{"id":616,"date":"2017-03-23T17:57:35","date_gmt":"2017-03-23T17:57:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/2017\/03\/23\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/"},"modified":"2017-03-23T17:57:35","modified_gmt":"2017-03-23T17:57:35","slug":"the-cordoba-update-5-2017","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/","title":{"rendered":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!-- {lofimg src=\"\/images\/stories\/Cordoba-Update_logo.jpg\"} --><\/p>\n<div><strong>8<sup>th<\/sup> &#8211; 21<sup>th<\/sup> March 2017<br \/><\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<em><br \/><\/em><\/div>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<style scoped=\"scoped\" type=\"text\/css\"><!--\ntd {\n\t\t\tbackground: #f5f4ef none repeat scroll 0 0;\n\t\t\tvertical-align: top;\n\t\t\tpadding: 6px 12px;\n\t\t}\n\t\ttd.cuintro {\n\t\t\tbackground: #F7FAFE none repeat scroll 0 0;\n\t\t}\n\t\tul {\n\t\t\tmargin: 0 0.5em 0 1em;\n\t\t\tpadding: 0;\n\t\t}\n\t\tli {\n\t\t\tmargin-bottom: 0;\n\t\t\tpadding-left: 9px;\n\t\t\ttext-align: left;\n\t\t}\n--><\/style>\n<div>\n<table border=\"0\" style=\"width: 100%; margin-bottom: 5px;\" cellspacing=\"4\" cellpadding=\"4\" align=\"center\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"cuintro\">\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">The bi-weekly CORDOBA UPDATE is the product of continuous monitoring work, carried out by the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva team. By analysing and reporting on key events and trends in the Foundation&rsquo;s areas of interest, we aim to draw readers&rsquo; attention to pertinent developments in North Africa, the Sahel, West Asia and Europe, which are not always covered in &lsquo;mainstream&rsquo; media.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">In addition to sharing news from these four regions, the Cordoba Update is an opportunity for the Foundation to provide regular updates on its publications, events and other developments.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">In line with the programmes and projects funded by partners of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, updates and information are included under the following themes:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Islamist-Secular relations;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Transition and Political participation;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations between communities of different ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Violent extremism and the war on terror;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">The Cordoba Foundation of Geneva in the media;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">General information.<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\"><br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">For questions and\/or feedback regarding the content and form of the Cordoba Update, please contact Sarah Franck: <a href=\"mailto:sarah.franck@cordoue.ch\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sarah.franck@cordoue.ch<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<hr style=\"border-top: 1px solid #cccccc; border-bottom: none; width: 50%; margin: auto;\" \/>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Le CORDOBA UPDATE est un bimensuel qui pr&eacute;sente le travail continu de suivi r&eacute;alis&eacute; par l&rsquo;&eacute;quipe de la Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve. Par l&rsquo;analyse des &eacute;v&eacute;nements et tendances qui concernent les domaines d&rsquo;int&eacute;r&ecirc;t de la Fondation, nous visons &agrave; attirer l&rsquo;attention de nos lecteurs sur les d&eacute;veloppements pertinents en Afrique du Nord, dans le Sahel, en Asie de l&rsquo;Ouest et en Europe, une actualit&eacute; qui n&rsquo;est pas toujours couverte dans les m&eacute;dias dits &lsquo;traditionnels&rsquo;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Outre le partage de l&rsquo;actualit&eacute; de ces quatre r&eacute;gions, le &laquo; Cordoba Update &raquo; est un moyen pour la Fondation de fournir des mises &agrave; jour r&eacute;guli&egrave;res sur ses publications, &eacute;v&eacute;nements et autres d&eacute;veloppements.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">En accord avec les programmes et projets financ&eacute;s par les partenaires de la Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve, les mises &agrave; jour et informations concernent les th&egrave;mes suivants :<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations islamistes-s&eacute;culiers ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Transition et participation politique ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations entre communaut&eacute;s de diff&eacute;rentes affiliations ethniques, culturelles et religieuses ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">L&rsquo;extr&eacute;misme violent et la guerre contre le terrorisme ;<br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">La Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve dans les m&eacute;dias ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Information g&eacute;n&eacute;rale.<br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Pour des questions et \/ ou des commentaires concernant le contenu et la forme du Cordoba Update, veuillez contacter Sarah Franck : <a href=\"mailto:sarah.franck@cordoue.ch\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sarah.franck@cordoue.ch<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>ISLAMIST-SECULAR RELATIONS<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Morocco, 20.03.2017: Mending Fences between Islamists and Leftists Unnerves the Palace<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Over 129 professionals linked to the Islamist group Al Adl wal-Ihssane (AWI) have been victims of a wave of relocations and terminations, since last January. On 20 March 2017, a group of human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists gathered at the office of Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), in Rabat, in order to discuss the situation and agree a solidarity action plan. Notable leftist figures such as Khadija Riyadi, head of the AMDH, Fouad Abdelmoumni, secretary-general of Transparency International-Morocco, Ali Anouzla, editor of the famous news website Lakome2, and lawyers Abdelaziz Nouayidi and Abderrahim Benameur all deplored the massive termination decisions, and pledged solidarity with the victims. A committee, headed by Khadija Riyadhi, was formed by the leftist figures to support the professionals concerned. The terminations have included, so far, 93 education inspectors, headmasters, and principals; 15 civil servants from the ministry of agriculture, 5 in the finance sector; 4 in the transport sector, 5 in Telecoms, to name a few. The lawyers at the press conference explained that some decisions on relocation or termination had no legal basis, whereas others were justified by protecting the public interest. There even reports about cases of termination of professionals who are already in retirement. Not only professionals were concerned by the relocations and terminations, a number of AWI graduates who passed teaching certification exams and have started teaching this year have been suspended as well.<\/p>\n<p>AWI and other analysts think that this wave of terminations is the Palace&rsquo;s response to the renewal of rapprochement between AWI and leftist political parties and labour unions, over the last four months or so. In late December 2016, AWI invited figures of opposition leftist parties and trade unions to its annual conference marking the fourth anniversary of the passing of their leader Sheikh Abdessalam Yacine. The conference aimed at mending fences between AWI and leftists, who had joined their efforts during the 20 February Movement, in 2011, but thereafter had divergent positions. Leftists put on the table, again, the position of IWA in regard to their political change strategy, freedoms, civil state, and the shape of the state AWI seeks. Following this conference, attended by political and opinion figures from outside Morocco, AWI launched a series of public meetings on the theme: dialogue and the necessity of joint action, with opposition leftist political and civil society groups. Observers think the authorities have chosen this period of political power handover and the political vacuum left by the inability of political parties to form a coalition government in order to sanction the Adl wal-Ihssane group.