{"id":591,"date":"2016-10-11T21:53:54","date_gmt":"2016-10-11T20:53:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/2016\/10\/11\/the-cordoba-update-17-2016\/"},"modified":"2023-04-27T16:14:32","modified_gmt":"2023-04-27T15:14:32","slug":"the-cordoba-update-17-2016","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/the-cordoba-update-17-2016\/","title":{"rendered":"The Cordoba Update 17\/2016"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!-- {lofimg src=\"\/images\/stories\/Cordoba-Update_logo.jpg\"} --><\/p>\n<div><strong>26<sup>th<\/sup> September &#8211; 10<sup>th<\/sup> October 2016<br \/><\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<em><br \/><\/em><\/div>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<style scoped=\"scoped\" type=\"text\/css\"><!--\ntd {\n\t\t\tbackground: #f5f4ef none repeat scroll 0 0;\n\t\t\tvertical-align: top;\n\t\t\tpadding: 6px 12px;\n\t\t}\n\t\ttd.cuintro {\n\t\t\tbackground: #F7FAFE none repeat scroll 0 0;\n\t\t}\n\t\tul {\n\t\t\tmargin: 0 0.5em 0 1em;\n\t\t\tpadding: 0;\n\t\t}\n\t\tli {\n\t\t\tmargin-bottom: 0;\n\t\t\tpadding-left: 9px;\n\t\t\ttext-align: left;\n\t\t}\n--><\/style>\n<div>\n<table border=\"0\" style=\"width: 100%;\" cellspacing=\"4\" cellpadding=\"4\" align=\"center\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"cuintro\">\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">The bi-weekly CORDOBA UPDATE is the product of continuous monitoring work, carried out by the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva team. By analysing and reporting on key events and trends in the Foundation&rsquo;s areas of interest, we aim to draw readers&rsquo; attention to pertinent developments in North Africa, the Sahel, West Asia and Europe, which are not always covered in &lsquo;mainstream&rsquo; media.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">In addition to sharing news from these four regions, the Cordoba Update is an opportunity for the Foundation to provide regular updates on its publications, events and other developments.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">In line with the programmes and projects funded by partners of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, updates and information are included under the following themes:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Islamist-Secular relations;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Transition and Political participation;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations between communities of different ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Violent extremism and the war on terror;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">The Cordoba Foundation of Geneva in the media;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">General information.<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\"><br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">For questions and\/or feedback regarding the content and form of the Cordoba Update, please contact Sarah Franck: <a href=\"mailto:sarah.franck@cordoue.ch\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sarah.franck@cordoue.ch<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<hr style=\"border-top: 1px solid #cccccc; border-bottom: none; width: 50%; margin: auto;\" \/>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Le CORDOBA UPDATE est un bimensuel qui pr&eacute;sente le travail continu de suivi r&eacute;alis&eacute; par l&#8217;&eacute;quipe de la Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve. Par l&rsquo;analyse des &eacute;v&eacute;nements et tendances qui concernent les domaines d&#8217;int&eacute;r&ecirc;t de la Fondation, nous visons &agrave; attirer l&#8217;attention de nos lecteurs sur les d&eacute;veloppements pertinents en Afrique du Nord, dans le Sahel, en Asie de l&rsquo;Ouest et en Europe, une actualit&eacute; qui n&rsquo;est pas toujours couverte dans les m&eacute;dias dits &lsquo;traditionnels&rsquo;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Outre le partage de l&rsquo;actualit&eacute; de ces quatre r&eacute;gions, le &laquo; Cordoba Update &raquo; est un moyen pour la Fondation de fournir des mises &agrave; jour r&eacute;guli&egrave;res sur ses publications, &eacute;v&eacute;nements et autres d&eacute;veloppements.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">En accord avec les programmes et projets financ&eacute;s par les partenaires de la Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve, les mises &agrave; jour et informations concernent les th&egrave;mes suivants :<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations islamistes-s&eacute;culiers ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Transition et participation politique ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Relations entre communaut&eacute;s de diff&eacute;rentes affiliations ethniques, culturelles et religieuses ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">L&#8217;extr&eacute;misme violent et la guerre contre le terrorisme ;<br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">La Fondation Cordoue de Gen&egrave;ve dans les m&eacute;dias ;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Information g&eacute;n&eacute;rale.<br \/><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 12px;\">Pour des questions et \/ ou des commentaires concernant le contenu et la forme du Cordoba Update, veuillez contacter Sarah Franck : <a href=\"mailto:sarah.franck@cordoue.ch\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sarah.franck@cordoue.ch<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>ISLAMIST-SECULAR RELATIONS \/ RELATIONS ENTRE S&Eacute;CULIERS ET ISLAMISTES<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Tunisia, 10.10.16: The Republic&#8217;s Mufti and Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Tunisia&#8217;s Grand Mufti Othmane Battikh, appointed by President Beji Caid Essebsi last summer, caused a political row, in late September, when he considered some labour sit-ins and protests as haram or religiously illicit because they harm the country&#8217;s fragile economy. Battikh was quick to clarify that his statement was an opinion and not a religious verdict or fatwa, but that did little to calm the controversy and debate his statement unleashed regarding the role of religion in a civil state, as Tunisia&#8217;s constitution upholds. Battikh, who was formerly minister of foreign affairs in Habib Sid&#8217;s government; and was appointed Grand Mufti from 2008-2013 by Zin el Abidin Ben Ali, put the PM Youssef Chad in an awkward position as to the nature of the relationship between the two institutions. Besides, apart from the reaction of the UGTT labour union that expressed its astonishment at the Mufti&#8217;s statement, secularist political parties and figures observed deafening silence and did not express any clear position in favour or against Battikh&#8217;s fatwa. Thus, it was social media activists who forced the issue onto the national political agenda, despite its careful avoidance by political parties and figures. Under the Ennahda-led Troika government Ennahda criticised the leftist Popular Front for triggering chaotic strikes and sit-ins which harmed the economy. It was therefore understandable for Ennahda not to oppose Battikh&#8217;s statement this time despite their strong differences. Besides, the Islamist party is in the coalition government and had to stand in solidarity by it. Likewise, Battikh&#8217;s entry in politics has, according to some observers, disarmed the Popular Front in that on the one hand it is seen by many as somehow supportive of the strikes, but on the other hand, as a secular political force, it has always criticised the Islamists and called for a strict separation of religion and politics.