{"id":219,"date":"2011-09-10T22:33:59","date_gmt":"2011-09-10T21:33:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/2011\/09\/10\/abbas-aroua-lalgerie-et-les-revolutions-arabes\/"},"modified":"2023-05-30T13:24:43","modified_gmt":"2023-05-30T12:24:43","slug":"abbas-aroua-lalgerie-et-les-revolutions-arabes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/abbas-aroua-lalgerie-et-les-revolutions-arabes\/","title":{"rendered":"Abbas Aroua &#8211; L\u2019Alg\u00e9rie et les r\u00e9volutions arabes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"images\/joomlart\/article\/cf4507ae4969876df39b5f798b6f40ce.jpg\" alt=\"\"><\/p>\n<p>Beaucoup de gens se demandent pourquoi l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie n&rsquo;a pas pris le train de r\u00e9volutions et n\u2019a pas particip\u00e9 au \u00ab Printemps arabe \u00bb de 2011. Est-ce qu\u2019elle va \u00eatre une exception? Est-ce qu\u2019elle va rater cette \u00ab fen\u00eatre historique \u00bb pour se lib\u00e9rer? Est-ce le dernier pays de la r\u00e9gion \u00e0 se d\u00e9barrasser d&rsquo;une dictature militaire impitoyable et corrompue? Les Alg\u00e9riens seraient-ils moins d\u00e9termin\u00e9s \u00e0 saisir la libert\u00e9 et la vie d\u00e9cente que les Tunisiens, les Egyptiens, les Y\u00e9m\u00e9nites et les autres? Pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 ces questions pertinentes et l\u00e9gitimes, nous devons faire un bref aper\u00e7u historique.<\/p>\n<p>Le peuple alg\u00e9rien, qui est pass\u00e9 en 1962 de la domination d\u2019une puissance coloniale fran\u00e7aise \u00e0 celle d&rsquo;un pouvoir r\u00e9pressif indig\u00e8ne, a \u00e9t\u00e9 le premier dans le monde arabe \u00e0 s&rsquo;engager, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, dans une lutte non-violente contre le despotisme et la corruption. Le mouvement a commenc\u00e9 dans quelques villes de l&rsquo;Est et s\u2019est propag\u00e9 au centre de l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie et atteindre Alger en Octobre 1988. Des manifestations pacifiques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9cras\u00e9es par une intervention militaire brutale r\u00e9sultant en des centaines de jeunes tu\u00e9s. Le sang de ces innocents a forc\u00e9 le r\u00e9gime \u00e0 op\u00e9rer une certaine ouverture dans les champs politique et m\u00e9diatique. Les Alg\u00e9riens ont go\u00fbt\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois la libert\u00e9 d&rsquo;expression et ont pratiqu\u00e9 leurs droits civils. Des dizaines de journaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9s et plus de soixante partis politiques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 fond\u00e9s, repr\u00e9sentant le large spectre politique alg\u00e9rien. Pendant trois ans (1989-1991), l\u2019Alg\u00e9rie a v\u00e9cu ce qu&rsquo;on appellera plus tard une \u00ab parenth\u00e8se d\u00e9mocratique \u00bb.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>Apr\u00e8s les \u00e9lections locales de 1990, le premier tour des \u00e9lections l\u00e9gislatives a \u00e9t\u00e9 organis\u00e9 en d\u00e9cembre 1991. Les gagnants du premier tour ont \u00e9t\u00e9 le Front de lib\u00e9ration nationale (FLN), qui avait gouvern\u00e9 l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie depuis l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance, le Front des forces socialistes (FFS), un parti de gauche d&rsquo;opposition au r\u00e9gime depuis 1963, et le Front islamique du salut (FIS), un nouveau parti cr\u00e9\u00e9 en 1989 et, de loin, le gagnant des \u00e9lections locales et l\u00e9gislatives.<\/p>\n<p>Les r\u00e9sultats de ce scrutin n&rsquo;ont pas plu \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tablissement militaire et aux services de renseignement. Un coup d&rsquo;Etat a \u00e9t\u00e9 ex\u00e9cut\u00e9 le 11 janvier 1992 par un \u00ab cabinet noir \u00bb soutenu par le gouvernement fran\u00e7ais. Ceci allait ouvrir les portes de l&rsquo;enfer pour le peuple alg\u00e9rien.