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1) MAROC<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb 22.01.2015 : Adoption d’une Nouvelle Loi \u00ab Antiterroriste \u00bb<\/strong><\/p>\n A l’occasion d’une session pl\u00e9ni\u00e8re, la Chambre des repr\u00e9sentants a adopt\u00e9 le 21 janvier la loi 14-86 relative au code p\u00e9nal et \u00e0 la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale pour la lutte antiterroriste. Cette nouvelle loi constitue un dispositif l\u00e9gislatif \u00e9largi incluant des peines privatives de libert\u00e9 plus s\u00e9v\u00e8res. Les peines s’\u00e9tendent d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 toute personne ayant suivi un entra\u00eenement d’une organisation dite terroriste ou ayant fait l’apologie du \u00ab terrorisme \u00bb. De plus, il est possible d\u00e9sormais pour les autorit\u00e9s marocaines d’interpeller et de juger tout citoyen \u00e9tranger se trouvant sur son territoire et accus\u00e9 de crimes dits terroristes dans d’autres pays.<\/p>\n http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2015\/01\/22\/les-representants-adoptent-loi-antiterroriste_1431114<\/a><\/p>\n Code p\u00e9nal marocain :<\/em> 2) LIBYA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>22-26.01.2015: Libya’s Geneva 2 Dialogue: \u00ab\u00a0Don’t Expect Immediate Results\u00a0\u00bb<\/strong><\/p>\n On Sunday 25 January, UNSMIL announced that talks among Libyan crisis stakeholders would take place on Monday in preparation for a second round of dialogue on Wednesday. Leon’s press release indicated that this second round would convene representatives of local and municipality assemblies from across Libya. Following the talks on Monday, Leon admitted that there are changes ahead and \u00ab\u00a0not to expect immediate results.\u00a0\u00bb The resumption of clashes right after the first round (14-15 January) came to complicate Leon’s task, especially, after that pro-Hafter militia allegedly attacked Benghazi’s central bank and looted huge sums of money and other deposits. UNSMIL condemned the attack and called for an independent inquiry into the incident. The attack compelled Tripoli’s Al Hassi government to freeze its decision to join the UN dialogue if held inside Libya. Besides, Leon’s talk, to the Financial Times on 22 January, of his discussions about peacekeeping forces in Libya with namely the US, UK, and France, has ignited very negative public sentiment towards his role. The statement has undermined the position of those who accepted to go to Geneva, without the permission of the General National Congress. Leon’s FT interview has alarmed the political and military leadership in Libya, who now think their conditions of clarifying the dialogue process, agenda, etc. before engaging in any dialogue round are very justified. The FT interview sent the impression that Leon has already a roadmap that he would like to impose as the outcome of the Geneva dialogue regardless of Libyan crisis stakeholders agree at the negotiation table. Some key towns, such as Misrata, whose local council participated in the first round, are calling now on their representatives to withdraw from the UN Geneva process in light of Leon’s FT statements.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/s\/0\/28b8486a-a185-11e4-b176-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Q1isErqS<\/a> 3) TUNISIA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>23-26.01.2015: Born Dead: Essid’s Cabinet Fails to Convince<\/strong><\/p>\n On Friday 23 January, Tunisian PM Habib Essid announced the composition of his government; but by the weekend, it became clear that Essid’s cabinet would not survive a vote of confidence at the National Assembly. First came Ennahdha’s decision not to endorse Essid’s government because it believed that Tunisia \u00ab\u00a0needs a government of national unity… and that the composition of the present government does not reflect the diversity of the Tunisian political landscape.