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/2016\/09\/27\/tunisie-mufti-greves-pole_n_12212758.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/2016\/09\/27\/tunisie-mufti<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lefigaro.fr\/flash-actu\/2016\/09\/27\/97001-20160927FILWWW00169-tunisiegreve-un-appel-du-mufti-fait-polemique.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lefigaro.fr\/flash-actu\/2016\/09\/27\/97001<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/arabi21.com\/story\/950594\/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9#category_2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/arabi21.com\/story\/950594<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>TRANSITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION \/ TRANSITION ET PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Egypt, 3-9.10.2016: More than 1879 death sentences issued against opponents<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Egypt&#8217;s Interior Ministry announced in a statement this week that influential Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Kamal had been killed during an exchange of fire, while sources within the Brotherhood said he was arrested before he died at the hands of the police. A number of Egyptian newspapers, including Al-Shorouk, Youm7 and Al-Bawaba, quoted security sources claiming Kamal had been arrested, along with another Brotherhood leader, Yasser Shehata. After a few hours, Youm7 announced the death of Kamal in an apartment he owned in the south-east district of Maadi, Cairo.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the Arab Observatory for the Freedom of the Media has appealed to all governments and international organizations concerned with human rights and the protection of the right to life to pressure the Egyptian regime to implement a moratorium on the death penalty against political opponents. On the World Day Against the Death Penalty (October 10), AOFM confirmed that more than 1879 death sentence issued against opponents of the regime are clear evidence of the failure of the justice system and its subservience to the executive authority, especially since those provisions were issued in just three years, while the previous 100 years witnessed a lot less death sentences and executions: the whole century had 1470 death sentences, of which only 2 were actually implemented. Eleven Egyptian rights groups also said on the World Day Against the Death Penalty that Egypt needs to temporarily suspend the use of the death penalty, given the recent record of human rights abuses, politicized trials and the ease with which Egyptian courts have been issuing lengthy prison terms and death sentences in recent times.<\/p>\n<p>On September 25, a judicial report was issued by the State Commissioners Authority, the advisory body for the State Council, supporting the Ministry of Interior&#8217;s decision to monitor social networking sites, follow up on activity on these sites and take all security measures necessary to address any threats to public security to ensure the best interest of the country. This report stirred the ire of numerous activists and human rights defenders, who saw it as a new tool to intimidate, stifle voices and suppress the freedoms of social media users, especially since social networking sites played a key role in mobilizing young people, fostering protest movements and highlighting the shortcomings of Hosni Mubarak&#8217;s regime before the outbreak of the January 25 Revolution in 2011.<\/p>\n<p>In response to a long list of accusations of murder, bribery, verbal and physical abuse and harassment, the government is taking steps to reform the police. In late August, the police law was amended to remove government-issued firearms from the hands of some officers. The law covers several areas. It prohibits the use of force or using firearms in any circumstances other than those prescribed by law. It requires police to turn in government-issued firearms at the end of their shifts &mdash; though exceptions can be made in situations when the Criminal Investigation Unit director believes it is in the public interest. The law also forbids improper or excessive use of authority. Violations can result in interrogation and transfer, disciplinary hearings, and delays in promotions, special allowances and raises. In some cases, police officers can be fired.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2016\/10\/egypt-court-support-decision-monitor-social-media-facebook.html#ixzz4MgR9SKpr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2016\/10\/egypt-court-support<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ikhwanweb.com\/article.php?id=32671\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ikhwanweb.com\/article.php?id=32671<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2016\/10\/egypt-new-police-law-amendments-crackdown-corruption.html#ixzz4MgSbfaz7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/pulse\/originals\/2016\/10\/egypt-new-police<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/eipr.org\/en\/pressrelease\/2016\/10\/10\/2671\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/eipr.org\/en\/pressrelease\/2016\/10\/10\/2671<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Egypt, 29.9-9.10.2016: Egypt&#8217;s economy: devaluing the pound and building a new capital<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Egypt&#8217;s new capital city moved a step closer to reality with the announcement that Chinese developers will largely fund the megaproject. The China Fortune Land Development Company (CFLD) agreed to provide $20 billion for the currently unnamed city, after a meeting between heads of the firm and Egyptian Abdel Fattah El Sisi. This follows a previous commitment of $15 billion from another Chinese state-owned company, bringing the project close to its $45 billion budget requirements for phase I. Plans for the new capital were first announced in March 2015. Government officials described the development as a solution to crowding, pollution and rising house prices in Cairo. Supporters of the move say Egypt is following a proven model: Turkey, India and Brazil all moved their capitals in the 20th century. Among the opponents of the project is Nezar Al Sayyad, an Egyptian-born professor of architecture at the University of California-Berkeley who is now a U.S. citizen. He was detained briefly last year at Cairo International Airport and questioned about humorous jabs he made on his Facebook page about the new city. &#8220;The whole thing reflects the top-down thinking of the government,&#8221; Al Sayyad said. &#8220;It is a military-style operation on land that is owned and being sold by the army.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>On Egypt&#8217;s deteriorating economy, one report explained, &#8220;the opaqueness of the decision-making process reflects badly on the economy and continues the Egyptian government&#8217;s rich tradition of keeping its population in the dark on major economic policy shifts.&#8221; The government appears to be on the verge of further devaluing the pound. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met the governor of the country&#8217;s central bank, Tarek Amer to give political cover to the move. Beltone Financial, an Egyptian investment bank, advised that the move is imminent. The devaluation and partial flotation would be part of a wider deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement economic reforms in return for a much-needed $12bn loan to jump-start the economy.