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1) MAROC<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb 10.01.2015 : Sondage sur l’utilit\u00e9 de la participation politique<\/strong><\/p>\n Un sondage r\u00e9alis\u00e9 par l’Institut des \u00e9tudes \u00ab Averti \u00bb montre que 83% des citoyens marocains questionn\u00e9s ont exprim\u00e9 leur non engagement ou affiliation et leur non soutien aux partis pr\u00e9sents sur la sc\u00e8ne politique. Le sondage a inclus 1084 citoyens de 40 villes marocaines. Ces r\u00e9sultats ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s \u00e0 la capitale Rabat lors d’un s\u00e9minaire sur \u00abl’utilit\u00e9 du vote lors des \u00e9lections\u00bb. La synth\u00e8se du sondage indique que 64% des citoyens s’int\u00e9ressent \u00e0 l’action politique tandis que 15,40% ne s’int\u00e9ressent pas. En ce qui concerne les raisons principales derri\u00e8re la participation dans les prochaines \u00e9lections, 47,50% ont li\u00e9 leur participation avec le devoir de citoyennet\u00e9, tandis que 24,70% ont confirm\u00e9 leur participation qui trouve sa justification dans la volont\u00e9 de d\u00e9velopper la d\u00e9mocratie locale, 13,20% l’ont justifi\u00e9 par leur engagement partisan, tandis que 45,90% ont confirm\u00e9 que la raison principale de leur non-participation est due \u00e0 la corruption des candidats.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.hespress.com\/politique\/251681.html<\/a><\/p>\n 2) LIBYA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>10.12.2015: Leon’s Libyan Dialogue Encounters Hurdles along the Road to Geneva<\/strong><\/p>\n UNSMIL announced over the weekend that a new round of Libyan political dialogue would take place in Geneva on Wednesday 14 January, this week. Despite the shuttle diplomacy effort, that Bernardino Leon seems to have carried out to consult with actors and stakeholders of the Libyan conflict in both Tripoli and Tobruk, it is very unlikely that all parties invited would go to Geneva. There are divisions on both sides of the conflict. Faraj Hashim, spokesperson of the Hafter-backed Tobruk House of Representatives (HoR) announced that a group of Tobruk parliamentarians flew to Geneva without any coordination with the Tobruk Theni-government. Likewise, the Hassi government and the GNC in Tripoli seem to be undecided. After a lengthy session of the GNC on Monday, the Congress decided to postpone the decision on whether to go to Geneva till next Sunday. The GNC considers that Leon did not allow enough time for consultations and that his roadmap, as summarised in the UNSMIL’s press release, still lacks detail. Leon hopes that the Geneva dialogue would lead to agreement on a national unity government and a consensus on how to manage the remainder of the transition period until a new constitution (already drafted) is adopted by referendum. It appears that some key actors within the GNC are sceptical of the idea of a dialogue outside Libya. Other groups within the GNC think that Leon’s plan does not state a well-defined framework for the dialogue process, timeframe, and guarantees. UNSMIL’s list of invitees only arrived at the GNC in Tripoli late at night on Monday 12th, which is arguably very late notice for a dialogue supposed to start a day later. Reportedly, the list contains the names of four members from the GNC, four Tobruk parliamentarians, four former members of the 2011 Transitional National Council, and five independent figures. Leon did meet with Hafter before the Geneva dialogue round was announced. It is unclear whether Hafter would be invited to Geneva. According to sources close to the GNC, Hafter’s participation would be a deal-breaker, and would undermine any hope of going to Geneva. With division on each side of the divide and within each camp of the conflict it is very unlikely that Leon will manage to bring all actors in the Libyan conflict to the dialogue table in Geneva this Wednesday.<\/p>\n http:\/\/unsmil.unmissions.org\/Default.aspx?ItemID=1992858<\/a> 3) TUNISIA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>6.01.2015: Divisions within Nidaa Tounes Delay Formation of New Government<\/strong><\/p>\n Almost two weeks after his designation to form a new government, Habib Essid has not yet managed to reconcile all key actors and stakeholders to be able to do so. The Popular Front, with 16 seats in the parliament, had already indicated its decision to stay in opposition as soon as President Caid Essebsi nominated Essid PM. While some observers think that Essebsi’s reference to a possibility of including Ennahdha in the new government might explain Hama Hamami’s (leader of the PF) decision to opt for the opposition, others consider that it was rather an ideological divergence on the social and economic policies with Nidaa Tounes that underpinned Hamami’s decision. Divisions within Nidaa Tounes are not helping Essid’s uphill task either. Last week, Khemaies Ksila, member of the Politburo of Nidaa Tounes, criticised publicly Mohsen Marzouk and Rafaa Ben Achour, two advisers in Essebsi’s cabinet. Ksila considered that both advisers \u00ab\u00a0represent the biggest danger for Nidaa Tounes and Tunisia … and that they act with a clique spirit … in order to dominate the party and exclude elected members of the parliament from consultations to form the government.