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/20\/vague-de-licenciements-des-militants-de-gauche-a-la-rescousse-dal-adl-wal-ihssane_1540041\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/20\/vague-de-licenciements-des-militants-de-gauche<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/02\/17\/al-adl-wal-ihssane-denonce-une-purge-contre-ses-membres_1535692\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/02\/17\/al-adl-wal-ihssane-denonce-une-purge-contre-ses-membres<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/UZHPZQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/UZHPZQ<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 11px;\"> (press conference at AMDH, 20 Mar. 2017)<\/span><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/rJlKQd\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/rJlKQd<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 11px;\"> (Leftists-Islamists joint action dialogue meeting, Dec. 2016)<\/span><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/cQVT4X\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/cQVT4X<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 11px;\"> (AWI-leftists dialogue meeting, Tanja, 6 Jan. 2017)<\/span><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/xzmBHP\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/xzmBHP <\/a><span style=\"font-size: 11px;\">(AWI-leftists dialogue, Fez, 9 Jan. 2017)<\/span><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.perspectivesmed.ma\/le-pjd-prete-main-forte-al-adl-freres-solidaires-et-capacite-de-nuisance\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.perspectivesmed.ma\/le-pjd-prete-main-forte-al-adl<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>TRANSITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION \/ TRANSITION ET PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Iraq, 8 &ndash; 13 March 2017: Political Collaboration Amid Tensions in the Lead-Up to Provincial Elections<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The run-up to the provincial elections, slated to be held in Iraq in 2017, has been featuring political activities in different sectors of the polity. At the national level, the central government has been working to demonstrate its political credentials and regional influence, as seen in the recent comments by Iraq&rsquo;s foreign minister, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, during a press conference with the Secretary-General of the Arab League. Al-Jaafari stated that \u00ab\u00a0Iraq has been working with Arab states to reduce the hotbeds of tension in the region, and expects them to stand with it in its war,\u00a0\u00bb attempting to relate the current conflict in Iraq to regional developments. Similarly, on 13 March, the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Saleem Al-Jubouri, called for a historic settlement between Arab states, removing \u00ab\u00a0all forms of tension once and for all.\u00a0\u00bb Al-Jubouri also framed his discourse in terms of wider regional developments outside of Iraq, insisting that \u00ab\u00a0the region as a whole needs an agreement that removes all tension.\u00a0\u00bb Their statements come as the battle against the so-called Islamic State appears to be making considerable progress, particularly in the symbolic recapture of Mosul. However, there are indications that the central government in Baghdad is wary of potential challenges to its control. As noted by sources, it is less clear \u00ab\u00a0whether Haider Al-Abadi&rsquo;s government will succeed in bringing Sunni factions into the political fold and address the country&rsquo;s deep sectarian divisions.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<p>Writing for Middle East Monitor, one journalist noted that, particularly in Mosul, \u00ab\u00a0there is still a feeling of deep distrust over the Shia-dominated security apparatus who are considered to be heavy-handed, sectarian and deeply corrupt.\u00a0\u00bb The mutual mistrust between communities goes some way to explaining the concerns of key Sunni groups within the country as to their future role in Iraq. For example, Al Monitor reports that former members of the 2006 Sahwa are wary of the developments that will take place following the liberation of Mosul. In particular, these individuals recall numerous instances of assassinations and detentions of key figures of the Sahwa movement. Sources have reported a number of political moves by Sunni-affiliated groups in Iraq, in recent weeks. On 8 March, a trilateral Sunni coalition was reportedly formed after a number of prominent Iraqi figures met to discuss the future of Sunnis in the country, at a conference held in Ankara. The new political group has been dubbed the \u00ab\u00a0Coalition of Iraqi National Forces\u00a0\u00bb. However, cross-sectarian political alliances are also reportedly being explored by local actors. According to Rudaw, Sunni political parties have announced that they seek to build coalitions with Shia- and Kurdish-majority groups. Raad Dahlaki, a Sunni leader and member of the immigration committee at the Iraqi parliament, has stated that this alliance \u00ab\u00a0will have international backing and support from Arab countries to secure \u00ab\u00a0large participation\u00a0\u00bb of \u00ab\u00a0all forces\u00a0\u00bb in the political process in Iraq.\u00a0\u00bb Dahlaki reportedly stated that such collaboration would \u00ab\u00a0not be based on religious or sectarian affiliations as it will include factions from all political and religious spectrums.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<p>Another political force that is expected to play a significant role in the 2017 elections are the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) that have gained notable political power in their combat role against the Islamic State group. According to Niqash, \u00ab\u00a0various militias had been negotiating alliances between themselves that they could capitalize on in upcoming Iraqi elections.\u00a0\u00bb However, there appear to be significant challenges to establishing a common political project between groups of diverse ideologies and tactics. For example, the militia led by local cleric Muqtada al-Sadr have stated that they will pursue their own political project, seeking alliances with civil society groups that have taken part in protests against government corruption in Baghdad. However, militias that are perceived to be close to Iran, including the League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq, the Jund Al Imam brigades and Harakat al-Nujaba, have agreed on forming an alliance to contest elections. Brigades known to be close to Grand Ayatollah Ali-Al-Sistani, the architect of the PMUs, will not be entering into politics. Despite these political ambitions, Iraqi law prohibits political parties and entities with armed wings to run for election. These groups will be unable to take part in the upcoming provincial elections unless the controversial 26 November 2016 law is implemented. This legislation allows for the incorporation of the PMUs into the security apparatus, making these groups part of an official government body, under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister. If this change in the PMUs status does occur, they would no longer be considered armed groups, but rather an official component of the Iraqi security forces, thereby legitimating any party affiliations.<\/p>\n<p><em>For a variety of sources on the topic, please see:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170316-fm-iraq-cooperates-with-arab-states-to-reduce-regional-tensions\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170316<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170313-iraqs-parliamentary-speaker-calls-for-historic-settlement-between-arab-states\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170313<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170309-mosul-between-war-and-sectarian-violence\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170309<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/qaede-isis-sawha-iraq-sunni-shiite-sectarianism.