<\/p>\n<p>Une campagne de r\u00e9pression \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle a suivi l\u2019interruption du processus d\u00e9mocratique. Elle a cibl\u00e9 d&rsquo;abord les membres et les sympathisants du FIS et a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tendue \u00e0 sa base sociale, puis \u00e0 toute la population. Elle a commenc\u00e9 par des arrestations massives des jeunes \u00e0 la sortie des mosqu\u00e9es apr\u00e8s les pri\u00e8res du Vendredi et est all\u00e9e crescendo : d\u00e9tentions arbitraires et d\u00e9portations de dizaines de milliers de personnes vers plusieurs camps de concentration dans le Sahara, certains d&rsquo;entre eux ayant servi comme sites d&rsquo;exp\u00e9rimentations nucl\u00e9aires fran\u00e7aises, utilisation syst\u00e9matique de la torture dans les centres de d\u00e9tention g\u00e9r\u00e9s par la police, la gendarmerie et les services de renseignement (DRS). Les jeunes alg\u00e9riens, soumis aux humiliations et mauvais traitements, ou craignant d&rsquo;\u00eatre arr\u00eat\u00e9s et tortur\u00e9s, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 contraints \u00e0 se livrer \u00e0 une r\u00e9sistance violente et ont form\u00e9 des groupes islamiques arm\u00e9s (GIA). Ces groupes ont ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 combattus par le r\u00e9gime militaire au moyen d\u2019une strat\u00e9gie de contre-insurrection : infiltration de certains groupes arm\u00e9s, cr\u00e9ation de faux GIA, et armement de dizaines de milliers de miliciens.<\/p>\n<p>Les forces arm\u00e9es combin\u00e9es, contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par le DRS, se sont engag\u00e9es dans une campagne horrible de tueries : ex\u00e9cutions extrajudiciaires et massacres. En une d\u00e9cennie (les ann\u00e9es 1990), la r\u00e9pression f\u00e9roce a abouti \u00e0 pr\u00e8s d\u2019un quart de million de morts, 20\u2019000 disparitions forc\u00e9es, des dizaines de milliers de survivants de la torture qui souffrent de s\u00e9quelles physiques et psychologiques, des centaines de milliers de personnes d\u00e9plac\u00e9es ou exil\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<p>La d\u00e9cennie suivante (\u00e8re de Bouteflika qui a pris ses fonctions en 1999) est caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par une violence directe moins intense, mais par plus de violence structurelle (pauvret\u00e9, r\u00e9gression des services publics tels que la sant\u00e9, l\u2019\u00e9ducation, le logement, etc.) et une corruption g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<p>Le r\u00e9gime militaire alg\u00e9rien n&rsquo;aurait pas r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 garder le contr\u00f4le sur la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 alg\u00e9rienne, sans les diverses formes de soutien (politique, diplomatique, militaire, de renseignement, \u00e9conomique, financier, etc.) de l\u2019Europe et des Etats-Unis. Ce soutien a \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s co\u00fbteux. D\u00e8s le d\u00e9but, le r\u00e9gime militaire a accept\u00e9 de faire des concessions significatives. Au niveau politique, l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie a renonc\u00e9 aux fondements de sa politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re : non-alignement, autod\u00e9termination pour tous les peuples, soutien aux mouvements de lib\u00e9ration qui luttent contre le colonialisme et l&rsquo;imp\u00e9rialisme. En 1995, l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie a sign\u00e9 le Trait\u00e9 de non prolif\u00e9ration apr\u00e8s des ann\u00e9es de refus de principe, faisant valoir que tous les pays, y compris les puissances nucl\u00e9aires, doivent \u00eatre trait\u00e9s de mani\u00e8re \u00e9gale. La m\u00eame ann\u00e9e, la diplomatie alg\u00e9rienne \u00e0 Washington a promis de \u00ab normaliser \u00bb les relations avec Isra\u00ebl. Ceci a \u00e9t\u00e9 suivi par des mesures suppl\u00e9mentaires culminant en 1999 avec l\u2019accolade entre Bouteflika et Barak lors des fun\u00e9railles du roi Hassan II, ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 comme un signe positif pour l&rsquo;acceptation d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl, et la rencontre en 2005 entre Bouteflika et Peres en Espagne.<\/p>\n<p>Sur le plan militaire l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e alg\u00e9rienne et les services de renseignement ont bris\u00e9 un tabou quand ils ont pris part \u00e0 des man\u0153uvres militaires de l&rsquo;OTAN dans la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e, impliquant Isra\u00ebl, quand ils ont organis\u00e9 des man\u0153uvres militaires conjointes alg\u00e9ro-am\u00e9ricaines dans le Sahara, et quand ils ont permis \u00e0 la CIA et au FBI d&rsquo;ouvrir des bureaux en Alg\u00e9rie.