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, Egypt&#8217;s foreign ministry sharply criticized the US embassy in Cairo for advising citizens to avoid large gatherings in the capital until Sunday (9 Oct.), calling the move &#8220;unjustifiable&#8221;. The US embassy&#8217;s message warned against being in public spaces such as concert halls, movie theaters, museums, shopping malls, and sports venues, citing &#8220;potential security concerns&#8221;, but did not specify what they were.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.madamasr.com\/news\/economy\/egyptian-pound-be-floated-within-hours-beltone-financial\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.madamasr.com\/news\/economy\/egyptian-pound-be-floated<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2016\/oct\/08\/egypt-travel-us-security-warning-tourism\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2016\/oct\/08\/egypt-travel-us<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/world\/2016\/09\/29\/egypt-building-new-capital----and-china-bankrolling\/91186264\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/world\/2016\/09\/29\/egypt-building<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2016\/10\/09\/africa\/egypt-new-capital\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2016\/10\/09\/africa\/egypt-new-capital<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/indepth\/opinion\/2016\/10\/egypt-economic-policy-evil-hear-evil-161005055234424.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/indepth\/opinion\/2016\/10\/egypt-economic<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Mauritanie, 29.09.16 : Un dialogue national &laquo; inclusif &raquo;, sans l&#8217;opposition<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Le Pr&eacute;sident mauritanien, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a pr&eacute;sid&eacute;, ce 29 septembre, la c&eacute;r&eacute;monie officielle d&#8217;ouverture du dialogue national inclusif. L&#8217;objectif est, selon le gouvernement, de d&eacute;samorcer la crise politique que traverse le pays et redonner un nouvel dynamisme aux institutions.<\/p>\n<p>Recherch&eacute;, depuis 2008, pour d&eacute;samorcer les crises politiques successives n&eacute;es du coup d&#8217;Etat d&#8217;ao&ucirc;t 2008 et des &eacute;lections pr&eacute;sidentielles et municipales contest&eacute;es ou boycott&eacute;es (2009, 2013 et 2014), ce dialogue n&#8217;a pas permis de regrouper l&#8217;ensemble de la classe politique mauritanienne.<\/p>\n<p>Pour le parti au pouvoir, l&#8217;Union pour la R&eacute;publique (UPR) et les partis qui le soutiennent dans le cadre de la coalition de la majorit&eacute; pr&eacute;sidentielle, ce dialogue permettra de sortir de l&#8217;impasse et les r&eacute;formes qui en d&eacute;couleront permettront la naissance de la troisi&egrave;me R&eacute;publique dans l&#8217;histoire du pays. Ainsi, ce parti a soumis des propositions portant sur une r&eacute;forme constitutionnelle profonde portant sur l&#8217;embl&egrave;me, l&#8217;hymne national et le drapeau. Il propose &eacute;galement des amendements profonds sur le statut du Pr&eacute;sident de la R&eacute;publique, son mandat et ses comp&eacute;tences. Il pr&eacute;conise l&#8217;&eacute;largissement du nombre des d&eacute;put&eacute;s &agrave; l&#8217;Assembl&eacute;e nationale, la suspension du S&eacute;nat et la cr&eacute;ation de conseils r&eacute;gionaux d&eacute;centralis&eacute;s.<\/p>\n<p>Les partis de l&#8217;opposition radicale, regroup&eacute;s au sein du Front national pour la d&eacute;mocratie et l&#8217;unit&eacute; (FNDU) et des groupes de la soci&eacute;t&eacute; civile consid&eacute;r&eacute;s comme proches de celle-ci, ont boycott&eacute; ce dialogue. Ils consid&egrave;rent que c&#8217;est une fuite en avant du pouvoir pour torpiller la constitution et d&eacute;stabiliser les institutions, en vue d&#8217;ouvrir la voie &agrave; un troisi&egrave;me mandat au Pr&eacute;sident Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz qui brique, actuellement, son deuxi&egrave;me et dernier mandat constitutionnellement permis aux termes de la loi fondamentale actuellement en vigueur.<\/p>\n<p>Entre les deux puissants p&ocirc;les antagonistes, un spectre de partis de l&#8217;opposition dite mod&eacute;r&eacute;e ont pris part &agrave; ce dialogue. Au troisi&egrave;me jour, certains d&#8217;entre eux ont d&eacute;nonc&eacute; les vell&eacute;it&eacute;s de la majorit&eacute; &agrave; changer la constitution et &agrave; glisser la question d&#8217;un troisi&egrave;me mandat du Pr&eacute;sident Ould Abdel Aziz dans l&#8217;agenda, alors que ce point &eacute;tait exclu dans les discussions pr&eacute;liminaires. Ils ont &eacute;t&eacute; outr&eacute;s, semble-t-il, de l&#8217;appel lanc&eacute; par l&#8217;un des activistes de la majorit&eacute;, &agrave; proclamer &laquo; Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, roi de Mauritanie &raquo; !<\/p>\n<p>Se poursuivant dans un bras de fer feutr&eacute; entre les acteurs, ce dialogue ne semble pas constituer une sortie consensuelle de la crise de confiance qui divise profond&eacute;ment la classe politique mauritanienne. M&ecirc;me si, son issue accouchera, peut-&ecirc;tre, d&#8217;une toute nouvelle donne politique dans le pays.<\/p>\n<p>Conclaves &agrave; suivre.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689514\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689514<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689513\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689513<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689457\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689457<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689503\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689503<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689419\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689419<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689324\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689324<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689533\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689533<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualite_internationale\/167816-mauritanie-l-opposition-est-contre-un-3e-mandat-presidentiel.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualite_internationale\/167816<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Iraq, 30.09.16 &ndash; 03.10.16: Power struggles in Baghdad and the shape of things to come, post-Islamic State.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In recent months, much of the international media&#8217;s attention has focused on the strategically and symbolically important battle for Mosul, Iraq; the last major stronghold of the so-called &#8216;Islamic State&#8217; group. Much less has been said on the recent political upheaval in the central government, in Baghdad.<\/p>\n<p>The latest political changes have been a series of dismissals of important members of the Iraqi government, following accusations of corruption, leading to a vote of no-confidence and loss of position. This process began in August 2016, with the removal from power of the then-defence minister, Khaled al-Obaidi. More recently, in September, the Iraqi finance minister, Hoshyar Zebari, was removed from office when 158 members of parliament approved a no-confidence motion to impeach him. The former interior minister, Muhammad Ghabban, also resigned in July under duress, following a massive bombing in a Baghdad suburb.