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/qaede-isis-sawha-iraq<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170310-sunni-coalition-formed-in-iraq\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170310-sunni-coalition-formed-in-iraq<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.rudaw.net\/english\/middleeast\/iraq\/10032017\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.rudaw.net\/english\/middleeast\/iraq\/10032017<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.niqash.org\/en\/articles\/politics\/5536\/Iraq%E2%80%99s-Controversial-Militias-Fail-To-Agree-On-Unified-Electoral-Positions.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.niqash.org\/en\/articles\/politics\/5536\/Iraq<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/iraq-election-pmu-shiite-militias-abadi.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/iraq-election<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Egypt: 14-20.03.2017: War on journalism &amp; the heavy civilian toll in Sinai<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Government sponsored candidate Abdel-Mohsen Salama became the head of the journalists&rsquo; syndicate. Salama is the managing editor of state owned Al-Ahram newspaper, and at the top of his list of supporters is former National Security agent Ahmed Mousa, a notorious mouthpiece for the regime who was supposedly intentionally planted in Al-Ahram. \u00ab\u00a0This recent development forecasts even darker times for an already gloomy era,\u00a0\u00bb said Aya Nader, Egyptian independent journalist, in OpenDemocracy. She added that \u00ab\u00a0the militarization of politics as well as authoritarianism are suffocating the people of Egypt. Public spaces are slowly but surely being securitized as the media is coopted. The economy is being divided like a pie to a select few, as a number of business tycoons and regime loyalists strategically buy out firms and distribute them among military men and their associates.\u00a0\u00bb In addition, assets of Mostafa Sakr, owner of Daily News Egypt, Egypt&rsquo;s only English independent daily print newspaper, and Arabic financial newspaper Al Borsa, were frozen. Sakr has been accused of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, branded by the Egyptian government as a terrorist organization. Although handed out abundantly, the accusation was even more ridiculous this time, as the regime had previously used the newspaper to seek out investors for its mega projects.<\/p>\n<p>Human Rights Watch reported that Egyptian internal security forces waging a campaign in the Sinai Peninsula against an affiliate of the Islamic State may have extrajudicially executed at least four and perhaps as many as 10 men in January 2017. The security forces may have arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared the men and then staged a counterterrorism raid to cover up the killings. The organization&rsquo;s investigation relied on multiple sources of evidence including documents, interviews with relatives, and an edited video of the purported raid made public by the authorities.<\/p>\n<p>Maged Mandour, a political analyst and columnist, stated, in Sada\/Middle East Analysis, that \u00ab\u00a0extrajudicial killings in Sinai increased in 2016, according to the Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, reaching 1,234 out of 1,384 extrajudicial killings across the country, constituting 89.2 percent of all cases documented.\u00a0\u00bb He mentioned that within this number, the vast majority of cases (1,177) occurred in the North Sinai province, which includes the towns of al-Arish and Shiekh Zuweid, as well as Halal Mountain, the epicenter of the insurgency. Across Egypt, air raids were responsible for 451 of the cases reported, assassinations for 443 cases, deaths during sustained state operations for 368 cases, and artillery for 56 cases. The use of artillery and the air force therefore constitute 36.6 percent of all extrajudicial killings in Egypt. By comparison, in 2015, the total number of extrajudicial killings reached 328 nationwide, with air power and artillery claiming the lives of 43 individuals combined, or 13.1 percent of the total death toll.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/arab-awakening\/aya-nader\/egypt-deep-state-s-war-on-journalism\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/arab-awakening\/aya-nader\/egypt-deep-state-s-war-on-journalism<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2017\/03\/16\/egypt-possible-extrajudicial-killings-sinai\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2017\/03\/16\/egypt-possible-extrajudicial-killings-sinai<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/?fa=68296\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/?fa=68296<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Egypt, 03.16.2017: Legislating authoritarianism: Egypt&rsquo;s new era of repression<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u00ab\u00a0Egypt&rsquo;s new authoritarian regime is rapidly closing the public space&mdash;cracking down on autonomous civil society and independent political parties, asphyxiating the practice of pluralist politics, and thwarting citizens&rsquo; peaceful and active engagement in public affairs,\u00a0\u00bb said Amr Hamzawy, a senior researcher at Carnegie. He added that the government&rsquo;s primary strategy is to institute wide-scale repression through lawmaking and justify its behavior through conspiratorial and populist narratives.<\/p>\n<p>Among the elements of the regime&rsquo;s strategy Hamzawy mentions:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Empowering the military and intelligence and security services to control civil society with little oversight.<\/li>\n<li>Undemocratic laws are being used to rescind established notions of the rule of law and denigrate trust in the impartiality of public institutions.<\/li>\n<li>Vague, broad language in new and amended laws&mdash;such as the Protest Law, NGO Law, Penal Code, Terrorism Law, and Military Court Law&mdash;is enabling the regime to arbitrarily prohibit or criminalize activities without definition, make accusations of terrorism without legal restraint, and transfer civilians to military courts.<\/li>\n<li>With legal backing, scare tactics and police brutality are being used regularly to deprive citizens of their freedoms of expression and association.<\/li>\n<li>To justify its policies, the regime is propagating conspiracy theories, the defamation of opponents, and hate speech directed at voices of dissent.<\/li>\n<li>The government is also using religious and nationalistic narratives to elevate its ruler to the level of a moral paragon and savior and to counteract dissatisfaction with Egypt&rsquo;s deteriorating conditions.<\/li>\n<li>This approach allows Egypt&rsquo;s generals to claim that their policies are aligned with national interests and national security.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Hamzawy illustrated that such a strategy has many effects including:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Debates about public affairs and politics have become permeated with incorrect information, fake news, and outright lies.<\/li>\n<li>Liberal and leftist parties have been once again either domesticated or marginalized in a formal political arena controlled by the security services.<\/li>\n<li>Viable opposition movements and civic activism have been severely hindered. Islamist movements, in particular, have been weakened. Human rights defenders and nongovernmental organizations have been pushed to the edge of extinction, in constant fear of government sanctions.