{"id":989,"date":"2019-01-02T04:35:00","date_gmt":"2019-01-02T04:35:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/2019\/01\/02\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\/"},"modified":"2023-04-27T16:13:41","modified_gmt":"2023-04-27T15:13:41","slug":"le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\/","title":{"rendered":"Le processus politique en Irak &#8211; 2018"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" alignleft size-full wp-image-984\" src=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote.jpg\" alt=\"\" align=\"left\" width=\"960\" height=\"640\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote.jpg 960w, https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote-640x427.jpg 640w, https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote-400x267.jpg 400w, https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote-367x245.jpg 367w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Avec plusieurs mois de retard et de tractations, le gouvernement irakien prend finalement forme petit &agrave; petit. En effet, pour la quatri&egrave;me fois depuis la chute du r&eacute;gime de Saddam Hussein, les irakiens avaient &eacute;t&eacute; appel&eacute;s aux urnes le 12 mai dernier afin de renouveler les 329 membres du parlement pour un mandat de quatre ans. Du fait de son syst&egrave;me politique, pour obtenir un bloc majoritaire au parlement, les partis sont contraints de constituer des coalitions plus ou moins formelles et ainsi approuver les candidats aux postes minist&eacute;riels. Cependant, depuis le mois de d&eacute;cembre, deux diff&eacute;rents blocs parlementaires, pourtant cens&eacute;s former une alliance tacite, se m&egrave;nent une guerre sans merci afin de positionner leur candidat aux diff&eacute;rents postes minist&eacute;riels.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>Avec plusieurs mois de retard et de tractations, le gouvernement irakien prend finalement forme petit &agrave; petit. En effet, pour la quatri&egrave;me fois depuis la chute du r&eacute;gime de Saddam Hussein, les irakiens avaient &eacute;t&eacute; appel&eacute;s aux urnes le 12 mai dernier afin de renouveler les 329 membres du parlement pour un mandat de quatre ans. Du fait de son syst&egrave;me politique, pour obtenir un bloc majoritaire au parlement, les partis sont contraints de constituer des coalitions plus ou moins formelles et ainsi approuver les candidats aux postes minist&eacute;riels. Cependant, depuis le mois de d&eacute;cembre, deux diff&eacute;rents blocs parlementaires, pourtant cens&eacute;s former une alliance tacite, se m&egrave;nent une guerre sans merci afin de positionner leur candidat aux diff&eacute;rents postes minist&eacute;riels.<\/p>\n<p>Apr&egrave;s l&rsquo;&eacute;lection, par les nouveaux parlementaires, du Pr&eacute;sident du Parlement Mohammed al-Halboussi le 15 septembre dernier, le processus de formation du gouvernement, qui constitutionnellement devait durer 90 jours, a pu commencer. Suivant cette &eacute;lection, Barham Salih a &eacute;t&eacute; choisi, le 2 octobre, pour occuper le poste &ndash; principalement honorifique &ndash; de Pr&eacute;sident de la R&eacute;publique d&rsquo;Irak, qui revient traditionnellement, depuis la chute de l&rsquo;ancien r&eacute;gime, &agrave; un Kurde. Sa position mod&eacute;r&eacute;e sur la probl&eacute;matique de l&rsquo;ind&eacute;pendance du Kurdistan lui a valu les faveurs des groupes parlementaires les plus importants.<\/p>\n<p>Fra&icirc;chement &eacute;lu, Salih a rapidement d&eacute;sign&eacute; Adel Abdul Mahdi comme Premier Ministre, ce dernier jouissant d&rsquo;une riche exp&eacute;rience en politique, tout en conservant une certaine ind&eacute;pendance vis-&agrave;-vis des rivalit&eacute;s sectaires et\/ou ethniques. Il a notamment servi comme ministre des finances, mais aussi comme ministre du p&eacute;trole pendant deux ans. Il &eacute;galement &eacute;t&eacute; &eacute;lu vice-pr&eacute;sident en 2005, poste qu&rsquo;il a conserv&eacute; jusqu&rsquo;&agrave; sa d&eacute;mission en 2011. D&eacute;tenteur des principaux pouvoirs en vertu de la Constitution, Abdul Mahdi a depuis la t&acirc;che de former son gouvernement en proposant des ministres qui doivent ensuite &ecirc;tre approuv&eacute;s par les parlementaires.