريطة دستورية*، مركز الجزيرة للدراسات، 25 مارس 2013.

[151] قانون رقم 17 لسنة 2013 بشأن انتخاب الهيئة التأسيسية لصياغة مشروع الدستور

http://hnec.ly/assets/uploads/2013/11/r.2013.17.pdf

[152] عزمي بشارة، "الحوار الوطني ليس رفاهية، مهمات ملحة في ليبيا"، *العربي الجديد*، 13 مايو 2014.

[153] عبدالفتاح ماضي، "متى تكون الانتخابات ديمقراطية؟"، *المجلة العربية للعلوم السياسية*، بيروت: الجمعية العربية للعلوم السياسية ومركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، عدد 16، أكتوبر 2007.

[154] The Ownership Law issued in 1978 under which houses and properties were confiscated. Post the revolution, the owners of these properties had claimed for compensation, and some of the owners forcibly evicted the new dwellers.

[155] علي عبد اللطيف أحميده، *غياب الحوار الوطني في ليبيا... تحديات وعوائق*، 12 مارس 2014.

http://libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/46395

[156] The text of this law is available at:

http://www.ltv.ly/article_details.php?article_id=2336

It was estimated that the number of people aggrieved by this law to be nearly 500,000 of the total population of Libya, that was 6.2 million, i.e. 8% of the Libyan population. See: Ibrahim Sharqieh, "Restructuring Libya: Stability through Reconciliation", the *Brookings Institute*, December 9th, 2013.

[157] Ibid.

[158] Ibid.

[159] This is the role of those known as spoilers, i.e. whose interests were threatened by peace and reconciliation. See:

رومان ديفيد وهدى فريودات، *إعادة النظر في قانون العزل السياسي في ليبيا: تغيير في الوجوه أم تغيير في السلوك؟* مركز بروكنجز الدوحة وجامعة ستانفورد للتحولات العربية، مارس 2014، 8.

[160] Ibid, 9.

[161] Sharqieh, Ibid, 24.

[162] South Africa used a system that granted amnesty in exchange for unveiling the truth via various methods of self-disclosure, such as testimony, hearings, etc. Poland implemented a system of reconciliation that included confession,

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testimony and investigations performed by a private prosecutor, with the evidence then being submitting to the courts that granted offenders a second chance. Those who continued to deceive were punished. In Hungary, bureaucrats had the freedom to choose between resigning or remaining in their jobs. See:

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رومان ديفيد وهدى فريودات، مرجع سابق.

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[163] Sharqieh, Ibid, 20.

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[164] فريدريك ويري، معركة السيطرة على بنغازي، مركز كارنيغي للشرق الأوسط، 285 فبراير 2014.

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[165] علي عبد اللطيف أحميده، مرجع سابق.

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[166] Ibid.

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[167] خالد مطاوع، نقد الذات والمصارحة الوطنية لإنقاذ ليبيا، العربي الجديد، 13 أغسطس 2014.

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[168] The first group is the Libyan House of Representatives that meets in Tobrouque, Abdullah Al-Thenny's government, and the Army Chief of Staff, Abdel Razeq Al-Nazoury. This group is supported by Khalifa Haftar's military forces in the eastern area, and the battalions of Sawaeq and al-Qa'qa' in the Western areas in Libya. The other group is the General National Conference, the former parliament that resumed its session in August 2014, the prime minister, Omar El-Hassy, and the Army Chief of Staff, Gad Al-Obaidy. This group is supported by the Dawn of Libya forces in Tripoli and Misrata, the battalions of Gheryan, Tajora', Souq Al-Joma'a, The Consultation Council of Benghazi's Rebels, and Ansar Al-Shari'a Organization. The authorities in Tripoli accused the House of Representatives in Tobrouque of supporting the "Operation of Honor" waged by retired general Khalifa Haftar since May 2014 against what he described as extremists. The General National Conference considered the "Operation of Honor" an attempt at a military coup. The Conference also supported the military operation called "the Dawn of Libya" that was waged in Tripoli.