<\/p>\n<p>Other sources speculate that Iraq&#8217;s Foreign Minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, could be the next dismissal, following his appearance before parliament on Thursday, 6 October, on charges of corruption.<\/p>\n<p>Some commentators have suggested that these dismissals are aimed at reassuring the Iraqi population of the central government&#8217;s commitment to the nation, and at winning back disenfranchised Iraqis. Importantly, in post-Islamic State Iraq, &#8220;this is particularly true for citizens who may have embraced or been complacent with alternative governance structures,&#8221; specifically those in the Islamic State-controlled territories.<\/p>\n<p>However, because more serious allegations of corruption have been levelled at numerous members of the Iraqi government, without consequence, and because of the weak state of the Iraqi central government (which lacks ministers for interior, defense, and finance; three of the most important government portfolios), other commentators understand these dismissals as a power struggle between powerful political factions in the Green Zone. Many have pointed the finger at former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, a powerful and influential figure in the Iraqi political class and beyond. Certainly, former-finance minister Zebari, &#8220;said he believed the vote was part of a hid&not;den political agenda &#8216;carried out by the State of Law parliamentary bloc, headed by Nuri al-Maliki,'&#8221; and alleged that the parliamentary speaker and head of the corruption commission, Salim al-Jabouri, had also been complicit. Al-Maliki and his allies are expected to seek leading positions in the upcoming provincial elections in 2017, and parliamentary elections in 2018.<\/p>\n<p>This political rivalry, between main factions within the Iraqi government, is not exhaustive. Further causes for concern over the political future of this country include the fraught relationship between the popular and influential Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, and the central government, and the ongoing crisis of Kurdish political life over the future leadership of the autonomous region. Yet another key concern is the future of Iraq&#8217;s diverse communities, including the Sunni population, as the so-called Islamic State continues to lose ground.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2016\/10\/the-political-battles-in-baghdad-after-the-battle-for-mosul\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2016\/10\/the-political-battles-in-baghdad<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/carnegie-mec.org\/diwan\/64716\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/carnegie-mec.org\/diwan\/64716<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKCN1250TA\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.niqash.org\/en\/articles\/politics\/5373\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.niqash.org\/en\/articles\/politics\/5373<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.thearabweekly.com\/?id=6548\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.thearabweekly.com\/?id=6548<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/english.alarabiya.net\/en\/News\/middle-east\/2016\/09\/30\/How-does-Maliki-exploit-Kurds-division-to-get-back-to-power-.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/english.alarabiya.net\/en\/News\/middle-east\/2016\/09\/30\/How-does-Maliki<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/uk.reuters.com\/article\/uk-iraq-politics-minister-idUKKCN11S2NV\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/uk.reuters.com\/article\/uk-iraq-politics-minister<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/rudaw.net\/english\/middleeast\/iraq\/061020162\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/rudaw.net\/english\/middleeast\/iraq\/061020162<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/2016\/09\/article55359155\/iraqi-fm-sacked\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/2016\/09\/article55359155\/iraqi-fm-sacked<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Maroc, 11.10.2016: R&eacute;sultats des &eacute;lections l&eacute;gislatives marocaines<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Bien qu&#8217;il n&#8217;ait pas obtenu la majorit&eacute; des si&egrave;ges du parlement qui s&#8217;&eacute;l&egrave;ve &agrave; 198 si&egrave;ges (sur un total de 395), le PJD (Parti justice et le d&eacute;veloppement) ressort tout de m&ecirc;me grand vainqueur des &eacute;lections l&eacute;gislatives marocaines, qui se sont tenues le 7 octobre dernier. Le parti du premier ministre sortant remporte un total final de 126 si&egrave;ges, alors que le PAM (Parti authenticit&eacute; et modernit&eacute;) remporte 102 si&egrave;ges, suivi par l&#8217;Istiqlal, qui &eacute;tait arriv&eacute; en deuxi&egrave;me position au scrutin de 2011. M. Benkirane a donc &eacute;t&eacute; reconduit de ses fonctions de premier ministre par le roi le 10 octobre et devra former un nouveau gouvernement. Il devra cependant s&#8217;allier &agrave; d&#8217;autres formations politiques afin de combler les 72 si&egrave;ges dont manque son parti pour atteindre la majorit&eacute;. Le PJD et le PAM ont d&egrave;s &agrave; pr&eacute;sent annonc&eacute; qu&#8217;aucune coalition ni aucun compromis ne sera envisag&eacute; entre ces deux partis. Ce scrutin peut &ecirc;tre consid&eacute;r&eacute; comme une double victoire pour le PJD, non seulement pour sa place de premi&egrave;re formation politique du pays, mais aussi comme une approbation du peuple de la politique men&eacute;e depuis 5 ans puisque le parti &eacute;tait d&eacute;j&agrave; au pouvoir suite aux derni&egrave;res &eacute;lections de 2011. En revanche, ces &eacute;lections sont une d&eacute;ception pour l&#8217;Istiqlal, parti historique marocain form&eacute; en 1925, arriv&eacute; en troisi&egrave;me position comme pr&eacute;c&eacute;demment mentionn&eacute;. Il semblerait donc que sa strat&eacute;gie de rapprochement avec le courant salafiste n&#8217;ait pas pay&eacute;e puisqu&#8217;aucun des candidats Salafi &agrave; s&#8217;&ecirc;tre pr&eacute;sent&eacute; sous les couleurs du parti de la balance n&#8217;a &eacute;t&eacute; &eacute;lu. La gauche a quant &agrave; elle aussi subi des pertes qui d&eacute;montrent que leur strat&eacute;gie &eacute;lectorale de rapprochement avec le PAM a affaibli leur gain et &agrave; seulement profiter au PAM qui a augment&eacute; ses si&egrave;ges de 46 en 2011 &agrave; 102 en 2016, alors que l&#8217;USFP (Union socialiste des forces progressistes) est pass&eacute;e de 39 &agrave; 20 si&egrave;ges. Ceci est la r&eacute;verb&eacute;ration de la crise interne qu&#8217;a travers&eacute; ce parti de gauche, ce qui est moins le cas du PPS (Parti progressiste socialiste) qui a seulement perdu 6 si&egrave;ges car il a su garder sa distance du PAM selon des observateurs marocains.<\/p>\n<p>Il est tout de m&ecirc;me int&eacute;ressant de noter que certains observateurs soulignent n&eacute;anmoins que les r&eacute;sultats de ces &eacute;lections n&#8217;ont qu&#8217;une valeur limit&eacute;e puisque le Palais conserve une grande partie des pouvoirs et est par cons&eacute;quent &laquo; le seul qui d&eacute;cide sur les questions strat&eacute;giques et &agrave; long terme &raquo; selon les analystes de la fondation Carnegie.