<\/p>\n<p>Au niveau \u00e9conomique, le r\u00e9gime alg\u00e9rien a accord\u00e9 aux pays occidentaux, notamment les Etats-Unis, d&rsquo;\u00e9normes concessions p\u00e9troli\u00e8res dans le Sahara. De vastes territoires dans le sud de l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie, o\u00f9 les compagnies p\u00e9troli\u00e8res \u00e9trang\u00e8res g\u00e8rent leurs entreprises et font venir leurs ing\u00e9nieurs et personnel de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 par des vols directs, sont presque interdits aux citoyens alg\u00e9riens qui ont besoin d&rsquo;un laissez-passer pour y acc\u00e9der.<\/p>\n<p>A partir du 11 septembre 2001, le soutien des Etats-Unis au r\u00e9gime militaire alg\u00e9rien a consid\u00e9rablement augment\u00e9. Avec sa longue exp\u00e9rience dans le terrorisme d&rsquo;Etat, l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie a r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 se vendre comme un Etat avec la meilleure expertise dans la \u00ab guerre contre le terrorisme \u00bb, et a propos\u00e9 de transf\u00e9rer cette expertise \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9chelle mondiale. Des \u00ab experts \u00bb alg\u00e9riens ont \u00e9t\u00e9 envoy\u00e9s r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement aux Etats-Unis pour \u00ab enseigner \u00bb \u00e0 leurs homologues am\u00e9ricains comment faire face aux groupes islamiques arm\u00e9s. L&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie a import\u00e9 la technologie de la r\u00e9pression de l&rsquo;Occident et a export\u00e9 les techniques de r\u00e9pression d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es durant les ann\u00e9es 1990. Ce partenariat se poursuit \u00e0 ce jour dans le cadre de la lutte contre ladite Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), qui est la version r\u00e9gionale des GIA locaux des ann\u00e9es 1990, et qui utilis\u00e9e comme pr\u00e9texte \u00e0 la r\u00e9pression du r\u00e9gime alg\u00e9rien de toute forme de r\u00e9sistance. AQMI sert \u00e0 la fois les int\u00e9r\u00eats du r\u00e9gime alg\u00e9rien, qui l&rsquo;utilise comme alibi pour supprimer les libert\u00e9s et les droits fondamentaux, et les int\u00e9r\u00eats des Etats-Unis qui visent \u00e0 contr\u00f4ler l&rsquo;Afrique du Nord et le Sahel.<\/p>\n<p>En 2011, le peuple alg\u00e9rien est encore sous un choc post-traumatique collectif. La soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est affaiblie par la perte de tant de ressources humaines, en particulier chez les jeunes. Les Alg\u00e9riens peinent \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre leurs probl\u00e8mes quotidiens. Les \u00e9meutes et les gr\u00e8ves ont lieu chaque jour dans tout le pays, motiv\u00e9es par des revendications sociales. Mais ce mouvement de protestation manque une coordination nationale, une strat\u00e9gie et une force organis\u00e9e pour le conduire et le transformer en une lutte politique. Cela explique en partie pourquoi l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 parmi les premiers pays d&rsquo;Afrique du Nord \u00e0 lancer le \u00ab Printemps arabe \u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>Mais les Alg\u00e9riens sont de plus en plus conscients de ces limites, et il ya des signes indiquant que dans un proche avenir, le peuple alg\u00e9rien va commencer son combat pour la libert\u00e9 et le changement politique radical pour \u00e9tablir un Etat de droit et de bonne gouvernance. Prions pour que cela soit r\u00e9alis\u00e9 par une r\u00e9sistance et des actions non-violentes.<\/p>\n<p>Abbas Aroua<br \/>\n5 septembre 2011<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><!--nextpage--><\/p>\n<p><strong>Algeria and the Arab Revolutions<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Many people keep asking why Algeria did not catch the train of revolutions and participate in the 2011 \u201cArab Spring\u201d. Is it going to be an exception? Is it going to miss this \u201chistoric window\u201d to liberate itself? The last country in the region to get rid of a ruthless corrupt military dictatorship? Are Algerians less determined to grasp freedom and decent life than Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis and others? To answer those meaningful and legitimate questions, we need a brief historical overview.