<\/p>\n<p>Gr&acirc;ce &agrave; leur alliance politique afin de former une majorit&eacute; au parlement, le bloc Islah (r&eacute;conciliation) men&eacute; par Moqtada al-Sadr et le bloc Binaa (construction) dirig&eacute; par Hadi al-Ameri se sont mis d&rsquo;accord sur 14 des 22 ministres. La rapidit&eacute; de ces approbations a laiss&eacute; penser que la situation s&rsquo;&eacute;tait bel et bien d&eacute;verrouill&eacute;e, mais Sadr et Ameri sont brusquement retourn&eacute;s &agrave; un blocage politique autour de l&rsquo;approbation du ministre de l&rsquo;int&eacute;rieur. En effet, ces derni&egrave;res ann&eacute;es, ce poste a toujours &eacute;t&eacute; attribu&eacute; &agrave; des personnalit&eacute;s politiques issues du mouvement dirig&eacute; par Ameri, lequel est fortement soutenu par T&eacute;h&eacute;ran., alors que Sadr pr&eacute;f&eacute;rait un candidat sans aucune affiliation politique &agrave; un r&eacute;gime &eacute;tranger et a r&eacute;p&eacute;t&eacute; &agrave; Abdul Mahdi de continuer &agrave; pr&eacute;senter des candidats pour le reste des minist&egrave;res encore vacants, malgr&eacute; l&rsquo;impasse sur ce poste.<\/p>\n<p>Agac&eacute; par cette situation, Sadr a &eacute;galement menac&eacute; de se retirer des processus d&rsquo;approbation et d&rsquo;organiser des manifestations gr&acirc;ce &agrave; son grand pouvoir de rassembleur. Effectivement, le populiste chiite &eacute;tait parvenu &agrave; mobiliser ses jeunes partisans, durant l&rsquo;occupation, pour tenter de chasser les troupes am&eacute;ricaines du pays. Mais c&rsquo;est particuli&egrave;rement en 2016 qu&rsquo;il d&eacute;montra l&rsquo;importance de son influence en organisant une manifestation anti-corruption de grande ampleur sur le principe d&rsquo;une identit&eacute; irakienne inclusive. Ses partisans &eacute;taient m&ecirc;me parvenus &agrave; entrer dans la &laquo; zone internationale &raquo; (&eacute;galement connue sous de &laquo; zone verte &raquo;) pour demander la d&eacute;mission de certains ministres.<\/p>\n<p>En raison de leur m&eacute;contentement avec les propositions d&rsquo;Abdul Mahdi, des membres du parlement, en majorit&eacute; affili&eacute;s &agrave; Sadr et &agrave; Abadi, ont immobilis&eacute; d&eacute;but d&eacute;cembre une session durant laquelle le Premier Ministre tentait de faire voter sa liste de candidats pour les postes de ministres inoccup&eacute;s. Cette disruption a forc&eacute; le Premier Ministre et ses candidats &agrave; quitter le parlement, laissant &agrave; nouveau le gouvernement irakien sans ministres de la d&eacute;fense ni de l&rsquo;int&eacute;rieur. Ce d&eacute;saccord &agrave; pour cause le souhait d&rsquo;Abdul Mahdi de pr&eacute;senter Falih al-Fayyadh comme ministre de l&rsquo;int&eacute;rieur, lequel est le pr&eacute;sident des Hachd al-Chaabi, ou &laquo; Unit&eacute; de Mobilisation Populaire &raquo;. Chef &eacute;galement de sa propre organisation (les Brigades Badr) cr&eacute;&eacute;e en 1982, qu&rsquo;il a transform&eacute; en parti politique en 2012, il a particip&eacute; aux combats contre l&rsquo;Etat Islamique. Pour ses opposants, les relations de Fayyadh avec T&eacute;h&eacute;ran constituent un conflit d&rsquo;int&eacute;r&ecirc;t. Il avait d&rsquo;ailleurs pr&eacute;c&eacute;demment d&ucirc; abandonner son poste de Conseiller &agrave; la s&eacute;curit&eacute; nationale pour cette raison. Frustr&eacute; par l&rsquo;immobilisme de la situation, Abdul Mahdi a fait savoir qu&rsquo;il ne pr&eacute;senterait de listes. Selon lui, c&rsquo;est au parlement de pr&eacute;senter de nouveaux noms.