![\"\"](\"images\/joomlart\/article\/68497d6cb194485d2759fde9466457b7.jpg\")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
1) LIBYA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>25.10.2014: Mousa Ibrahim, Qaddaif’s Spokesma, Re-emergers after Three Years<\/strong><\/p>\n Mousa Ibrahim who led Qaddafi’s PR campaign to counter the 2011 uprising in Libya re-emerged last week in Cairo, three years after his last public appearance in late summer 2011. Addressing a gathering of former Qaddafi figures and supporters, Ibrahim announced the formation of the Libyan National and Popular Movement. The speeches pronounced at the founding conference of the Libyan National Movement went in line with Khalifa Hafter’s operations and Abdalh Theni’s government in Tobruk. While clashes between the Libya Dawn armed groups and Hafter’s Dignity groups rage on in Benghazi, the diplomatic struggle between Omar Al Hassi’s government in Tripoli and Theni’s in Tobruk continues. The latter went on a diplomatic offensive since the surprise visit of UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon to Tripoli two weeks ago. Theni was received in Malta, Sudan, while a delegation of parliamentarians in Tobruk was welcomed in Paris last week.<\/p>\n https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=99ckHs5dlPg<\/a><\/p>\n 2) TUNISIA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>28.10.2014: Ennahdha’s Election Score: Electoral Defeat or Strategic Retreat?<\/strong><\/p>\n Early partial results of the 26 October general elections in Tunisia have indicated that Beji Caid Essebsi’s Nidaa Tounes is leading in this second electoral test since the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections in which Ennahdha enjoyed a landslide victory by 90 of the CA seats. The early results unveiled Monday show that Ennahdha has retained around 70 seats. This means that the movement’s doctrinal base has remained loyal. The seats Ennahdha seems to have lost are those it attracted in 2011 from outside its stronghold and ideological base. Many, especially among the revolutionary youth, did not swallow Ennahdah’s decision of not imposing the vetting law when it was in power. For these revolutionary youth Ennahdha is responsible for the return of the ancien regime since last January. For them Ennahdha had to be punished and they did so in the ballot box. Nevertheless, partial results show that the southern constituencies have voted mostly in strong support to Ennahdha, with Nida Touness finishing second or third with a very large gap. This was the case in Tataouine, Kebilli, Touzer, Mednine, and Qabes. Whatever the final tally, Ennahdha would remain a significant bloc within the new parliament. Beji Essebsi has announced that Nidaa Tounes would \u00ab\u00a0rule with those closest to it\u00a0\u00bb, while Ghanoushi has called for a national unity government in order to face up to the economic challenges of Tunisia. Beyond the coalition building calculations of Nidaa Tounes ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in late November, keen observers of Tunisian affairs tend to caution against the hasty coverage in the mainstream media, which tended to dismiss Ennahdha’s performance as being a defeat.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.isie.tn\/index.php\/fr\/resultats-partielles-pour-les-elections-legislatives.html<\/a><\/p>\n 3) EGYPT<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>24.10.2014 : Manifestations des \u00e9tudiants en Egypte<\/strong><\/p>\n L’arm\u00e9e \u00e9gyptienne a subi deux attaques vendredi 24 octobre dans le nord du Sina\u00ef qui ont provoqu\u00e9 la mort de 31 soldats. Ce sont les attaques les plus meurtri\u00e8res depuis ao\u00fbt 2013. Suite \u00e0 ces attaques, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 vendredi soir l’\u00e9tat d’urgence accompagn\u00e9 d’un couvre-feu pour une p\u00e9riode de 3 mois dans les r\u00e9gions du nord du Sina\u00ef. Al-Sisi accuse des mains \u00e9trang\u00e8res derri\u00e8re ces attaques, mais n’a nomm\u00e9 personne. Il est \u00e0 noter que, imm\u00e9diatement apr\u00e8s l’incident, un certain nombre d’experts ont craint qu’il pourrait annoncer la d\u00e9cision de d\u00e9placer les gens habitant au Sina\u00ef \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re adjacente \u00e0 la bande de Gaza sous le pr\u00e9texte de combattre le terrorisme. Le Conseil r\u00e9volutionnaire \u00e9gyptien a mis en garde contre cette tentative qui serait une mesure \u00ab contraire \u00e0 toutes les conventions, les lois et les normes internationales \u00bb. Bien que l’organisation Ansar J\u00e9rusalem soit souvent accus\u00e9e d’\u00eatre derri\u00e8re ces op\u00e9rations, des soup\u00e7ons s’\u00e9l\u00e8vent sur la possibilit\u00e9 que ce groupe soit infiltr\u00e9 par des renseignements qui auraient int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 jouer la carte du terrorisme en Egypte. En effet, des questions sont lev\u00e9es sur le mode d’op\u00e9rations de ces attaques et leur visible succ\u00e8s sur des forces qui devraient justement pr\u00e9venir de tels actes.