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/2016\/10\/07\/elections-maroc-direct_n_12383356.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/2016\/10\/07\/elections-maroc-direct<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.atlantico.fr\/pepites\/maroc-islamistes-en-tete-elections-legislatives-2844341.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.atlantico.fr\/pepites\/maroc-islamistes-en-tete-elections-legislatives<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.elwatan.com\/international\/legislatives-au-maroc-une-election-en-trompe-l-oeil-08-10-2016-330261_112.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.elwatan.com\/international\/legislatives-au-maroc-une-election<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/infographies-les-cinq-scenarios-de-coalitions-possibles-pour-le-pjd_1518434\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/infographies-les-cinq-scenarios-de-coalitions-possibles<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/farhat-othman\/amere-victoire-des-islami_b_12400272.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/farhat-othman\/amere-victoire-des-islami<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/article\/2016\/10\/07\/elections-au-maroc-participation-limitee-les-islamistes-denoncent-des-tentatives-de-fraudes_5010240_3212.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/article\/2016\/10\/07\/elections-au-maroc-participation-limitee<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/les-candidats-salafistes-les-autres-perdants-du-scrutin-legislatif-2016_1518276\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/les-candidats-salafistes-les-autres-perdants<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/mohammed-vi-charge-benkirane-former-nouveau-gouvernement_1518575\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/telquel.ma\/2016\/10\/10\/mohammed-vi-charge-benkirane<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/article\/2016\/10\/10\/maroc-l-islamiste-benkirane-reconduit-au-poste-de-premier-ministre_5011412_3212.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/afrique\/article\/2016\/10\/10\/maroc-l-islamiste-benkirane<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/abdelhak-riki\/bataille-de-leadership-au-sein-de-la-gauche-entre-le-pps-et-lusfp_b_12232660.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.huffpostmaghreb.com\/abdelhak-riki\/bataille-de-leadership<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS \/ <br \/>RELATIONS ENTRE COMMUNAUT&Eacute;S DE DIFF&Eacute;RENTES AFFILIATIONS ETHNIQUES, CULTURELLES ET RELIGIEUSES<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bahrain, 09.10.2016: Journalist Detained after a Tweet Judged as &#8220;Defamatory&#8221;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A man has been detained for a &#8220;defamatory&#8221; sectarian tweet in Bahrain and a prosecution has been opened, stated the Interior Ministry on Sunday 9th October. Different sources identify the man as the Bahraini journalist Faisal Hayyat although the authorities have not given his name. The journalist had indeed tweeted on Sunday that he just received a call from the criminal investigation department.<\/p>\n<p>The detention happened after Mr. Hayyat recently posted a tweet that provoked indignation as the tweet may have been judged &#8220;defamatory&#8221; towards a figure well respected among Sunni Muslims.<\/p>\n<p>A few days before the arrest, the journalist addressed the minister of the interior about the torture he was subjected to after being arrested in 2011 in response to the minister&#8217;s declaration which stated that people working in the ministry &#8220;fear God&#8221; and do not violate human rights.<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for further information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/hosted.ap.org\/dynamic\/stories\/M\/ML_BAHRAIN?SITE=AP&amp;SECTION=HOME&amp;TEMPLATE=DEFAULT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/hosted.ap.org\/dynamic\/stories\/M\/ML_BAHRAIN<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/mirror.no-ip.org\/en\/news\/34099.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/mirror.no-ip.org\/en\/news\/34099.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.bahrainrights.org\/en\/node\/4723\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.bahrainrights.org\/en\/node\/4723<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Y&eacute;men, 10.10.16: Risque d&#8217;escalade de la violence apr&egrave;s l&#8217;attaque d&#8217;une maison fun&eacute;raire &agrave; Sanaa<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Le Secr&eacute;taire G&eacute;n&eacute;ral de l&#8217;ONU, Ban Ki-moon, a fermement condamn&eacute; l&#8217;attaque d&#8217;une maison fun&eacute;raire &agrave; Sanaa, samedi 8 octobre, o&ugrave; se d&eacute;roulaient les obs&egrave;ques du p&egrave;re du ministre de l&#8217;int&eacute;rieur houthi, Jalal Al-Rouich&egrave;ne. Cette attaque, qualifi&eacute;e de &laquo; massacre &raquo; par les Houthis, a fait selon les derni&egrave;res estimations du coordinateur des Nations Unies plus de 140 morts et 525 bless&eacute;s et serait le fait de la coalition men&eacute;e par l&#8217;Arabie saoudite, aux c&ocirc;t&eacute;s de laquelle se trouvent notamment les Etats-Unis, le Maroc, l&#8217;Espagne et le Danemark. La France et le Canada ont r&eacute;clam&eacute; une enqu&ecirc;te ind&eacute;pendante afin de faire la lumi&egrave;re sur les conditions exactes de l&#8217;attaque et ont demand&eacute; &agrave; &laquo; la coalition men&eacute;e par l&#8217;Arabie saoudite &raquo;, qui nie toute implication dans les frappes, de &laquo; respecter son engagement de mener une enqu&ecirc;te &raquo;. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, envoy&eacute; sp&eacute;cial pour les Nations Unies au Y&eacute;men est re&ccedil;u ce lundi 10 octobre par le ministre des affaires &eacute;trang&egrave;res fran&ccedil;ais, Jean-Marc Ayrault.<\/p>\n<p>Cette attaque intervient alors que l&#8217;envoy&eacute; sp&eacute;cial des NU pour le Y&eacute;men avait annonc&eacute; vendredi 7 octobre qu&#8217;une tr&ecirc;ve de 72 heures serait annonc&eacute;e, fruit de discussions, &agrave; Mascate, avec des repr&eacute;sentants houthis. Ce dernier avait ajout&eacute; que les opposants houthis &eacute;taient &eacute;galement d&#8217;accord de &laquo; r&eacute;activer le Comit&eacute; de d&eacute;sescalade et de coordination &raquo;, un point &laquo; tr&egrave;s positif &raquo; selon lui. Malheureusement, suite &agrave; l&#8217;attaque de samedi, les repr&eacute;sentants houthis ont prononc&eacute; leur refus de poursuivre les n&eacute;gociations sous l&#8217;&eacute;gide de l&#8217;ONU tant que les massacres ne cesseront pas. Khaled Saeed, membre du Conseil politique supr&ecirc;me houthi et participant aux n&eacute;gociations de paix, a en effet d&eacute;clar&eacute; dimanche 9 octobre au media Sputnik: &#8220;The negotiations will not resume while massacre is being committed in the capital Sanaa. We will not have a dialogue while our people are being killed, we will not have a dialogue with the UN special envoy [for Yemen] while the massacre continues&#8221;. Le Conseil national supr&ecirc;me a de son c&ocirc;t&eacute; appel&eacute; les habitants de Sanaa &agrave; descendre dans la rue afin de condamner l&#8217;attaque de samedi dernier et &eacute;galement de poursuivre la campagne de soutien de la Banque Centrale. Cette derni&egrave;re coop&egrave;re en effet avec les chambres de commerce et d&#8217;industrie de Sanaa afin d&#8217;&eacute;viter un effondrement du secteur financier et une potentiel p&eacute;nurie alimentaire. L&#8217;ancien pr&eacute;sident Ali Abdullah Saleh a &eacute;galement appel&eacute; &agrave; la &laquo; mobilisation &agrave; la fronti&egrave;re avec l&#8217;Arabie saoudite &raquo; pour &laquo; venger &raquo; les victimes de cette attaque, ce qui fait craindre une escalade de la violence.