\u00a0\u00bb Ennahdha’s communique over the weekend, following a two-day meeting of its Consultation (Shura) Council, stated that the Movement is \u00ab\u00a0ready to join the new government in the event of receiving an official invitation and if the consultations would lead to consensus on the government’s project and its priorities.\u00a0\u00bb For Kapitalis, a liberal outlet of the business community in Tunisia, including Ennahdha in the new government would amount to committing political suicide, and Nidaa Tounes would then face the same fate as Moncef Merzouki’s Congress for the Republic and Mustapha Jaafar’s Takattoul parties, which were severely punish by Tunisians in the last legislative and presidential elections.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.kapitalis.com\/politique\/26742<\/a> 4) EGYPTE<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>08.01.2015 : Rapprochement entre l’Egypte et le Qatar, coup dur pour les Fr\u00e8res musulmans d’Egypte ; quelles cons\u00e9quences pour le Hamas ?<\/strong><\/p>\n Suite \u00e0 une initiative saoudienne de m\u00e9diation entre l’Egypte et le Qatar inaugur\u00e9e le 20 d\u00e9cembre dernier, al-Jazeera a annonc\u00e9 la fermeture de sa cha\u00eene Mubashir misr (l’Egypte en direct). Cette annonce vient frapper les Fr\u00e8res musulmans en Egypte qui perdent ainsi une plateforme m\u00e9diatique tr\u00e8s influente. Cette initiative de rapprochement soul\u00e8ve de grands d\u00e9bats. Certains m\u00e9dias rapportent qu’une des conditions \u00e9mises par l’Egypte, qui serait l’arr\u00eat de tout soutien qatari aux Fr\u00e8res musulmans en Egypte et en Palestine, aurait provoqu\u00e9 une scission interne dans le gouvernement qatari entre ceux qui y sont favorables et ses opposants. D’autres m\u00e9dias annoncent que ce rapprochement pourrait \u00eatre suivi par un autre, celui de l’Egypte avec la Turquie, avec le Qatar comme m\u00e9diateur. Une autre question tr\u00e8s d\u00e9battue est la position du Qatar face au Hamas. Certaines sources d’information soutiennent que la rupture des liens avec les leaders du Hamas serait aussi demand\u00e9e par l’Egypte. Des d\u00e9clarations divergentes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 faites sur un arr\u00eat de l’aide financi\u00e8re qatarie au parti palestinien et sur une invitation \u00e0 quitter l’\u00e9mirat adress\u00e9e \u00e0 Khaled Meshaal, tout cela dans un contexte o\u00f9 Hamas semble vouloir r\u00e9tablir des liens avec T\u00e9h\u00e9ran.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2015\/01\/al-jazeera-egypt-suspension.html<\/a> 5) Y\u00c9MEN<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>05.01.2015 : Les Houthis s’opposent \u00e0 une division en six r\u00e9gions de l’Etat f\u00e9d\u00e9ral<\/strong><\/p>\n Lundi 5 janvier, le Comit\u00e9 de r\u00e9daction de la nouvelle constitution a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 un projet incluant la division du Y\u00e9men en six r\u00e9gions dans la fondation d’un Etat f\u00e9d\u00e9ral, comme il en avait \u00e9t\u00e9 convenu lors du Dialogue National. Les Houthis, qui avaient un repr\u00e9sentant dans ce comit\u00e9, ont cependant refus\u00e9 le projet, s’opposant \u00e0 la division en six r\u00e9gions, reprochant \u00e0 ce d\u00e9coupage de ne pas tenir compte des questions de populations et de r\u00e9partition des ressources. En effet, la r\u00e9gion de Azal, qui comprend les gouvernorats de Saada, d’Amran, de Dhamar et de Sanaa, et dans laquelle les Houthis privil\u00e9gient d’une forte influence, n’a pas d’acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la mer. Les Houthis se disent favoriser une division en deux r\u00e9gions, r\u00e9gion du nord et r\u00e9gion du sud, ce qui co\u00efncide avec la demande des s\u00e9paratistes du sud et du parti socialiste.