<\/p>\n<p>The Algerian people, who moved in 1962 from a domination by a brutal French colonial power to that of an indigenous repressive power, were the first in the Arab world to engage, in the late 1980s, in a nonviolent struggle against despotism and corruption. The movement started in a few eastern cities and spread to central Algeria and reach Algiers in October 1988. Peaceful demonstrations were crushed through a heavy military intervention resulting in hundreds of youngsters killed. The blood of these innocents forced the regime to allow for some opening in politics and the media. The Algerians experienced for the first time freedom of expression and practiced their civil rights. Dozens of newspapers were launched and over sixty political parties were set up representing the wide Algerian political spectrum. For three years (1989-1991) Algeria lived what would be called a \u201cdemocratic parenthesis\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>After the 1990 local elections, the first round of general elections was organised in December 1991. The winners in the first round were the Front of National Liberation (FLN), which ruled Algeria since independence, the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), a leftist party opposing the regime since 1963, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a new party created in 1989, by far the winner of both local and general elections.<\/p>\n<p>The results of this poll did not please the military-intelligence establishment. A coup by a \u201cblack cabinet\u201d backed by the French government took place on 11 January 1992. This would open the doors of hell for the Algerian people.<\/p>\n<p>A large-scale campaign of repression followed. First it targeted FIS members and sympathisers and was extended to its social base, then to the whole population. It started with mass arrests of youngsters at the exit of mosques following Friday prayers and went crescendo: arbitrary detention and deportation of tens of thousands of people to several concentration camps in the Sahara, some of them having served as French nuclear test sites, systematic use of torture in detention centres run by the police, the gendarmerie, and the intelligence services (DRS). The Algerian youth, subjected to humiliation and ill-treatment, or fearing to be arrested and tortured, were forced to engage in violent resistance and formed the Islamic armed groups (GIAs). These groups were then fought by the military regime through a counter-insurgency strategy, infiltrating some armed groups, creating fake GIAs, and arming tens of thousands of militias.<\/p>\n<p>The combined armed forces controlled by the DRS engaged in an awful campaign of mass killings: widespread extrajudicial executions and massacres. In one decade (1990s) the fierce repression resulted in a quarter of a million deaths, twenty thousand disappearances, tens of thousands of survivors of torture suffering from physical and psychological traumas, with hundreds of thousands of internally displaced and exiled persons.<\/p>\n<p>The following decade (era of Bouteflika, who took office in 1999) is characterised by less direct violence, but more structural violence (poverty, regression of public services such as health, education, housing, etc.) and widespread corruption.<\/p>\n<p>The military regime would not have managed to keep the control over the Algerian society without the various forms of support (political, diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, financial, etc.) from Europe and the United States. This support was very costly. From the beginning, the military regime has accepted to make many significant concessions. At the political level, Algeria renounced the fundamentals of its foreign policy: non-alignment, self-determination for all peoples, support of liberation movements who fight colonialism and imperialism. In 1995 Algeria signed the Non Proliferation Treaty after years of principled refusal, having argued that all countries, including nuclear powers must be treated equally. The same year the Algerian diplomacy in Washington promised to \u201cnormalize\u201d relations with Israel. This was followed by additional steps culminating in the 1999 Bouteflika-Barak accolade during the funerals of King Hassan II, what was interpreted as a positive sign for acceptance of Israel, and the 2005 Bouteflika-Peres meeting in Spain. At the military level the Algerian army and intelligence broke a big taboo when they took part in NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea, involving Israel, when they organised joint Algerian-US military maneuvers in the Sahara, and when they allowed the CIA and the FBI to open offices in Algeria.