<\/li>\n<li>Tens of thousands of people have been detained, imprisoned, tortured or killed by the security and intelligence services in the name of protecting the country&rsquo;s stability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2017\/03\/16\/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2017\/03\/16\/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Maroc, 22.03.2017 : Nouvelle donne par d&eacute;cret royal<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>5 mois apr&egrave;s les &eacute;lections, le Maroc se trouve toujours sans gouvernement. C&rsquo;est pourquoi, ayant nomm&eacute; dans un premier temps l&rsquo;ancien chef du gouvernement et secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral du Parti justice et d&eacute;veloppement (PJD), Abdelilah Benkirane, pour former une nouvelle coalition, le roi, Mohammed VI, a pris la d&eacute;cision de le d&eacute;mettre de ses fonctions jeudi 16 mars 2017 par d&eacute;cret royal, suite &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;chec des n&eacute;gociations entre les diff&eacute;rents partis politiques marocains. Le choix du roi s&rsquo;est donc report&eacute; sur le num&eacute;ro 2 du m&ecirc;me parti, Saad Dine El Otmani, qui succ&eacute;dera &agrave; Monsieur Benkirane et qui s&rsquo;att&egrave;lera &agrave; la lourde t&acirc;che de former la prochaine coalition gouvernementale dans les plus brefs d&eacute;lais. Monsieur El Otmani, psychiatre de m&eacute;tier, f&ucirc;t le ministre des affaires &eacute;trang&egrave;res sous l&rsquo;ancien gouvernement de Benkirane, et est vu par le palais comme plus &laquo; pacifiste &raquo;. De son c&ocirc;t&eacute;, le PJD, lors d&rsquo;une r&eacute;union de son conseil national samedi 18 mars, a d&eacute;gag&eacute; toutes responsabilit&eacute;s de Monsieur Benkirane pour l&rsquo;&eacute;chec des tractations &eacute;voquant les nombreuses concessions qu&rsquo;avait accept&eacute; le premier ministre d&eacute;sign&eacute;.<\/p>\n<p>A sa victoire en octobre 2016, le PJD avait pour but de reformer la m&ecirc;me coalition qui &eacute;tait en place avant les &eacute;lections, mais c&rsquo;&eacute;tait sans compter les nouvelles demandes de deux des partis (le Rassemblement national des ind&eacute;pendants (RNI) et le Mouvement populaire (MP)) compris dans celle-ci qui ont r&eacute;clam&eacute; l&rsquo;inclusion de plus petits partis alli&eacute;s. Devant le refus de Monsieur Benkirane, qui a &eacute;voqu&eacute; des lignes rouges &agrave; ne pas d&eacute;passer, ces deux formations politiques ont tout simplement refus&eacute; l&rsquo;offre de faire partie du gouvernement, bloquant ainsi toute issue positive.<\/p>\n<p>Selon la presse locale, le roi a donc donn&eacute; 15 jours &agrave; Monsieur El Otmani pour sortir de l&rsquo;impasse politique dans laquelle se trouve le royaume Ch&eacute;rifien depuis 5 mois. Ainsi les tractations ont recommenc&eacute; mardi 21 mars, avec la rencontre du nouveau chef du gouvernement d&eacute;sign&eacute; avec premi&egrave;rement 3 repr&eacute;sentants de l&rsquo;Istiqlal (PI) puis Ilyas El Omari, secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral du Parti authenticit&eacute; et modernit&eacute; (PAM) qui se trouve &ecirc;tre le parti principal de l&rsquo;opposition en ayant remport&eacute; la deuxi&egrave;me place au scrutin du mois d&rsquo;octobre. Ce dernier a affirm&eacute; maintenir sa &laquo; position du 8 octobre &raquo; mais a salu&eacute; la nouvelle strat&eacute;gie de tractation et signal&eacute; que l&rsquo;ouverture sur toutes les sensibilit&eacute;s politiques au Maroc devait se poursuivre. Monsieur El Otmani a ensuite rencontr&eacute; Aziz Akhannouch, pr&eacute;sident du RNI au c&ocirc;t&eacute; de Mohamed Sajid, secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral de l&rsquo;Union constitutionnelle (UC), puis Mohand Laenser, secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral du Mouvement populaire (MP). Enfin, Monsieur El Otmani a rencontr&eacute; Driss Lachgar, premier secr&eacute;taire de l&rsquo;Union socialiste et des forces populaire (USFP), puis Nabil Benabdellah, secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral du Parti du progr&egrave;s et du socialisme (PPS).<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&rsquo;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/markaz\/2017\/03\/02\/morocco-the-kings-dilemma\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/markaz\/2017\/03\/02\/morocco-the-kings-dilemma<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2017\/03\/king-mohammed-vi-ousts-pm-abdelilah-benkirane-170316044402539.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2017\/03\/king-mohammed-vi-ousts-pm-abdelilah-benkirane<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/video\/news\/2017\/03\/moroccos-king-dismisses-prime-minister-abdelilah-benkirane-170317122951169.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/video\/news\/2017\/03\/moroccos-king-dismisses-prime-minister<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/video\/news\/2017\/03\/saad-eddine-el-othmani-named-morocco-pm-170318105255036.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/video\/news\/2017\/03\/saad-eddine-el-othmani-named-morocco-pm<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/indepth\/features\/2017\/03\/saad-eddine-el-othmani-morocco-deadlock-170320053214750.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/indepth\/features\/2017\/03\/saad-eddine-el-othmani-morocco-deadlock<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.bladi.net\/maroc-nouveau-gouvernement,47577.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.bladi.net\/maroc-nouveau-gouvernement<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/africapostnews.com\/2017\/03\/21\/maroc-un-gouvernement-tres-attendu\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/africapostnews.com\/2017\/03\/21\/maroc-un-gouvernement-tres-attendu<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/fr.le360.ma\/politique\/futur-gouvernement-des-leaders-du-pjd-tablent-sur-lechec-del-othmani-112387\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/fr.le360.ma\/politique\/futur-gouvernement-des-leaders-du-pjd-tablent-sur-lechec-del-othmani<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/afrique\/39339141\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/afrique\/39339141<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/video\/2017\/03\/21\/maroc-saad-eddine-al-othmani-est-un-homme-consensuel-et-diplomate_5098406_3212.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/video\/2017\/03\/21\/maroc-saad-eddine-al-othmani-est-un-homme-consensuel<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/21\/gouvernement-el-othmani-demarre-les-discussions-avec-listiqlal_1540061\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/21\/gouvernement-el-othmani-demarre-les-discussions-avec-listiqlal<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/21\/rni-luc-soutiennent-el-othmani-veulent-donner-du-temps_1540094\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2017\/03\/21\/rni-luc-soutiennent-el-othmani-veulent-donner-du-temps<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS \/ <br \/>RELATIONS ENTRE COMMUNAUT&Eacute;S DE DIFF&Eacute;RENTES AFFILIATIONS ETHNIQUES, CULTURELLES ET RELIGIEUSES<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Iraq, 5-16.03.2017: Communities in Sinjar, Tel Afar and Ninevah Seek Semi-Autonomous Self-Government<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>On 5 March, the Yazidi Independent Supreme Council, the Turkmen Rescue Foundation and Al-Rafidain (Two Rivers) Organization, representing Iraq&rsquo;s Assyrian Christians, issued a joint statement calling for a semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq. Under their terms, this region would constitute three contiguous regions, each considered to be the homelands of one or more of these minorities. Sinjar is considered to be the homeland of the Yazidi, Tel Afar that of the Turkmen, and the Ninevah plain that of the Christian and Shabak communities, and others. According to observers, the proposal for a semi-autonomous region is a demonstrable attempt by Iraq&rsquo;s minorities to extricate themselves from ongoing conflicts that have had devastating effects on their communities.<\/p>\n<p>According to an Iraqi researcher, Saad Salloum, the proposal falls in line with the Iraqi Constitution, which provides minorities with \u00ab\u00a0the right to autonomy or self-administration in sub-units of territory.\u00a0\u00bb The proposal calls for a region free from racial or sectarian entrenchment, with democratic governance, focusing on the protection of heritage, culture and civilisation. The proposal also highlights the principle of dialogue with all Iraqi entities, and a policy of openness towards all political and social organisations within the new semi-autonomous region.<\/p>\n<p>One representative, Ali Akram al Bayati, President of the Turkmen Rescue Foundation, explained in an interview that the new region will require \u00ab\u00a0international protection for a certain time, as was previously offered to the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government], along with empowerment and training of our local forces to prepare them to defend the borders of the new autonomous region.