<\/p>\n<p>Le 2 octobre dernier l&#8217;agence de presse Saba (Yemen News Agency) avait annonc&eacute; que les Houthis avaient charg&eacute; Abdel Aziz ben Habtour de former un &laquo; gouvernement de salut national &raquo;.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/saudi-led-coalition-investigate-yemen-strike-killed-over-140-people-1028902344\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/saudi-led-coalition-investigate-yemen-strike<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.liberation.fr\/planete\/2016\/10\/09\/au-yemen-un-bombardement-fait-un-carnage-lors-d-une-ceremonie-funeraire_1520690\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.liberation.fr\/planete\/2016\/10\/09\/au-yemen-un-bombardement-fait-un-carnage<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/proche-orient\/article\/2016\/10\/09\/yemen-la-france-demande-une-enquete-sur-un-raid-meurtrier-a-sanaa_5010690_3218.html?xtmc=yemen&amp;xtcr=2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/proche-orient\/article\/2016\/10\/09\/yemen-la-france-demande-une-enquete<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/proche-orient\/article\/2016\/10\/08\/yemen-raids-aeriens-meurtriers-contre-une-veillee-funebre-a-sanaa_5010532_3218.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/proche-orient\/article\/2016\/10\/08\/yemen-raids-aeriens-meurtriers<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/sputniknews.com\/middleeast\/20161009\/1046148291\/un-yemen-attack.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/sputniknews.com\/middleeast\/20161009\/1046148291\/un-yemen-attack<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.liberation.fr\/planete\/2016\/10\/07\/yemen-le-mediateur-de-l-onu-travaille-a-une-treve-de-72-heures_1520547\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.liberation.fr\/planete\/2016\/10\/07\/yemen-le-mediateur-de-l-onu<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/sputniknews.com\/middleeast\/20161009\/1046158343\/yemen-peace-talks.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/sputniknews.com\/middleeast\/20161009\/1046158343\/yemen-peace-talks<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/uae-admits-crewmen-were-wounded-houthi-attack-ship-near-yemen-1602586376\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.middleeasteye.net\/news\/uae-admits-crewmen-were-wounded<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/tempsreel.nouvelobs.com\/monde\/20161003.REU7481\/l-ex-gouverneur-d-aden-charge-de-former-un-gouvernement-au-yemen.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/tempsreel.nouvelobs.com\/monde\/20161003.REU7481\/l-ex-gouverneur-d-aden<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/presstv.ir\/Detail\/2016\/10\/03\/487419\/Yemen-Saudi-Arabia-Peace-Talks-Duff\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/presstv.ir\/Detail\/2016\/10\/03\/487419\/Yemen-Saudi-Arabia-Peace-Talks-Duff<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/sabanews.net\/en\/news442229.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/sabanews.net\/en\/news442229.htm<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/almashareq.com\/fr\/articles\/cnmi_am\/features\/2016\/08\/03\/feature-01\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/almashareq.com\/fr\/articles\/cnmi_am\/features\/2016\/08\/03\/feature-01<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Europe, 10.10.16: Echec du referendum en Hongrie et ancrage du populisme europ&eacute;en<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Dimanche 2 octobre Viktor Orban a essuy&eacute; un &eacute;chec en ne parvenant pas &agrave; r&eacute;unir suffisamment de voies pour son referendum contre l&#8217;accueil des migrants. La question pos&eacute;e aux Hongrois &eacute;tait exprim&eacute;e en ces termes : &laquo; Voulez-vous que l&#8217;Union europ&eacute;enne d&eacute;cr&egrave;te une relocalisation obligatoire de citoyens non hongrois en Hongrie sans l&#8217;approbation du Parlement hongrois ? &raquo;.<\/p>\n<p>Seulement 39.8% des hongrois se sont finalement rendus aux urnes, un taux ne permettant pas la validation du referendum. Cet &eacute;chec intervient alors qu&#8217;une campagne anti-migrants et hostile &agrave; l&#8217;Union europ&eacute;enne fait rage en Hongrie. Le gouvernement hongrois avait notamment produit il y a quelques mois une brochure stipulant des soi-disant &#8220;no go zone&#8221; &agrave; Londres, et illustrant ces espaces &laquo; dangereux &raquo; &agrave; l&#8217;aide d&#8217;une carte. Selon la rh&eacute;torique du gouvernement hongrois ces zones seraient &agrave; &eacute;viter en raison d&#8217;une proportion &eacute;lev&eacute;e de migrants. Cette brochure a notamment &eacute;t&eacute; republi&eacute;e &agrave; l&#8217;occasion du referendum du dimanche 2 octobre. Le Bureau des Affaires &eacute;trang&egrave;res et le Commonwealth avaient vivement r&eacute;agi en d&eacute;clarant que ce document &eacute;tait infond&eacute; et qu&#8217;il n&#8217;y avait pas au Royaume-Uni de zones o&ugrave; la loi du Royaume-Uni ne s&#8217;appliquerait pas.<\/p>\n<p>Alors que les mouvements populistes et anti-migrants semblent &ecirc;tre toujours plus populaires en Europe et notamment aupr&egrave;s de la jeune g&eacute;n&eacute;ration, cet &eacute;chec pourrait appara&icirc;tre comme un paradoxe. Une &eacute;tude de l&#8217;Institut Diderot vient notamment de para&icirc;tre sur l&#8217;all&eacute;geance des jeunes fran&ccedil;ais au Front National (FN). Selon Foreign Policy cette popularit&eacute; s&#8217;expliquerait par plusieurs facteurs, entre autres l&#8217;incertitude sociale et &eacute;conomique, la peur du multiculturalisme et le sentiment que les musulmans se s&eacute;gr&eacute;gueraient eux-m&ecirc;mes d&#8217;une identit&eacute; fran&ccedil;aise ancr&eacute;e dans la la&iuml;cit&eacute;. Si de nombreux jeunes reproduisent l&#8217;opinion politique familiale, ce n&#8217;est pas le cas de tous les jeunes adh&eacute;rents au FN. La nouvelle dynamique du parti, plus jeune et d&eacute;complex&eacute;e, la d&eacute;sillusion vis-&agrave;-vis de la politique en g&eacute;n&eacute;ral et des partis traditionnalistes, mais aussi le climat d&#8217;ins&eacute;curit&eacute; actuel sont autant de facteurs qui semblent motiver cette nouvelle g&eacute;n&eacute;ration d&#8217;adh&eacute;rents au FN. Selon une &eacute;tude Ipsos, effectu&eacute;e dans le cadre des r&eacute;gionales 2015, la majorit&eacute; des jeunes Fran&ccedil;ais de 18 &agrave; 24 ans, qui ont l&#8217;intention de voter, d&eacute;clarent que Marine le Pen serait leur pr&eacute;sidente privil&eacute;gi&eacute;e.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/presstv.ir\/Detail\/2016\/10\/10\/488391\/UK-Corbyn-Abbott-Cable-street-fascism\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/presstv.ir\/Detail\/2016\/10\/10\/488391\/UK-Corbyn-Abbott-Cable-street-fascism<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/europe\/article\/2016\/10\/02\/hongrie-le-manque-de-participation-au-referendum-sur-l-accueil-des-refugies-pourrait-invalider-la-victoire-du-non_5006966_3214.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/europe\/article\/2016\/10\/02\/hongrie-le-manque-de-participation<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.politico.eu\/interactive\/in-pictures-kno..