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.yementimes.com\/en\/1849\/news\/4775\/Islah-MP-condemns-meeting<\/a><\/p>\n Archive :<\/em><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.aawsat.net\/2014\/12\/article55339325<\/a><\/p>\n 6) SAHEL<\/strong><\/p>\n Mali:<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>10.01.2015 A new government has been formed in Mali<\/strong><\/p>\n A new government, the third one of the presidency of Ibrahim Boubacar Ke\u00efta (IBK), was formed in Mali after the replacement of the Prime Minister Moussa Mara by Modibo Ke\u00efta last Thursday. Moussa Mara had assumed his function only last April 2014, at the same time as Modibo Ke\u00efta was nominated high representative of the President for the peace negotiations with the armed groups that took place in Algiers. This change of Prime Minister is deemed as a sign of political softening by the President since Moussa Mara firmly opposed the idea of federalism while Modibo Ke\u00efta is a charismatic political figure with experience that dates back to the 1980’s and who is perceived as a rallying man, including from the Tuareg side. The new government, comprising 29 membres (as compared to 31 for the previous government), was announced last Saturday and sees the departure of 8 Ministers, among them the Ministers of Defence, Economics and Communication. Two Ministers, Mohamed Ag Erlaf (Environment) and Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed (Reconciliation), who are said to be close to Tuareg armed groups have joined the new government. Nevertheless, no members of the opposition have been nominated. The new government’s priority will be the settlement of peace in the Northern part of the country.<\/p>\n http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/mali\/articles\/lavenir-politique-du-mali-la-relance<\/a><\/p>\n Chad:<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>07.01.2015 Chad threatened by attacks from Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region<\/strong><\/p>\n More than 3,000 Nigerians have sought asylum in the region of Lake Chad since mid-December as a result of attacks from Boko Haram in the Northern-Eastern part of their country. The government of Chad has taken some measures to ensure the security of these affected populations and provide them with the necessary humanitarian assistance. On January 3rd the armed group took over an important military base, located at the entrance of the city of Baga, which was hosting the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force). It returned on January 7th to attack the city and its surrounding villages. This means that Boko Haram now controls the whole of the Nigerian territory that shares borders with Niger, Cameroon and Chad. In addition to its economic and commercial impact, this situation raises serious concerns on the possibility for the government of Nigeria to maintain presidential elections that shall take place on February 14th. Chad is considering joint attacks with Nigeria and Cameroon against Boko Haram in the region.<\/p>\n Nigeria:<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong><\/strong>09.01.2015 : Le pire massacre dans l’histoire de Boko Haram<\/strong><\/p>\n Un nouveau raid meurtrier a \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9 mercredi dernier le 7 janvier par le groupe arm\u00e9 Boko Haram. Ce dernier a d\u00e9truit 16 villes et villages dans le nord-est du Nig\u00e9ria, notamment dans la ville strat\u00e9gique de Bagna. Selon Amnesty International c’est le pire massacre perp\u00e9tr\u00e9 par Boko Haram laissant derri\u00e8re plus de 2000 morts et plus de 20.000 d\u00e9plac\u00e9s.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/for-media\/press-releases\/nigeria-massacre-possibly-deadliest-boko-haram<\/a> <\/p>\n The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 6 – 12 January 2015 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":5698,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-471","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.alwasat.ly\/ar\/news\/libya\/55782\/<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.kapitalis.com\/politique\/26822<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.ennahdha.tn\/<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.eremnews.com\/?id=97043<\/a>
\nhttps:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/articles\/middle-east\/16043-will-qatars-new-links-with-egypt-change-turkeys-position<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.egyptindependent.com\/\/news\/turkey-follows-qatar-s-steps-reconciliation-egypt<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2014\/12\/egypt-qatar-rapprochement-hamas.html<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/blogs\/worldviews\/wp\/2015\/01\/06\/has-the-head-of-hamas-been-kicked-out-of-qatar\/<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20150109184917\/d-fense-s-curit-terrorisme-boko-haram<\/a><\/p>\n
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