<\/p>\n<p>At the economic level, the Algerian regime granted Western countries, particularly the US, huge oil concessions in the Sahara. Vast territories in southern Algeria, where foreign oil companies run their business and bring their engineers and security personnel by direct flights, are almost forbidden to Algerian citizens who need a special laissez-passer to get there.<\/p>\n<p>From 9\/11 on, US backing of the Algerian military regime increased significantly. With its long experience in state terrorism, Algeria managed to sell itself as a state with the best expertise in \u201ccounter-terror\u201d war and proposed to transfer this expertise to the global level. Algerian \u201cexperts\u201d were sent regularly to the US to \u201cteach\u201d their counterparts how to deal with Islamic armed groups. Algeria imported repression technology from the West and exported repression techniques developed during the 1990s. This partnership continues to this day in the framework of the fight against the so-called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), which is the regional version of the 1990s GIAs, used as pretext for the Algerian regime\u2019s repression of any form of resistance. AQMI serves both the interests of the Algerian regime, which uses it as an alibi to suppress fundamental liberties and rights, and the US interests that aim to control North Africa and the Sahel.<\/p>\n<p>In 2011 the Algerian people are still under a collective post-traumatic stress disorder. The society is weakened by the loss of so many human resources especially among the youth. Algerians struggle to solve their day-to-day problems. Riots and strikes are called for every day all around the country motivated by social claims. But this protest movement lacks national coordination, strategy, and an organized force to conduct it and transform it into a political struggle. This explains partly why Algeria was not among the first North African countries to launch the Arab Spring.<\/p>\n<p>But the Algerians are more and more aware of these limitations, and there are warning signs indicating that in the near future the Algerian people will start their fight for freedom and a radical political change to establish a state of law and good governance. Let\u2019s pray for this to be achieved through nonviolent resistance and actions.<\/p>\n<p>Abbas Aroua<br \/>\n5 September 2011<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><!--nextpage--><\/p>\n<p><strong>L\u2019Algeria e le rivoluzioni arabe<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Molti continuano a chiedersi perch\u00e9 l\u2019Algeria non abbia preso il treno delle rivoluzioni partecipando alla \u201cprimavera araba\u201d del 2011. Finir\u00e0 con l\u2019essere un\u2019eccezione? Finir\u00e0 col perdere questa \u201cfinestra storica\u201d per liberarsi? L\u2019ultimo paese della regione a liberarsi di una dittatura militare corrotta e insensibile? Gli algerini sono meno determinati ad afferrare la libert\u00e0 e una vita decente rispetto a tunisini, egiziani, yemeniti e altri? Per rispondere a tali domande importanti e legittime ci serve una breve ricostruzione storica.