\u00a0\u00bb Ennahdha’s decision was echoed by other political parties such as the Hama Hamami’s leftist Popular Front (15 seats), Afak Tounes (8 seats), and Kamel Morjane’s Al Moubadara (Initiative) Party (3 seats). Nida Tounes with 86 seats and Slim Riahi’s Union Patriotique Libre (16 seats) would have certainly faced defeat in parliament against the opposition with Ennahadh’s 69 seats, and the votes of the Popular Front, Afak Tounes, Al Moubadar, and other independent deputies. Nidaa Tounes even faced internal division within its ranks, while some figures and deputies expressed publically their rejection of Essid’s proposed cabinet. By Sunday, the Assembly session which was scheduled for Monday to vote the cabinet was delayed and Essid had to resume consultations to reach consensus among the key political parties in the parliament on the new government. Thus, Ennahdha and the Popular Front have demonstrated that they are key players in the political arena, and that Nidaa Tounes could not ignore them. While Ennahdha is demanding a national unity government, Hamami’s Popular Front seems to be determined to stay in the opposition and not take part in a government that included Ennahdha or technocrats from the former Ben Ali regime era.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.kapitalis.com\/politique\/27182-politique-habib-essid-efface-presque-tout-et-recommence.html<\/a> 4) EGYPTE<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>24.01.2015 : El-Baradei Sort de son Silence<\/strong><\/p>\n El-Baradei a donn\u00e9 sa premi\u00e8re interview \u00e0 un journal autrichien depuis son retour d’Egypte en ao\u00fbt 2013. Il explique notamment comment il a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 par le pouvoir militaire et souligne son opposition \u00e0 toute violence. Il dit regretter l’assaut men\u00e9 contre les Fr\u00e8res musulmans.<\/p>\n Lien(s) pour plus d’information :<\/em><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/politics\/65618b7a-9764-4543-adc4-018704057fed<\/a> 5) Y\u00c9MEN<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>22.01.2015 : D\u00e9mission du Pr\u00e9sident<\/strong><\/p>\n Jeudi 22 janvier 2015, le pr\u00e9sident Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi et tous les membres de son cabinet ont d\u00e9pos\u00e9 leur d\u00e9mission et sont, depuis ce jour, assign\u00e9s \u00e0 r\u00e9sidence par Ansar Allah (Houthis). Cette d\u00e9mission pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e au parlement place le pays devant deux sc\u00e9narios possibles :<\/p>\n Un troisi\u00e8me sc\u00e9nario qui envisageait la formation d’un conseil pr\u00e9sidentiel constitu\u00e9 des diverses factions politiques n’est \u00e0 ce jour plus envisageable. Ce sc\u00e9nario, favorable \u00e0 Ansar Allah, leur aurait permis de d\u00e9signer un vice-pr\u00e9sident, puis de pousser lentement Hadi \u00e0 la sortie apr\u00e8s avoir am\u00e9nag\u00e9 une succession leur \u00e9tant favorable.<\/p>\n Selon la constitution, si le si\u00e8ge pr\u00e9sidentiel devait devenir vacant, ce serait au pr\u00e9sident du parlement d’assumer cette charge jusqu’\u00e0 ce que des votations \u00e9lisent le nouveau pr\u00e9sident, \u00e0 moins qu’un conseil militaire annonce l’\u00e9tat d’urgence et le couvre-feu, ce qui mettrait fin \u00e9galement au pouvoir du parlement. Il est probable que le parlement cherche \u00e0 persuader le pr\u00e9sident de revenir sur sa d\u00e9mission, mais le pr\u00e9sident pourrait s’en tenir \u00e0 sa d\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n Plusieurs observateurs voient dans ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements un coup d’Etat et une tentative de retour au pouvoir de l’ancien pr\u00e9sident Saleh comme certains indices ont pu le laisser penser depuis la prise de Sanaa par Ansar Allah en septembre dernier. La coordination entre Ansar Allah et Saleh, longtemps ni\u00e9e par ce dernier, aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 confirm\u00e9e la semaine derni\u00e8re \u00e0 travers la diffusion d’un appel t\u00e9l\u00e9phonique entre Saleh et l’un des leaders d’Ansar Allah. Pour certains, la d\u00e9mission du pr\u00e9sident Hadi et de son gouvernement renforce le sc\u00e9nario du retour de Saleh qui prendrait Abdel-Malik Al-Houthi ou l’un des repr\u00e9sentants de son mouvement comme vice-pr\u00e9sident. Ce sc\u00e9nario commencerait peut-\u00eatre par la nomination du pr\u00e9sident du parlement, Yahya al-Ra\u00ef, proche de Saleh, comme pr\u00e9sident par int\u00e9rim, selon ce que prescrit la constitution. Saleh ou son fils Ahmed Ali Saleh pourraient aussi parvenir acc\u00e9der directement au pouvoir par l’interm\u00e9diaire d’un conseil militaire. D’autres observateurs consid\u00e8rent plut\u00f4t que la d\u00e9mission du pr\u00e9sident mettrait les alli\u00e9s conjoncturels que sont Ansar Allah et Saleh en rivalit\u00e9, les premiers ayant conscience qu’une fois de retour au pouvoir, Saleh n\u00e9gligerait ceux qui lui ont permis cette accession.