\u00a0\u00bb Another representative agreed, Pr\u012f&ntilde;\u010d\u0117 Naif Dawoud, President of the Yazidi Independent Supreme Council, saying \u00ab\u00a0the project would need the support of major world powers and the United Nations, especially in its early stages.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<p>In addition to this, an international Assyrian news agency has reported that, at the beginning of March, \u00ab\u00a0Chaldean Syriac Assyrian (Christian) parties held a joint press conference&#8230; calling on Iraqi government to recognise their demands to create a Nineveh Plain Province.\u00a0\u00bb Participants reportedly urged the UN Security Council to issue a resolution protecting these minorities, as well as for the UN Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) \u00ab\u00a0to be given the right to monitor the security situation and rehabilitation efforts, reducing exploitation and preventing the imposition of hegemonic policies across the Nineveh Plain, through offices established for this purpose and the assignment of observers.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<p><em>For a variety of sources on the topic, please see:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/rafedin-minorities-iraq-nineveh-plain-autonomy.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2017\/03\/rafedin-minorities-iraq<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/alrafideincoalition.wordpress.com\/2017\/03\/07\/national-coalition-for-al-rafidein-region\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/alrafideincoalition.wordpress.com\/2017\/03\/07\/national-coalition-for-al-rafidein-region<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aina.org\/news\/20170314151100.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aina.org\/news\/20170314151100<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Europe, 20.03.2017: Proposition de nouveaux programmes de formation des imams par les instances politiques en France et en Suisse<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>La formation des imams est un th&egrave;me qui a fait l&rsquo;actualit&eacute; ces derni&egrave;res semaines en France et en Suisse, notamment dans le canton de Gen&egrave;ve. Ce dernier a en effet annonc&eacute; la cr&eacute;ation d&rsquo;un cursus universitaire pour les imams d&eacute;j&agrave; en exercice, sous la forme d&rsquo;une formation continue. Interview&eacute; par la Radiot&eacute;l&eacute;vision Suisse (RTS), F. Dermange, professeur d&rsquo;&eacute;thique &agrave; l&rsquo;Universit&eacute; de Gen&egrave;ve (UNIGE), explique que cette formation permettra aux imams de mieux s&rsquo;int&eacute;grer au cadre social dans lequel ils exercent. Cette formation, pens&eacute;e par diff&eacute;rents acteurs &agrave; savoir certaines communaut&eacute;s musulmanes genevoises, des experts &eacute;trangers et les instances de l&rsquo;Etat de Gen&egrave;ve et de l&rsquo;UNIGE, aurait donc, selon F. Dermange, pour but de proposer une vision de l&rsquo;islam plus facile &agrave; adapter aux valeurs suisses dans une perspective qui ne se veut pas militante mais scientifique et acad&eacute;mique. Fid&egrave;le &agrave; sa Constitution de 2012, qui proclame que malgr&eacute; le caract&egrave;re la&iuml;que de l&rsquo;Etat &laquo; les autorit&eacute;s entretiennent des relations avec les communaut&eacute;s religieuses &raquo;, les institutions genevoises donnent, avec ce programme, une des premi&egrave;res applications concr&egrave;tes de son texte constitutionnel.<\/p>\n<p>Il est toutefois important de souligner que d&rsquo;autres programmes existent d&eacute;j&agrave;, comme dans le canton de Fribourg, o&ugrave; le Centre Suisse Islam et Soci&eacute;t&eacute; (CSIS), cr&eacute;&eacute; le 1er janvier 2015, se consacre &agrave; la recherche, &agrave; la formation de la rel&egrave;ve scientifique et &agrave; la formation continue dans le domaine de l&rsquo;islam et de la soci&eacute;t&eacute;. Pour Pierre Maudet, conseiller d&rsquo;Etat charg&eacute; du d&eacute;partement de la s&eacute;curit&eacute; et de l&rsquo;&eacute;conomie, le programme de l&rsquo;UNIGE ne viendrait pas concurrencer les activit&eacute;s d&eacute;velopp&eacute;es par le CSIS mais viendrait les compl&eacute;ter, offrant notamment une formation continue &agrave; un public plus large que celui du CSIS, qui propose en particulier des formations pour les aum&ocirc;niers exer&ccedil;ant dans les prisons, les centres de requ&eacute;rants d&rsquo;asile et h&ocirc;pitaux. La formation continue dans le canton de Gen&egrave;ve a &eacute;t&eacute; plut&ocirc;t bien accueillie m&ecirc;me si le contenu pr&eacute;cis des programmes n&rsquo;a pas encore &eacute;t&eacute; clairement communiqu&eacute; pour le moment.<\/p>\n<p>En France, la mise en place d&rsquo;une formation pour les imams dans le cadre universitaire est &eacute;galement &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;tude. Le 16 mars 2017, un rapport a &eacute;t&eacute; rendu par Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, historienne de l&rsquo;islam, Mathilde Philip-Gay, juriste sp&eacute;cialiste de la la&iuml;cit&eacute;, et Rachid Benzine, islamologue, dans le cadre de la Mission de r&eacute;flexion sur la formation des imams, cr&eacute;&eacute;e en 2015 suite aux attentats qui ont touch&eacute; la France. Les auteurs de ce rapport, command&eacute; par le gouvernement, ont notamment soulign&eacute; le fait qu&rsquo;il convenait de redonner un cadre solide &agrave; la formation des imams. Selon eux, les imams seraient en effet, pour le moment, form&eacute;s majoritairement &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;tranger et dans le cadre de formations peu qualitatives. Ils pointent &eacute;galement du doigt une situation alarmante en France, o&ugrave; il n&rsquo;existe plus aucun professeur d&rsquo;islamologie depuis 2016. Ces experts proposent donc des formations plus structur&eacute;es, plus pouss&eacute;es et plus approfondies qui mettraient l&rsquo;accent sur l&rsquo;&eacute;tude scientifique et historicis&eacute;e des textes ainsi que sur des &eacute;changes avec d&rsquo;autres facult&eacute;s enseignant des disciplines telles la la&iuml;cit&eacute;, la psychologie, les sciences sociales dans le religieux, la philosophie, la gestion de conflit et de projet, entre autres. Comme dans le cadre de la formation suisse, cette formation ferait intervenir des professeurs d&rsquo;universit&eacute; et des intervenants ext&eacute;rieurs.<\/p>\n<p>La question de la formation des imams soul&egrave;ve une nouvelle fois le d&eacute;bat de la gestion des affaires religieuses par le politique. Dans une conf&eacute;rence &agrave; l&rsquo;Universit&eacute; de Gen&egrave;ve sur la th&eacute;matique de l&rsquo;Islam en Europe (12 octobre 2016), Yahd Ben Achour, juriste tunisien et futur intervenant ext&eacute;rieur dans le cadre de la formation continue &agrave; Gen&egrave;ve, souligne qu&rsquo;en effet les musulmans ont comme devoir de s&rsquo;adapter au fonctionnement europ&eacute;en et &agrave; son ordre politique mais qu&rsquo;il est &eacute;galement n&eacute;cessaire de repenser la la&iuml;cit&eacute; dans le contexte actuel. Selon lui en effet, &laquo; la la&iuml;cit&eacute; passive, celle de la neutralit&eacute; de l&rsquo;Etat, n&rsquo;est plus de mise &raquo; car, entre autres, &laquo; quand l&rsquo;Etat adopte une stricte neutralit&eacute; &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;gard des religions, il ouvre la voie &agrave; l&#8217;emprise de la communaut&eacute; &raquo;. Il souligna qu&rsquo;une implication de l&rsquo;Etat dans la gestion de certaines questions religieuses comme l&rsquo;&eacute;dification de lieux de culte ou la formation de personnes comp&eacute;tentes &agrave; l&rsquo;enseignement religieux, dans le cadre strict du respect des principes de l&rsquo;ordre public europ&eacute;en et en particulier de la libert&eacute; de conscience, redonnerait &agrave; l&rsquo;islam une chance de rayonnement en Europe et lui permettrait d&rsquo;approfondir son h&eacute;ritage classique de la libert&eacute;. Concluant, et citant Jacques Le Goff, ceci favoriserait selon lui le passage du musulman de la situation &laquo; d&rsquo;Autre &raquo; &agrave; &laquo; Concitoyen &agrave; part enti&egrave;re &raquo;.