[169] Sharqieh, Ibid,15.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ibid. 9.

[172] See: Wolfram Lacher, "Libya's Transition: Towards Collapse," *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, May 2014, 4.

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[173] أنور بوخرص وآخرون، تأثيرات الحدث المصري: توترات متصاعدة وتحالفات متبدلة، مركز كارنيغي للشرق الأوسط، 13 فبراير 2014، وكذا يزيد صايغ، السياسة العسكرية في ليبيا: تقدم نحو الماضي؟ مركز كارنيغي للشرق الأوسط، 29 مايو 2014.

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[174] Egypt's leader urges America to reinstate military aid for fight against terror, *Fox News*, 23 April 2014.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/04/23/egypt-leader-urges-america-to-

reinstate–military–aid–for–fight–against–terror/

[175] تم اختيار مدينة طبرق لأنه الأكثر أمانا مقارنة بسيطرة ميليشيات مسلحة على طرابلس وبنغازي.

[176] *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/world/africa/egypt–and–united–arab–emirates–said–to–have–secretly–carried–out–libya–airstrikes.html?_r=0

[177] Sharqieh, Ibid, 33.

[178] تبادل المحتجزين بين غريان وورشفانة يرعاية مجلس حكماء ليبيا

http://www.libya–al–mostakbal.org/news/clicked/55414

[179] مجلس حكماء ليبيا يطرح مبادرة لتسوية الصراع المسلح، *BBC News*، 1 أغسطس 2014،

http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2014/08/140801_libya_fighting_initiative

[180] Sharqieh, Ibid, 34.

[181] رئيس الوزراء الليبي يطلق مبادرة للحوار الوطني، *مركز DW الإعلامي*، 25 أغسطس 2014.

[182] The Committee's website: http://ndpc.ly/ar/

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid.

[187] موقع ليبيا المستقبل، 14 سبتمبر 2014.

http://www.libya–al–mostakbal.org/news/clicked/55435

[188] هشام الشلوي، *حوار غدامس وغياب القوى الليبية الفاعلة*، مركز الجزيرة للدراسات، 14 أكتوبر 2014.

http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2014/10/2014101481349598655.htm

[189] "مجلس ثوار بنغازي" ينضم لرافضي الحوار بين "برلمان طبرق" ومقاطعيه، بتاريخ 1 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2014.

http://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya–news/31028.html

[190] دار الإفتاء الليبية تطالب بتعليق حوار غدامس بتاريخ 30 سبتمبر 2014.

http://www.libya–al–mostakbal.org/news/clicked/56126

[191] هشام الشلوي، مرجع سابق.

[192] *انطلاق مؤتمر بمدريد لدعم الحوار في ليبيا*، الجزيرة.نت، 17 سبتمبر 2014.

[193] Ibid.

[194] *زعيم تحالف القوى الوطنية الليبية يرفض المشاركة في الحوار الوطني بتونس*، جريدة الشروق، 23 أبريل 2014.

[195] جريدة العربي الجديد، 18 سبتمبر 2014.

[196] الجزيرة.نت 16 سبتمبر 2014.

[197] Weekly Update 26.08–08.09.2014, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva (CFG)

http://cordoue.ch/weekly–update/item/344–weekly–update–2608–08092014

[198] اتفاق مصري ـ ليبي لتعزيز التعاون الأمني وتدريب الجيش يثير قلق "المتطرفين"، *جريدة الشرق الأوسط*، 10 أكتوبر 2014.

http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=13100&article=790200 #.VFZ36zSUfy0

[199] The city of Beni Walid is accused of supporting Gaddafi and is considered to be in opposition to the February revolution, while the city had witnessed an attempt to oust Gaddafi in 1993.

[200] على خليفة الكواري وعبدالفتاح ماضي، "مفهوم الكتلة التاريخية على قاعدة الديمقراطية"، المستقبل العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، عدد 373 – آذار/ مارس 2010.

[201] For more details on the role played by the UN, see: Steven A. Zyck, Ibid., 4–6 & 10–11.

[202] Ibid.