\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.politico.eu\/interactive\/in-pictures-kno..<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/hungary-says-migran..\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/hungary-says-migran..<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/09\/29\/hungarys-refu..\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/09\/29\/hungarys-refu..<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/10\/07\/marine-le-pens-youth-brigade-national-front-young-voters-france\/?utm_source=Sailthru&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=ed%20picks%20oct%207&amp;utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/10\/07\/marine-le-pens-youth-brigade-national-front<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ipsos.fr\/sites\/default\/files\/doc_associe\/sociologie_de_lelectorat_electionsregionales2015_6_decembre_-_20h30.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ipsos.fr\/sites\/default\/files\/doc_associe\/sociologie_de_lelectorat<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Mali, 08.10.16: Mort &agrave; Kidal de Cheikh Ag Aoussa, ex-num&eacute;ro 2 de An&ccedil;ar Dine et chef militaire de la CMA<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Selon des informations en provenance de Kidal (nord Mali), l&#8217;ex-leader de An&ccedil;ar Dine et chef traditionnel Ifoghas et chef militaire de la Coordination des mouvements de l&#8217;Azawad (CMA, ex-r&eacute;bellion), Cheikh Ag Aoussa aurait trouv&eacute; la mort dans la ville de Kidal.<\/p>\n<p>Selon les sources, Cheikh Oussa quittait le bureau de la Mission de l&#8217;ONU (Minusma), &laquo; o&ugrave; il a assist&eacute; &agrave; une r&eacute;union, quand en rentrant chez lui, il a &eacute;t&eacute; accidentellement tu&eacute;. Sa voiture a saut&eacute; sur une mine, et il est mort sur le coup &raquo;, a d&eacute;clar&eacute; une source militaire africaine au sein de la Minusma. La Coordination des mouvements de l&#8217;Azawad (CMA, ex-r&eacute;bellion), qui contr&ocirc;le Kidal, aurait confirm&eacute; l&#8217;information et r&eacute;clam&eacute; &laquo; une enqu&ecirc;te ind&eacute;pendante &raquo;.<\/p>\n<p>&laquo; Nous demandons une enqu&ecirc;te ind&eacute;pendante, parce que parmi les th&egrave;ses, il y a celle de l&#8217;attentat et de la voiture pi&eacute;g&eacute;e &raquo;, a d&eacute;clar&eacute; &agrave; la presse, Mohamed Ag Ouss&egrave;ne, membre de la CMA.<\/p>\n<p>Figure de proue de la r&eacute;bellion touar&egrave;gue, issu de la tribu des Ifoghas, Cheikh Ag Aoussa, num&eacute;ro deux du Haut conseil pour l&#8217;unit&eacute; de l&#8217;Azawad (HCUA), &eacute;tait consid&eacute;r&eacute; comme &laquo; un faucon &raquo; de la r&eacute;bellion. Au d&eacute;clenchement de celle-ci en 2012, il a rejoint le groupe Ansar Dine, dirig&eacute; par Iyad Ag Ghaly dont il &eacute;tait le bras droit. En 2013, tout juste apr&egrave;s l&#8217;intervention fran&ccedil;aise de janvier de la m&ecirc;me ann&eacute;e, les routes des deux hommes s&#8217;&eacute;cartent et Cheikh ag Aoussa rejoint le Mouvement islamique de l&#8217;Azawad, qui deviendra en mai 2014 le Haut Conseil Islamique de l&#8217;Azawad (HCUA).<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/maliactu.net\/mali-le-chef-militaire-de-lex-rebellion-tue-par-lexplosion-dune-mine-sources-militaire-et-ex-rebelles-3\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/maliactu.net\/mali-le-chef-militaire-de-lex-rebellion-tue<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/maliactu.net\/mali-face-a-lavancee-du-gatia-la-minusma-barricade-kidal\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/maliactu.net\/mali-face-a-lavancee-du-gatia-la-minusma-barricade-kidal<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689535\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689535<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689539\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.cridem.org\/C_Info.php?article=689539<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali\/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali\/167813-les-regions-de-menaka-et-kidal-fragilisees-par-l-insecurite.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali\/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/364014\/politique\/visite-mali-angela-merkel-plaide-soutien-militaire-accompagne-daide-developpement\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/364014\/politique\/visite-mali-angela-merkel-plaide<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/362997\/politique\/niger-lallemagne-va-construire-base-militaire-appui-a-minusma-mali\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/362997\/politique\/niger-lallemagne-va-construire<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/bamada.net\/nord-du-mali-la-duplicite-algerienne\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/bamada.net\/nord-du-mali-la-duplicite-algerienne<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/bamada.net\/mali-les-circonstances-de-la-mort-de-cheikh-ag-aoussa-restent-incertaines\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/bamada.net\/mali-les-circonstances-de-la-mort-de-cheikh-ag-aoussa<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #902323;\"><strong>VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE WAR ON TERROR \/ EXTR&Eacute;MISME VIOLENT ET LA GUERRE CONTRE LA TERREUR<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Cross-regional, 3-5.10.2016: Militant recruits are well educated and recruited by friends and family<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A study by the World Bank has found that recruits to militant groups are likely to be well educated and relatively wealthy, with those aspiring to be suicide bombers among the best off, a study by the World Bank has found. The research, based on internal records from the Islamic State group, will reinforce the growing conclusion among specialists that there is no obvious link between poverty or educational levels and radicalization. The data, leaked by a disaffected former member of Isis in March, includes basic information on 3,803 foreign recruits from all over the Islamic world and Europe who joined the organization between early 2013 and late 2014, when the flow of volunteers to the organization reached a peak.<\/p>\n<p>According to another report into Boko Haram, the Isis-affiliated Islamist group in Nigeria, female members of the brutal organization were almost as likely as men to be deployed as fighters, challenging a widespread perception that women are mainly used as cooks, sex slaves and suicide bombers.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, members of the extremist organization Boko Haram are most often recruited by people they already know, such as friends and family &ndash; not by people in mosques or madrasas. Women have larger responsibilities in Boko Haram than previously thought. This is the conclusion of a study conducted by Finn Church Aid (FCA), The International Dialogue Centre (KAICIID), The Network of Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and the Citizen Research Centre. It is preceded by similar research carried out by the same authors conducted with Al Shabab fighters in 2014. The research by Finn Church Aid, a Finnish NGO, also found that economic factors were important in drawing people in north-east Nigeria into extremist violence.