<\/p>\n<p>Ainsi, il convient d&egrave;s lors de probl&eacute;matiser la situation en France et en Suisse par la question suivante : comment la gestion de la formation des imams par le politique dans ces diff&eacute;rents contextes s&rsquo;inscrit-elle dans le cadre la&iuml;que europ&eacute;en traditionnel et qu&rsquo;est-ce qui les distingue l&rsquo;une de l&rsquo;autre ? Pour Sylvain Odier, Directeur de l&rsquo;organisation Horizon Parrh&eacute;sia, une des diff&eacute;rences fondamentales entre ces deux pays est que le Canton de Gen&egrave;ve a &eacute;t&eacute; mandat&eacute; par les communaut&eacute;s musulmanes locales afin de mettre en place une formation continue et ce pour des imams d&eacute;j&agrave; en exercice. Le Canton a donc r&eacute;pondu &agrave; une demande sp&eacute;cifique, ce qui n&rsquo;est pas le cas en France. En effet, les experts mandat&eacute;s par le gouvernement s&rsquo;inscrivent dans le cadre de la Fondation de l&rsquo;islam de France, cr&eacute;&eacute;e officiellement le 8 octobre 2016 par le gouvernement Valls suite &agrave; la vague d&rsquo;attentats des derni&egrave;res ann&eacute;es. Cette fondation refl&egrave;te clairement l&rsquo;approche s&eacute;curitaire du gouvernement et sa volont&eacute; de s&eacute;curiser l&rsquo;islam de France. Cette &laquo; ouverture &raquo; vers la communaut&eacute; musulmane ne saurait faire oublier que sous le mandat finissant de Fran&ccedil;ois Hollande la la&iuml;cit&eacute; a toujours &eacute;t&eacute; comprise comme tr&egrave;s strict, une la&iuml;cit&eacute; qui refuse de collaborer avec les communaut&eacute;s religieuses.<\/p>\n<p>Dans ce contexte, redynamiser la place de l&rsquo;islam en Europe et notamment en France et en Suisse, dans une perspective de la&iuml;cit&eacute; ouverte et donc plus entreprenante, permettrait un r&eacute;&eacute;quilibrage positif de la place occup&eacute;e par les diff&eacute;rentes religions au sein de l&rsquo;Etat.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&rsquo;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.unige.ch\/public\/actualites\/2016\/12102016-lislam-en-europe\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.unige.ch\/public\/actualites\/2016\/12102016-lislam-en-europe<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rts.ch\/play\/radio\/forum\/audio\/la-nouvelle-formation-a-geneve-pour-les-imams-prend-forme?id=8453021\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.rts.ch\/play\/radio\/forum\/audio\/la-nouvelle-formation-a-geneve-pour-les-imams-prend-forme<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rts.ch\/info\/regions\/geneve\/8466990-geneve-ambitionne-de-lancer-une-formation-continue-pour-les-imams.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.rts.ch\/info\/regions\/geneve\/8466990-geneve-ambitionne-de-lancer-une-formation-continue<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ge.ch\/legislation\/rsg\/f\/s\/rsg_a2_00.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.ge.ch\/legislation\/rsg\/f\/s\/rsg<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.unifr.ch\/szig\/fr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.unifr.ch\/szig\/fr<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/campus\/article\/2017\/03\/17\/la-piste-des-universites-pour-mieux-former-les-imams_5096389_4401467.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/campus\/article\/2017\/03\/17\/la-piste-des-universites-pour-mieux-former-les-imams<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/religions\/video\/2017\/03\/16\/comprendre-la-laicite-en-france-en-trois-minutes_5095583_1653130.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/religions\/video\/2017\/03\/16\/comprendre-la-laicite-en-france-en-trois-minutes<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.interieur.gouv.fr\/Actualites\/L-actu-du-Ministere\/Formation-des-imams-et-des-cadres-religieux-musulmans\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.interieur.gouv.fr\/Actualites\/L-actu-du-Ministere\/Formation-des-imams-et-des-cadres-religieux-musulmans<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/urbi-orbi-africa.la-croix.com\/monde\/france-propositions-permettre-formation-plus-diversifiee-imams\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/urbi-orbi-africa.la-croix.com\/monde\/france-propositions-permettre-formation-plus-diversifiee-imams<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.la-croix.com\/Urbi-et-Orbi\/Actualite\/France\/Les-universites-n-ont-pas-toutes-pris-conscience-de-la-necessite-de-developper-l-islamologie-2015-07-07-1332244\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.la-croix.com\/Urbi-et-Orbi\/Actualite\/France\/Les-universites-n-ont-pas-toutes-pris-conscience<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.la-croix.com\/Archives\/1996-11-28\/Islam-_NP_-1996-11-28-417155\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.la-croix.com\/Archives\/1996-11-28\/Islam<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.horizonparrhesia.ch\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.horizonparrhesia.ch\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Liban, 07-21.03.2017 : Le Hezbollah et un climat de tensions croissantes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Les propos du pr&eacute;sident Michel Aoun en f&eacute;vrier dernier qui affirmait que le maintien d&rsquo;un Hezbollah arm&eacute; &eacute;tait un besoin pour l&rsquo;Etat et que ce parti &eacute;tait un compl&eacute;ment &agrave; l&rsquo;arm&eacute;e nationale libanaise avaient provoqu&eacute; de vives r&eacute;actions de la part du Groupe international de soutien au Liban (regroupant les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l&rsquo;Allemagne, l&rsquo;Italie et la Chine) aussi bien que de l&rsquo;ambassadeur de l&rsquo;Union europ&eacute;enne et des repr&eacute;sentants du Secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral au Liban et de la Ligue arabe. L&rsquo;&eacute;volution du parti arm&eacute; continue depuis &agrave; susciter des questions et des analyses divergentes.<\/p>\n<p>Certains analystes soulignent le renforcement de la puissance militaire du Hezbollah par un perfectionnement de ses techniques de combat, d&eacute;veloppement qui a &eacute;t&eacute; acc&eacute;l&eacute;r&eacute; par ses combats en Syrie, et donc l&rsquo;occasion de se confronter &agrave; divers environnements de combats. Non seulement le Hezbollah, combattant au c&ocirc;t&eacute; des Russes et des Iraniens en Syrie, d&eacute;velopperait ses capacit&eacute;s technologiques par son recours de plus en plus accru aux drones par exemple, mais &eacute;galement ses capacit&eacute;s op&eacute;rationnelles et strat&eacute;giques sur le terrain (attaque, occupation puis contr&ocirc;le de territoires).<\/p>\n<p>Un ancien officier des renseignements isra&eacute;liens ne cache pas qu&rsquo;Isra&euml;l suit de tr&egrave;s pr&egrave;s cette &eacute;volution. Selon l&rsquo;Institute for National Security Studies isra&eacute;lien, le Hezbollah aurait cette ann&eacute;e devanc&eacute; l&rsquo;Iran en lui prenant le titre de plus grand danger pour le pays. Un regain de tension avec le voisin du sud s&rsquo;illustre &eacute;galement par un &eacute;change de menaces entre le Hezbollah et le pr&eacute;sident libanais d&rsquo;une part et Isra&euml;l d&rsquo;autre part le mois dernier. Parmi les d&eacute;clarations de ce dernier, on peut noter celles du ministre de l&rsquo;&eacute;ducation, Naftali Bennett, qui affirme que le Liban retournerait au Moyen-Age en cas de guerre. En effet, M. Bennett s&rsquo;appuie sur les r&eacute;cents propos du pr&eacute;sident pour valider la cible de toute infrastructure civile, le Hezbollah n&rsquo;&eacute;tant plus consid&eacute;r&eacute; comme un groupe &agrave; part, mais comme partie int&eacute;grante de l&rsquo;Etat libanais, ce qui rendrait caduque la distinction entre civils et militaires. Le ministre tient cependant &agrave; pr&eacute;senter ses propos comme des avertissements afin de pr&eacute;venir une nouvelle guerre, affirmant qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y a aucune intention d&rsquo;attaque actuellement.