<\/p>\n<p>Cette immobilisation du processus politique paralyse le pays, et pour cette raison le budget de 2019 n&rsquo;a pas encore pu &ecirc;tre planifi&eacute;. &Agrave; cause de ceci d&eacute;coule une impossibilit&eacute; d&rsquo;organiser la reconstruction du pays et d&rsquo;envoyer les aides devant parvenir aux zones les plus pauvres et d&eacute;truites par les combats. Abdul Mahdi se retrouve paralys&eacute; par cette situation et dans l&rsquo;incapacit&eacute; d&rsquo;exercer son pouvoir, sachant qu&rsquo;un autre poste clivant doit &ecirc;tre encore approuv&eacute;, &agrave; savoir celui de ministre de la d&eacute;fense. Ce poste comprend la gestion des th&eacute;matiques s&eacute;curitaires et celles li&eacute;es aux forces arm&eacute;es et est de ce fait tr&egrave;s convoit&eacute;. D&rsquo;apr&egrave;s la constitution irakienne, ce minist&egrave;re doit &ecirc;tre tenu par un technocrate ou un ind&eacute;pendant. En novembre, les parlementaires sunnites ont nomm&eacute; l&rsquo;ancien Pr&eacute;sident du parlement Salim al-Jabouri apr&egrave;s de nombreuses tractations. Mais les principaux partis &eacute;tant tr&egrave;s occup&eacute;s avec le choix d&rsquo;un ministre de l&rsquo;int&eacute;rieur, Jabouri n&rsquo;a jusqu&rsquo;&agrave; ce jour &eacute;t&eacute; ni confirm&eacute; ni infirm&eacute;.<\/p>\n<p>Ce blocage au sein de l&rsquo;appareil politique chiite et les partis repr&eacute;sentant des alliances vari&eacute;es d&eacute;montrent un changement de cap de la politique irakienne en g&eacute;n&eacute;ral. Ce n&rsquo;est plus le clivage chiite-sunnite qui domine les tractations politiques, mais les diff&eacute;rentes visions de ce qui d&eacute;finit l&rsquo;identit&eacute; irakienne et la volont&eacute; d&rsquo;emp&ecirc;cher de nouvelles ing&eacute;rences &eacute;trang&egrave;res.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Avec plusieurs mois de retard et de tractations, le gouvernement irakien prend finalement forme petit &agrave; petit. En effet, pour la quatri&egrave;me fois depuis la chute du r&eacute;gime de Saddam Hussein, les irakiens avaient &eacute;t&eacute; appel&eacute;s aux urnes le 12 mai dernier afin de renouveler les 329 membres du parlement pour un mandat de quatre [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":984,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-989","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-contributions"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Le processus politique en Irak - 2018 - Cordoba Peace Institute | \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628\u064a\u0629<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ar_AR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Le processus politique en Irak - 2018 - Cordoba Peace Institute | \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628\u064a\u0629\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Avec plusieurs mois de retard et de tractations, le gouvernement irakien prend finalement forme petit &agrave; petit. En effet, pour la quatri&egrave;me fois depuis la chute du r&eacute;gime de Saddam Hussein, les irakiens avaient &eacute;t&eacute; appel&eacute;s aux urnes le 12 mai dernier afin de renouveler les 329 membres du parlement pour un mandat de quatre [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Cordoba Peace Institute | \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628\u064a\u0629\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2019-01-02T04:35:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-04-27T15:13:41+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/01\/ThePoliticalProcessInIraq_vote.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"960\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"640\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u0643\u064f\u062a\u0628 \u0628\u0648\u0627\u0633\u0637\u0629\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"\u0648\u0642\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0631\u0627\u0621\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u064f\u0642\u062f\u0651\u0631\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"7 \u062f\u0642\u0627\u0626\u0642\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/ar\\\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/ar\\\/le-processus-politique-en-irak-2018\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"C\u00f2rdoba Geneva\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cpi-geneva.org\\\/ar\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0a76d9365b1b8c6b5265567c49ee79df\"},\"headline\":\"Le processus politique en Irak &#8211; 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