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The views and perspectives contained in these Blogs are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Peace Institute - Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.

Contrairement à la vision promue par l'armée, la situation en Egypte n'est pas celle d'un combat entre pro-islamistes et anti-islamistes mais bien le résultat d'un coup d'Etat militaire.

Les événements des derniers jours en Egypte témoignent de l'extrême brutalité d'une dictature militaire revenue (ou demeurée) au pouvoir, de l'incapacité de la communauté internationale à condamner fermement la violence contre des civils lorsqu'elle est prétendument dirigée contre des «islamistes», et de la stratégie de manipulation mise en place par un pouvoir ne pouvant s'appuyer sur aucune légitimité démocratique.

The past days' events in Egypt demonstrate the extreme virulence of a military dictatorship that seems to be back (or remained) in the political arena, the incapacity of the international community to firmly condemn the violence used against civilians, when it is so-called led against "islamists", and the manipulation's strategy driven by a power that cannot rely on any democratic legitimacy.

Came to power through what is first, described as a revolution by those who, ignoring the democratic frame when applied to islamists, reject the idea of a coup d'état, the army now reveals its true face, strengthening some people in their blind support to a brutish regime, as long as it pretends to be opposed to 'bearded people', sometimes embarrassing its followers from the first days, when it is not scaring away to Vienna its supposed leader, worried to be one day sued for crimes against humanity.

We are told that some churches are burnt down, Christians are threatened, and museums are stolen. The "charia" application is claimed, "djihad" is called. Over and above the death of individuals, it seems that once again we assist, and in the extension of a politics expressed by Bush in 2001, to a war between the "good" and the "evil". Today, the army introduces itself as the life saver of Egypt, the Middle East, even of the world against obscurantism and the conservatism of the so-called islamists. Playing the modernity and minorities' protector card, the army justifies by the violence used against Coptics and the destruction of the national heritage, the declaration of the state of emergency and the bloody repression towards the "guilty": the Muslim Brothers or the islamists in general.

يعد عزل الرئيس محمد مرسي من قبل الجيش المصري انقلابا عسكريا بكل جلاء وبساطة. حيث ينطبق على عزل مرسي تعريف الانقلاب العسكري الذي يتمثل في الإطاحة غير القانونية برئيس الدولة من قبل الجيش أو فصيل داخله، أو من قبل الأجهزة الأمنية، من خلال استخدام القوة أو التهديد باستخدامها. وتذكرنا التجارب السابقة للانقلابات العسكرية مثل إسقاط حكومة مصدق في إيران في عام 1953، وسلفادور ألاندي في تشيلي في عام 1973، والانقلاب العسكري في الجزائر في عام 1992 بأن الانقلابات العسكرية ليست أبدا أداة ذكية لتسوية النزاعات. إن الانقلاب العسكري في مصر لشهادة مؤسفةعلى فشل جميع الفاعلين السياسيين وأصحاب المصلحة في إدارة المرحلة الانتقالية، نتيجة للاستقطاب الحاد.

فما هي التحديات التي تواجهها مصر اليوم بعد تعليق الدستور وتولي الجيش لإدارة شؤون البلاد؟

L'éviction du président Mohamed Morsi par l'armée égyptienne est un coup d'Etat militaire pur et simple. En effet, cette éviction répond à la définition d'un renversement illégal de la tête de l'Etat par l'armée, une faction interne, ou les services de sécurité, par l'utilisation de la force ou de la menace de l'utiliser. Les expériences passées de coups d'Etats militaires comme le renversement du gouvernement Mossadegh en Iran en 1953, de Salvador Allende au Chili en 1973, ou encore le putsch militaire en Algérie de 1992 nous rappellent que les coups d'Etats militaires ne sont jamais un bon mécanisme pour la résolution de conflits. Le coup d'Etat militaire en Egypte est un témoignage regrettable de l'échec de tous les acteurs politiques et des parties engagées dans la manière de gérer la période de transition qui a été caractérisée par une très forte polarisation.

Aujourd'hui, alors que la constitution a été suspendue et que l'armée a repris le pouvoir, quels sont les défis à relever pour l'Egypte ?

The ousting of President Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian army is a military coup d'état pure and simple. Morsi's ousting qualifies for a military putsch which is by definition the illegal removal of the head of the state by the army or a faction within it, or the security services, through the use of force or the threat to using it. Past experiences of military coup d'état such as the toppling of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953, Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, and the military putsch in Algeria in 1992 remind us that military coups are never a smart tool for conflict resolution. The military coup in Egypt is a regrettable testimony for the failure of all political actors and stakeholders to manage the transition period, as a result of acute polarization. Now that the constitution has been suspended and the army has taken over what are the challenges faced by Egypt today?

June 30, 2013 marks the last day of the first year of President Morsi's rule in Egypt. For his supporters, this is something to celebrate as Egypt completes a year of democracy under democratically elected President. For his opponents, this is his last day in power.

The language of certainty was much higher amongst the opponents maybe a month ago, when the mobilization of Rebel (Tamarrud) movement was high collecting signatures to sack the President (withdraw confidence as they called it). The support to the President at that time from his group (the Muslim Brotherhood) was rather doubtful; some people expected that the group that dominated the Egyptian politics over this year of Morsi's rule would sacrifice the President to keep the organization intact, or that the Brotherhood would make all the possible retreats and present all the possible concessions to save itself and maybe the President. The anticipation was that Morsi would accept a referendum on his rule if not an early Presidential elections.

To defuse this certainty, Impartiality (Tagarrud) movement was launched as an opponent to Tamarrud. It was exactly the same way the Conscience (Dameer) Front was established to defuse the Salvation (Inquaz) Front.

Yet, the difference was striking. Dameer Front was made of benign quasi-Islamist and partially-secular supporters of Morsi. It was answering the Salvation Front made of secular liberal and socialist opponents. The realm of ideology dichotomy was still apparent; and things were not sorted as Islam versus Secularism at that point. But the second wave of opposing Morsi was totally different; it was fully radical against the Brotherhood and their so called "Islamic Rule" as the tone became higher by Tamarrud and the call became pro having a full rebellion and establishing a whole new regime through the "popular revolutionary will" and by means of violence (if necessary). This was highly spear-headed this time by the Popular Current (Hamdeen sabbahi) whose ideology matches that of Tamarrud and where the key leaders of the rebel movement come from this Populist Nasserist Socialist current. The tone was totally high against the Brotherhood as an Islamist group rather than a political opponent represented through the Freedom and Justice Party. Describing the Brotherhood as Kherfan (cheep) was abundant to the point that the cause was portrayed as a battle between Islam versus Secularism. This ignited a fully Islamist support to Morsi in the form of Tagarrud movement spear-headed by the Jamaa Islameyya and its Construction and Development Party.