<\/p>\n<p>Dans son nouveau rapport, l&rsquo;International Crisis Group met en garde le Hezbollah devant une situation qu&rsquo;il serait difficile de g&eacute;rer. Par exemple, le rapport souligne le r&ocirc;le de ce parti dans l&rsquo;exacerbation des tensions sectaires. Un clerc irakien, critique de cette attitude, en explique la cause par le besoin de mobilisation. En effet, selon ce dernier, loin du contexte de la r&eacute;sistance contre Isra&euml;l, il aurait &eacute;t&eacute; difficile de lever des troupes pour aller en aide au pr&eacute;sident Assad, voire m&ecirc;me &agrave; l&rsquo;Iran. Ainsi, les arguments politiques ont c&eacute;d&eacute; la place aux arguments sectaires et la mobilisation s&rsquo;est faite &agrave; l&rsquo;origine au nom de la protection de la mosqu&eacute;e Sayyida Zaynab. L&rsquo;attitude du Hezbollah est en effet tr&egrave;s contradictoire &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;gard de la question du sectarisme. Alors que le parti r&eacute;p&egrave;te que ce qu&rsquo;il m&egrave;ne en Syrie n&rsquo;est pas une guerre sectaire, il qualifie pourtant sans distinction tous les combattants sunnites en Syrie de takfiris. Or alors qu&rsquo;un jour, les diff&eacute;rends politiques se n&eacute;gocient autour d&rsquo;une table, il en va d&rsquo;enjeux bien plus complexes pour concilier des c&oelig;urs d&eacute;chir&eacute;s par la fracture sectaire.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&rsquo;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/columns\/falling-arab-consensus-michael-aoun-and-road-arab-summit-2049246045\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/columns\/falling-arab-consensus-michael-aoun-and-road-arab-summit<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/english.almanar.com.lb\/189055\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/english.almanar.com.lb\/189055<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/crisiswatch\/february-2017#lebanon\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/crisiswatch\/february-2017#lebanon<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.haaretz.com\/israel-news\/1.776419\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.haaretz.com\/israel-news\/1.776419<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/hezbollah-must-drop-sectarian-rhetoric-push-peace-save-credibility-icg-852222126\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/hezbollah-must-drop-sectarian-rhetoric-push-peace-save-credibility<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/columns\/special-offer-lebanon-time-travel-israeli-military-1462699098\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/columns\/special-offer-lebanon-time-travel-israeli-military<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/middle-east-north-africa\/eastern-mediterranean\/lebanon\/175-hizbollah-s-syria-conundrum\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/middle-east-north-africa\/eastern-mediterranean\/lebanon\/175<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/analysis-hezbollah-enters-new-war-use-armed-drones-syria-11412100\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/analysis-hezbollah-enters-new-war-use-armed-drones-syria<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170317-palestinian-and-lebanese-concerns-over-a-potential-war-is-confrontation-possible\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20170317-palestinian-and-lebanese-concerns-over-a-potential-war<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/lebanons-jumblatt-affirms-son-taymour-political-heir-997403557\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/lebanons-jumblatt-affirms-son-taymour-political-heir<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE WAR ON TERROR \/ EXTR&Eacute;MISME VIOLENT ET LA GUERRE CONTRE LA TERREUR<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Egypt, Russia &amp; U.S.A., 26.02-14.03.2017: Russia appears to deploy forces in Egypt, eyes on Libya role<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Russia appears to have deployed special forces to an airbase in western Egypt near the border with Libya in recent days, U.S., Egyptian and diplomatic sources say, a move that would add to U.S. concerns about Moscow&rsquo;s deepening role in Libya. The U.S. and diplomatic officials said any such Russian deployment might be part of a bid to support Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar, who suffered a setback with an attack on March 3 by the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB) on oil ports controlled by his forces. The U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the United States has observed what appeared to be Russian special operations forces and drones at Sidi Barrani, about 60 miles (100 km) from the Egypt-Libya border. Egyptian security sources offered more detail, describing a 22-member Russian special forces unit, but declined to discuss its mission. They added that Russia also used another Egyptian base farther east in Marsa Matrouh in early February.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the top commander of American military operations in the Middle East said during a recent visit to Cairo that the United States wanted to resume a major military exercise with Egypt that President Barack Obama canceled in 2013 to protest the killings of hundreds of civilian protesters. \u00ab\u00a0It is my goal to get that exercise back on track and try to re-establish that as another key part of our military relationship,\u00a0\u00bb Gen. Joseph L. Votel, the head of the United States Central Command, told an Egyptian television interviewer. General Votel&rsquo;s comments were made shortly after he met with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and top Egyptian military and Defense Ministry officials.<\/p>\n<p>The New York Times reported that even before Trump took office, Obama had agreed to resume the provision of major weapons systems, including F-16 fighter planes, M1A1 Abrams tanks and Harpoon missiles. The delivery of those systems by Obama was suspended in 2013 after the Egyptian military ousted Mohamed Morsi, Egypt&rsquo;s first democratically elected president. But growing concern over the threat of militants in Sinai, many of whom have pledged loyalty to the Islamic State, as well as Egypt&rsquo;s decision to buy weapons from Russia and France, led the Obama administration to reverse course. President Trump appears even less inclined to let Egypt&rsquo;s dismal human rights record interfere with the security relationship between the two countries.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/02\/26\/world\/middleeast\/trump-al-sisi-egypt-military-exercise.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/02\/26\/world\/middleeast\/trump-al-sisi-egypt-military<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-russia-libya-exclusive-idUSKBN16K2RY\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-russia-libya-exclusive<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>U.S.A., 13.03.2017: Jobs, not bombs, will win the war on terror<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Zuri Linetsky, a Truman Project national security fellow, wrote in Foreign Policy that new polling data indicate that it&rsquo;s unemployment, not religion, fueling extremist groups like Boko Haram. He added that almost immediately after taking office, President Donald Trump&rsquo;s administration hinted that it would \u00ab\u00a0revamp and rename\u00a0\u00bb the existing approach to \u00ab\u00a0countering radical Islamic extremism.\u00a0\u00bb At the same time, the president proposed a dramatic increase in military spending, paid for in part by deep cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budgets. \u00ab\u00a0The new Trump strategy seems to assume that America&rsquo;s enemies are motivated by Islam and the best way to fight them is with military might.\u00a0\u00bb he said. Both assumptions are dangerously wrong-headed. Take Nigeria, where Boko Haram is currently waging the third-deadliest insurgency in the world. The group may have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, but survey data collected in the three Nigerian states most affected by Boko Haram (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe) show that Islam is not a major factor in motivating recruits. Unemployment, not religiosity, is the best predictor of support for the terrorist group. The presence of visible USAID programs, meanwhile, coincides with lower levels of support for Boko Haram. Taken together, these findings suggest that diplomatic soft power &mdash; rather than the hard power emphasized in the early days of Trump&rsquo;s presidency &mdash; is the key to weakening terrorist groups. In other words, slashing State Department and USAID spending to pay for military efforts to defeat the Islamic State and like-minded groups could have precisely the opposite effect.