<\/p>\n Lien(s) pour plus d’information :<\/em><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/opinion\/b9fd007e-e24a-4c26-9929-5c656fb58354<\/a> 4) Y\u00c9MEN<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>21.10.2014 : Saleh et fils saperaient la transition d\u00e9mocratique<\/strong><\/p>\n Un panel d’experts des Nations unies a identifi\u00e9 cinq \u00e9minents Y\u00e9m\u00e9nites pour leurs efforts \u00e0 saper la mise en application de l’initiative du Golfe au Y\u00e9men. Il s’agit de l’ancien pr\u00e9sident Ali Abdullah Saleh, son fils Ahmad Ali Abdullah et de trois dirigeants houthis, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, son fr\u00e8re Abdulkhaleq al-Houthi et Abu Ali al-Hakem, le commandant des op\u00e9rations du mouvement. Or le nom qui \u00e9veille le plus de soup\u00e7ons est celui d’Ahmad Ali Abdullah, car malgr\u00e9 le fait qu’il n’ait pas jou\u00e9 de r\u00f4le clair dans les derniers \u00e9v\u00e9nements, la pr\u00e9sence de son nom avec les quatre autres en plus du fait qu’il soit l’ambassadeur du Y\u00e9men aux Emirats arabes unis, laissent indiquer qu’il aurait jou\u00e9 un r\u00f4le dans l’aggravation de la situation politique du pays avec son p\u00e8re. De plus, des fuites dans les m\u00e9dias qui n’ont pas pu \u00eatre v\u00e9rifi\u00e9es insinuaient il y a quelques jours qu’Ahmad Ali Abdullah \u00e9tait impliqu\u00e9 dans la pr\u00e9paration d’un coup d’Etat militaire pour renverser le gouvernement du Pr\u00e9sident Hadi. Ainsi un certain nombre d’observateurs y\u00e9m\u00e9nites pensent que le fils de l’ancien pr\u00e9sident Saleh coordonne la politique des Emirats au Y\u00e9men, qui soutient indirectement l’op\u00e9ration men\u00e9e par le duo Saleh et les Houthis contre les Fr\u00e8res musulmans comme mouvement politique au Y\u00e9men. Cette politique a finalement conduit \u00e9galement \u00e0 la mont\u00e9e des mouvements radicaux tels que le groupe Ansar al-Sharia, le bras d’al-Qaida au Y\u00e9men, qui a gagn\u00e9 le consentement et le soutien dans sa lutte contre les Houthis. Cela co\u00efncide avec l’intensification des combats entre Al-Qa\u00efda et les tribus dans tout Rida’ dans le gouvernorat d’Al-Bayda, dans le district d’Udayn dans le gouvernorat d’Ibb et dans diff\u00e9rentes parties du gouvernorat de Dhamar. En fin on note que beaucoup de nouvelles signalent qu’il y a des milliers de soldats de la Garde pour d\u00e9manteler et neutraliser, ce qui signifie que la zone sera ouverte aux milices arm\u00e9es qui pourront s’\u00e9lever comme une alternative \u00e0 l’Etat et ouvriront les voies pour les conflits internes au Y\u00e9men.<\/p>\n Lien(s) pour plus d’information :<\/em><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/middleeast\/2014\/10\/un-sanctions-target-high-profile-yemenis<\/a><\/p>\n 5) SAHEL<\/strong><\/p>\n Chad :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>24.10.2014 : Bilateral cooperation with Morocco<\/strong><\/p>\n The Prime Minister of Chad, Mr. Kalzeub\u00e9 Payimi Deubet, undertook a three day visit in Morocco to strengthen cooperation with this country. He met with his counterpart, Mr. Abdelilah Benkirane, and with representatives of several Ministries. The visit led to the signature of a memorandum of understanding in the areas of public service and the modernization of public administration. Both Prime Ministers also chaired on Friday in Rabat a working session of the High Joint Commission for bilateral cooperation. This Commission had been created last April as a result of a visit from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.moroccoworldnews.com\/2014\/10\/142341\/morocco-chad-give-new-impetus-to-bilateral<\/a><\/p>\n Niger :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>23.10.2014: Niger bought a \u20ac 10 million electronic intelligence aircraft<\/strong><\/p>\n The government of Niger announced the purchase of a \u20ac 10 million electronic intelligence aircraft to fight against Islamist armed groups along its borders with Mali and Libya. Thus the government of Niger strengthens its own capacities to protect its territory and population from these armed groups. The plane was acquired with the financial support of the USA. This is part of a broader defense cooperation framework between the USA and Niger which led last September to the agreement to open an American military base in Agadez, in the northern part of the country.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20141023132312\/defense-securite-terrorisme<\/a><\/p>\n Mali :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>27.10.2014: French troops redeployed to Northern Mali<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0The French army will temporarily strengthen its troops in northern Mali until the forces of the MINUSMA are reinforced\u00a0\u00bb, declared the French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian. Only 22% of the soldiers of the MINUSMA are based in the northern part of Mali and they were lacking effective logistical support. Since its establishment in July 2013, the MINUSMA, which comprises 8300 soldiers deployed in 12 bases and 970 police officers, has been the target of multiple attacks from armed Islamist groups. 31 soldiers have died as a result from mines, rockets attacks and assaults by armed Islamist groups. Mr. Herv\u00e9 Ladsous, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, promised to the MINUSMA additional support in terms of training, surveillance drones, armored tanks etc.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/JA2805p034.xml0\/defense-terrorisme-armee-francaise<\/a><\/p>\n Nigeria :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>26.10.2014 : Peut-on encore esp\u00e9rer quelque chose du cessez-le-feu avec Boko Haram ?<\/strong><\/p>\n Le 17 octobre, un accord de cessez-le-feu avec Boko Haram, inclut la lib\u00e9ration des 200 lyc\u00e9ennes enlev\u00e9es il y a six mois, \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9 par les autorit\u00e9s tchadiennes et nig\u00e9rianes. Mais depuis les attaques de la secte islamique se poursuivent dans le nord du Nig\u00e9ria. En effets, ce groupe arm\u00e9 a enlev\u00e9 trente adolescents, des gar\u00e7ons et des filles, dans un village de l’Etat de Borno, dans le nord-est du Nig\u00e9ria.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20141022152810\/diplomatie-terrorisme-boko-haram-goodluck<\/a> The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 21 – 27 October 2014 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":5699,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-447","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/politics\/2db50493-6f93-4c34-bcde-c2a5b07f85e8<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.france24.com\/fr\/20141025<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/DEPAFP20141026171255\/terrorisme-boko-haram-terrorisme<\/a><\/p>\n
\n