<\/p>\n<p>Il popolo algerino, che pass\u00f2 nel 1962 da una dominazione del brutale potere coloniale francese a un potere repressivo indigeno, fu il primo del mondo arabo a impegnarsi verso la fine degli anni 1980 in una lotta nonviolenta contro il dispotismo e la corruzione. Il movimento inizi\u00f2 in alcune citt\u00e0 orientali e si diffuse all\u2019Algeria centrale raggiungendo Algeri nell\u2019ottobre 1988. Le dimostrazioni pacifiche furono schiacciate da un pesante intervento militare che risult\u00f2 in centinaia di giovani uccisi. Il sangue di questi innocenti costrinse il regime a permettere qualche apertura nella politica e nei media. Gli algerini per la prima volta provarono la libert\u00e0 d\u2019espressione e praticarono i loro diritti civili. Vennero varati dozzine di giornali e s\u2019istituirono oltre sessanta partiti politici in rappresentanza dell\u2019ampio spettro politico algerino. Per tre anni (1989-1991) l\u2019Algeria visse quella che si sarebbe definita una \u201cparentesi democratica\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Dopo le elezioni locali del 1990, la prima tornata di elezioni generali fu organizzata nel dicembre 1991. I vincitori furono il Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale (FLN), al governo dell\u2019Algeria fin dall\u2019indipendenza, il Fronte delle Forze Socialiste (FFS), un partito di sinistra contrario al regime dal 1963, e il Fronte di Salvezza Islamico (FIS), un nuovo partito creato nel 1989, vincitore con distacco sia delle elezioni generali sia locali.<\/p>\n<p>I risultati di questa consultazione elettorale non garbavano all\u2019establishment militare e dei servizi di sicurezza. Un colpo di mano di un \u201cgabinetto nero\u201d sostenuto dal governo francese ebbe luogo l\u201911 gennaio 1992, aprendo le porte dell\u2019inferno per il popolo algerino.<\/p>\n<p>Ne segu\u00ec una campagna di repressione su vasta scala; che dapprima ebbe come bersaglio membri e simpatizzanti FIS estendendosi alla sua base sociale e poi all\u2019intera popolazione. Inizi\u00f2 con arresti di massa di giovani all\u2019uscita delle moschee dopo le preghiere del venerd\u00ec e and\u00f2 crescendo: detenzione e deportazione arbitraria di decine di migliaia di persone in vari campi di concentramento nel Sahara, alcuni dei quali erano serviti come siti sperimentali nucleari francesi, uso sistematico della tortura in centri detentivi gestiti dalla polizia, la gendarmerie, e dai servizi segreti (DRS). La giovent\u00f9 algerina, sottoposta a umiliazioni e maltrattamenti, o con la paura di venire arrestata e torturata, fu costretta a impegnarsi in una difesa violenta e form\u00f2 i Gruppi Islamici Armati (GIA). Questi gruppi furono allora combattuti dal regime militare con una strategia contro-insurrezionale, infiltrando alcuni gruppi, creando finti GIA, e armando decine di migliaia di miliziani.<\/p>\n<p>Le forze armate complessive controllate dal DRS si buttarono in una spaventosa campagna di uccisioni di massa: esecuzioni extragiudiziarie e massacri diffusissimi. In un decennio (gli anni 1990) la brutale repressione risult\u00f2 in 250.000 morti, 20.000 sparizioni, decine di migliaia di sopravvissuti alla tortura sofferenti di traumi fisici e psicologici, centinaia di migliaia di sfollati ed esiliati.<\/p>\n<p>Il decennio successivo (era di Bouteflika, che sal\u00ec in carica nel 1999) \u00e8 caratterizzata da meno violenza diretta, ma pi\u00f9 violenza strutturale (povert\u00e0, regressione dei servizi pubblici sanitari, educativi, abitativi, ecc.) e corruzione diffusa.<\/p>\n<p>Il regime militare non sarebbe riuscito a mantenere il controllo sulla societ\u00e0 algerina senza le varie forme di sostegno (politico, diplomatico, militare, di spionaggio, economico, finanziario, ecc.) dell\u2019 Europa e degli Stati Uniti. Tale sostegno era molto costoso. Fin dall\u2019inizio il regime militare ha accettato di fare molte significative concessioni. A livello politico, l\u2019Algeria ha rinnegato gli elementi basilari della propria politica estera: non-allineamento, auto-determinazione per tutti i popoli, sostegno ai movimenti di liberazione in lotta contro il colonialismo e l\u2019imperialismo. Nel 1995 l\u2019Algeria firm\u00f2 il Trattato di Non Proliferazione dopo anni di diniego argomentato, avendo sostenuto che tutti i paesi, comprese le potenze nucleari, devono essere trattate in modo uguale. Lo stesso anno la diplomazia algerina a Washington promise di \u201cnormalizzare\u201d le relazioni con Israele. A ci\u00f2 seguirono ulteriori passi culminati nell\u2019abbraccio cerimoniale del 1999 fra Bouteflika e Barak (primo ministro israeliano, ndt) durante i funerali del re Hassan II del Marocco, interpretato come segnale positivo di accettazione d\u2019Israele, e l\u2019incontro Bouteflika-Peres del 2005 in Spagna. A livello militare l\u2019esercito e lo spionaggio algerini infransero un grosso tab\u00f9 prendendo parte alle manovre NATO nel mar Mediterraneo con Israele e organizzando manovre militari congiunte algerino-USA nel Sahara, e permettendo a CIA e FBI di aprire uffici in Algeria.