<\/p>\n Certains observateurs soulignent que les manifestations populaires ayant lieu dans la capitale depuis la d\u00e9mission du pr\u00e9sident pourraient dessiner le d\u00e9but d’un soul\u00e8vement populaire d’opposition \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sence d’Ansar Allah.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.yementimes.com\/en\/1854\/news\/4835\/Anti-Houthi-protestors-assaulted-and-arrested.htm<\/a> 5) SAHEL<\/strong><\/p>\n Mali :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>24.01.2015 Tense Climate in Mali before the Next Round of Peace Negotiations<\/strong><\/p>\n A Malian delegation including the President of the High Islamic Council, Mahmoud Dicko, and the archbishop of Bamako, Jean Zerbo, left Sunday to undertake a tour of Europe. The main objective of this visit is to discuss and gather support for the resolution of the crisis in the Northern part of the country. They will meet with political and religious leaders. Other prominent figures of this delegation include Ch\u00e9rif Ousmane Madani Ha\u00efdara, the former Prime Minister Mohamed Ag Hamani, the President of the Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali (UNTM) and the President of Feminine organizations of Mali.<\/p>\n Discussions took place last week-end in Algiers between the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, and the UN representative for Mali, Hamdi Mongi. The aim of this meeting was to prepare the 5th round of negotiations that shall start in February. The peace process is seriously compromised by the numerous attacks that have been taking place for the past few weeks in the Northern and Central-Western parts of the country. It is also put into questions by the outcry of a great part of the public opinion against the \u00ab\u00a0project agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali\u00a0\u00bb that resulted from the last round of peace negotiations. Tensions are very high between the MINUSMA and the MNLA which mounted demonstrations against the MINUSMA in Kidal, Ber and M\u00e9naka.<\/p>\n http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/mali\/articles\/nord-du-mali-lua-condamne-le-comportement<\/a> Nigeria :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>25.01.2015 : L’Environnement Difficile des Prochaines Elections Pr\u00e9sidentielles<\/strong><\/p>\n Lors de sa visite \u00e0 Lagos, le secr\u00e9taire d’Etat am\u00e9ricain John Kerry a soutenu qu’il \u00ab est imp\u00e9ratif que les \u00e9lections se tiennent \u00e0 la date pr\u00e9vue \u00bb tandis qu’report du scrutin a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9 en raison des d\u00e9placements de population li\u00e9s \u00e0 la violence de Boko Haram. En 2011, lors de la derni\u00e8re \u00e9lection, 800’000 personnes avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 tu\u00e9es et 65’000 avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9plac\u00e9es.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20150126083154\/<\/a> <\/p>\n The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 20 – 26 January 2015 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":5701,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-473","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.coe.int\/t\/dghl\/cooperation\/economiccrime\/cybercrime\/Documents\/CountryProfiles\/CriminalCodeMorocco.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/unsmil.unmissions.org\/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=1993612<\/a>
\nhttps:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?x-yt-ts=1421914688&x-yt-cl=84503534&v=sHEPDfJxvnI<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.ennahdha.tn\/<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/diepresse.com\/home\/politik\/aussenpolitik\/4646594\/ElBaradei<\/a><\/p>\n\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.yementimes.com\/en\/1854\/news\/4834\/President-and-Cabinet-members<\/a>
\nhttps:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/news\/middle-east\/16530-activist-yemen-suffering-from-counter-revolution<\/a>
\nhttps:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/news\/middle-east\/16522-houthi-leader-proposes<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/news\/arabic\/2015\/1\/26\/<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20150122172347\/#ixzz3Pv3KuR9S<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/africa\/2015\/01\/boko-haram-launches-offensive<\/a><\/p>\n
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