<\/p>\n<p>Linetsky concluded that the Trump administration is right to target radical extremist organizations around the globe, because these organizations are responsible for horrifying levels of death and destruction. But how it goes about countering these groups matters a great deal. The United States cannot blindly chase a \u00ab\u00a0radical Islamic\u00a0\u00bb boogeyman, a fact that Trump&rsquo;s own national security advisor, H.R. McMaster, seems to have acknowledged in private. Bombing campaigns like the one currently underway in Yemen &mdash; or the sale of arms to military partners like Nigeria &mdash; cannot by themselves defeat extremist groups or their ideologies.<\/p>\n<p>Hassan Hakimian, Director of the London Middle East Institute and Reader in Economics at SOAS, University of London, argued that the sixth anniversary of the Arab Spring uprisings this year came and went largely unnoticed. Unlike in previous years, there was no torrent of commentary about the tumultuous events that shook the Arab world and seemed to promise a transformation of its politics. He added that on the eve of their downfall, few Arab autocrats were actually being lauded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for their supposed success in adopting the \u00ab\u00a0right\u00a0\u00bb economic policies. The World Bank&rsquo;s subsequent mea culpa is a clear indication that there may have been a problem with the policies they had prescribed for the Arab ancien r&eacute;gimes.<\/p>\n<p>According to Hakimian, a failure to anticipate political revolutions reflects, at least partly, conceptual inadequacies. Mainstream economics tends to focus on the equilibrium-seeking behavior of homo economicus, guided by rational choice, when marginal benefits equal marginal costs. That conceptual framework is demonstrably ill equipped to deal with social and political upheavals, which can hardly be described as marginal changes. He concluded that the Arab Spring suggests that improved economic performance cannot be viewed as an insurance policy against political instability. Learning that lesson that may help us avoid being blindsided by future political upheaval. It might even enable us to avoid the kind of disappointment and despair that the Arab Spring has brought.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2017\/03\/13\/this-poll-proves-that-trumps-counterterrorism-strategy-will-fail-africa-nigeria-boko-haram\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2017\/03\/13\/this-poll-proves-that-trumps-counterterrorism-strategy<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/arab-spring-economic-forecasting-failure-by-hassan-hakimian-2017-03\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/arab-spring-economic-forecasting-failure<\/a><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><em>The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>8th &#8211; 21th March 2017 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":596,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-616","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Cordoba Update 5\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"8th &#8211; 21th March 2017 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"576\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u00c9crit par\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"35 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0a76d9365b1b8c6b5265567c49ee79df\"},\"headline\":\"The Cordoba Update 5\\\/2017\",\"datePublished\":\"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":7115,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2016\\\/12\\\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Newsletter\"],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/\",\"name\":\"The Cordoba Update 5\\\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2016\\\/12\\\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2016\\\/12\\\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2016\\\/12\\\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":576},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Cordoba Update 5\\\/2017\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/\",\"name\":\"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI\",\"description\":\"CPI Gen\u00e8ve | 20 ans aux service de la paix\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2025\\\/12\\\/CPI-Geneva.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/3\\\/2025\\\/12\\\/CPI-Geneva.png\",\"width\":740,\"height\":740,\"caption\":\"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0a76d9365b1b8c6b5265567c49ee79df\",\"name\":\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\"},\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/fr\\\/author\\\/corwebmaster\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/","og_locale":"fr_FR","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais","og_description":"8th &#8211; 21th March 2017 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva","og_url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/","og_site_name":"Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais","article_published_time":"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":576,"url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"\u00c9crit par":"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva","Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e":"35 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/"},"author":{"name":"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/0a76d9365b1b8c6b5265567c49ee79df"},"headline":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017","datePublished":"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/"},"wordCount":7115,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg","articleSection":["Newsletter"],"inLanguage":"fr-FR"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/","url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/","name":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017 - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg","datePublished":"2017-03-23T17:57:35+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg","width":1024,"height":576},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/the-cordoba-update-5-2017\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Cordoba Update 5\/2017"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#website","url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/","name":"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI","description":"CPI Gen\u00e8ve | 20 ans aux service de la paix","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"fr-FR"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#organization","name":"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI","url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2025\/12\/CPI-Geneva.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2025\/12\/CPI-Geneva.png","width":740,"height":740,"caption":"Cordoba Peace Institute - Gen\u00e8ve CPI"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/0a76d9365b1b8c6b5265567c49ee79df","name":"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/cf6a4ecb9e914acddd89e4c4cbc3c6fdccfd6614c26ec3023ce0173515d50eff?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva"},"url":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/author\/corwebmaster\/"}]}},"featured_image_src":{"landsacpe":["https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt-1024x445.jpg",1024,445,true],"list":["https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt-463x348.jpg",463,348,true],"medium":["https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt-300x169.jpg",300,169,true],"full":["https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2016\/12\/Cordoba_Update_IntroTxt.jpg",1024,576,false]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/616","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=616"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/616\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/596"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=616"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=616"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=616"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}