<\/p>\n<p>A livello economico, il regime algerino ha aggiudicato ai paesi occidentali, particolarmente gli USA, enormi concessioni petrolifere nel Sahara. Vasti territori dell\u2019Algeria meridionale, dove le compagnie petrolifere straniere gestiscono i propri affari e portano con voli diretti il proprio personale tecnico e di sicurezza, sono quasi proibite ai cittadini algerini che necessitano di uno speciale lasciapassare per entrarvi.<\/p>\n<p>Dall\u201911 settembre in poi, il supporto USA al regime militare algerino \u00e8 molto aumentato. Con la propria lunga esperienza nel terrorismo di stato, l\u2019Algeria ha fatto in modo di vendersi come stato con la migliore perizia nella guerra di \u201ccontro-terrorismo\u201d proponendo di trasferirla a livello globale. \u201cEsperti\u201d algerini sono stati regolarmente inviati negli USA per \u201cinsegnare\u201d alle loro controparti come trattare i gruppi islamici armati. L\u2019Algeria ha importato tecnologia repressiva dall\u2019Occidente esportando tecniche repressive sviluppate durante gli anni 1990. Questa partnership continua tuttora nell\u2019ambito della lotta contro la cosiddetta Al Qaeda nel Maghreb Islamico (AQMI), versione regionale dei GIA degli anni 1990, usata a pretesto per la repressione da parte del regime algerino di ogni forma di resistenza. AQMI serve gli interessi sia del regime algerino, che la usa come alibi per sopprimere libert\u00e0 e diritti fondamentali, sia degli USA che mirano a controllare il Nord Africa e il Sahel.<\/p>\n<p>Nel 2011 il popolo algerino \u00e8 tuttora in uno stato collettivo di disordine da stress post-traumatico. La societ\u00e0 \u00e8 indebolita dalla perdita di tante risorse umane specialmente fra i giovani. Gli algerini gi\u00e0 faticano a risolvere i propri problemi quotidiani. Ogni giorno si contano tafferugli e scioperi in tutto il paese, motivati da rivendicazioni sociali. Ma questo movimento di protesta manca di coordinamento nazionale, di strategia, e di una forza organizzata che lo guidi e lo trasformi in una lotta politica. Questo spiega in parte perch\u00e9 l\u2019Algeria non fosse fra i primi paesi nordafricani a lanciare la Primavera Araba.<\/p>\n<p>Ma gli algerini sono sempre pi\u00f9 consci di queste limitazioni, e ci sono segni premonitori che in un futuro prossimo il popolo algerino comincer\u00e0 la sua lotta per la libert\u00e0 e un radicale cambiamento politico che istituisca uno stato di legalit\u00e0 e buon governo. Preghiamo che ci\u00f2 venga conseguito con una resistenza e azioni nonviolente.<\/p>\n<p>Abbas Aroua<br \/>\n5 settembre 2011<\/p>\n<p>Traduzione di Miky Lanza per il Centro Sereno Regis (www.serenoregis.org)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Beaucoup de gens se demandent pourquoi l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie n&rsquo;a pas pris le train de r\u00e9volutions et n\u2019a pas particip\u00e9 au \u00ab Printemps arabe \u00bb de 2011. Est-ce qu\u2019elle va \u00eatre une exception? Est-ce qu\u2019elle va rater cette \u00ab fen\u00eatre historique \u00bb pour se lib\u00e9rer? Est-ce le dernier pays de la r\u00e9gion \u00e0 se d\u00e9barrasser d&rsquo;une dictature [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":6076,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-219","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-contributions"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Abbas Aroua - L\u2019Alg\u00e9rie et les r\u00e9volutions arabes - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/abbas-aroua-lalgerie-et-les-revolutions-arabes\/\" \/>\n<link rel=\"next\" href=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/fr\/abbas-aroua-lalgerie-et-les-revolutions-arabes\/2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Abbas Aroua - L\u2019Alg\u00e9rie et les r\u00e9volutions arabes - Cordoba Peace Institute | Fran\u00e7ais\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Beaucoup de gens se demandent pourquoi l&rsquo;Alg\u00e9rie n&rsquo;a pas pris le train de r\u00e9volutions et n\u2019a pas particip\u00e9 au \u00ab Printemps arabe \u00bb de 2011. 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