<\/p>\n<p>According to Aaron Stein, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council&#8217;s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the data suggest that Turkish ISIS members use a variety of recruitment techniques. The most effective is &#8220;the recruitment of new members through face-to-face or small group settings, wherein recruiters are embedded with other members of their community and target specific groups.&#8221; He added that &#8220;ISIS supplements these efforts with its Turkish-language media operations, which are designed to take advantage of political and religious sympathies among a small segment of the Turkish populace supportive of the idea of an Islamic State.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><em>Links for more information:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2016\/oct\/05\/islamic-state-recruits-world-bank-study-education-boko-haram\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2016\/oct\/05\/islamic-state-recruits<\/a><br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi\/en\/latest-news\/news\/new-evidence-friends-not-firebrand-imams-recruit-fighters-to-boko-haram\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi\/en\/latest-news\/news\/new-evidence<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Islamic-State-Networks-in-Turkey-web-1003.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Niger, 06.10.16 : le gouvernement confirme la mort de 22 soldats dans une attaque qualifi&eacute; de &laquo; terroriste &raquo;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Jeudi, 06 octobre, aux environs de 14h20, une position militaire nig&eacute;rienne, assurant la s&eacute;curit&eacute; du camp de r&eacute;fugi&eacute;s maliens de Tazalit &agrave; 45 km au nord-ouest de Tassara (r&eacute;gion de Tahoua), proche de la fronti&egrave;re malienne, a fait l&#8217;objet d&#8217;une attaque meurtri&egrave;re. Le lendemain, vendredi, le gouvernement nig&eacute;rien a confirm&eacute;, dans un communiqu&eacute;, la mort de 22 de ses soldats dont 14 gardes nationaux, 5 gendarmes et 3 militaires ainsi que 3 autres bless&eacute;s.<\/p>\n<p>Des sources ind&eacute;pendantes, notamment celles du UNHCR qui g&egrave;re ledit camp des r&eacute;fugi&eacute;s maliens, les assaillants ont pris d&#8217;assaut le magasin des stocks alimentaires qu&#8217;ils ont pill&eacute;, l&#8217;armurerie du camp et emport&eacute; trois v&eacute;hicules : deux de l&#8217;arm&eacute;e et un v&eacute;hicule du UNHCR avant de br&ucirc;ler l&#8217;ambulance du camp. Selon toujours ces m&ecirc;mes sources, seuls trois soldats de l&#8217;unit&eacute; ont &eacute;chapp&eacute; &agrave; l&#8217;attaque.<\/p>\n<p>Le communiqu&eacute; du minist&egrave;re nig&eacute;rien de la D&eacute;fense attribue la responsabilit&eacute; de l&#8217;attaque &agrave; &#8220;une bande de criminels arm&eacute;s non identifi&eacute;s&#8221; &agrave; bord de v&eacute;hicules en provenance du Mali voisin.<\/p>\n<p>Les assaillants ont aussit&ocirc;t pris la direction du Mali apr&egrave;s leur forfait, ajoute le communiqu&eacute;.<\/p>\n<p>En attendant les r&eacute;sultats des poursuites engag&eacute;es et des investigations en cours, un deuil national de deux jours sera observ&eacute; &agrave; compter de samedi sur l&#8217;ensemble du territoire national. Selon le porte-parole du minist&egrave;re de la D&eacute;fense, qui a promis que le gouvernement nig&eacute;rien poursuivra la lutte implacable contre cette bande de criminels, &#8220;cette agression ne restera pas impunie&#8221;. Selon des observateurs, la r&eacute;gion de Tahoua, au centre-ouest du Niger se situerait sur une zone frontali&egrave;re assez sensible. Elle est, en fait, limit&eacute;e au nord par la fronti&egrave;re nord-malienne et ses groupes religieux arm&eacute;es comme Aqmi ou Ansar Dine. Au sud, par le Nigeria et Boko Haram. La r&eacute;gion, plus de 110 000 m&egrave;tres carr&eacute;s, est &eacute;galement sur le chemin de l&#8217;Alg&eacute;rie et de la Libye. En clair, un territoire difficilement contournable pour les trafics en tout genre : drogue, bien s&ucirc;r, mais aussi armes et migrants.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations :<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75950.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75950.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75948.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75948.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75947.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75947.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75925.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75925.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75913.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/news.aniamey.com\/h\/75913.html<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.actuniger.com\/societe\/12152-attaque-de-tezalit-vaste-op%C3%A9ration-de-ratissage-de-l%E2%80%99arm%C3%A9e-nig%C3%A9rienne-dans-la-r%C3%A9gion-de-m%C3%A9naka-mali.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.actuniger.com\/societe\/12152-attaque-de-tezalit-vaste-op<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.actuniger.com\/societe\/12150-attaque-de-tazalit-un-garde-r%C3%A9publicain-pr%C3%A9sent-lors-de-l-attaque-interpell%C3%A9.htmlm%C3%A9naka-mali.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.actuniger.com\/societe\/12150-attaque-de-tazalit-un-garde<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/363368\/politique\/niger-camp-de-refugies-maliens-cible-dune-attaque-armee-louest-pays\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/363368\/politique\/niger-camp-de-refugies-maliens-cible<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali\/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali\/167764-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-du-niger-%E2%80%9Cil-n%E2%80%99y-a-pas-de-distinction-.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali\/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/tazalit-une-attaque-visant-larmee-nigerienne-tue-22-soldats\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/tazalit-une-attaque-visant-larmee<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/niger-deuil-national-apres-la-mort-de-22-soldats-tues-dans-une-attaque-jihadiste\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/niger-deuil-national<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/niger-le-gouvernement-confirme-la-mort-de-22-soldats-dans-une-attaque-terroriste\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/niger-le-gouvernement-confirme<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Mali, 05.10.16 : Mort de 52 militaires maliens en 3 mois suite &agrave; des attaques<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Selon des sources ind&eacute;pendantes, plus de 60 attaques ont &eacute;t&eacute; perp&eacute;tr&eacute;es au Mali au cours de ces trois derniers mois. Ces informations ont &eacute;t&eacute; &eacute;galement reprises dans le dernier rapport du Secr&eacute;taire g&eacute;n&eacute;ral des Nations Unies Ban Ki Moon, publi&eacute; le 29 septembre 2016. Ce rapport pr&eacute;cise que ces attaques ont fait 52 morts parmi les militaires maliens, 13 chez les casques bleus et 5 parmi les civils.<\/p>\n<p>Le document pr&eacute;cise que ces attaques qui ont aussi vis&eacute; les forces fran&ccedil;aises de l&#8217;op&eacute;ration Barkhane sont g&eacute;n&eacute;ralement commises par des groupes qualifi&eacute;s de jihadistes. Le texte indique &eacute;galement que la Minusma a besoin de renforcer son effectif et ses &eacute;quipements puisque sa composante militaire compte &agrave; ce jour 80% de l&#8217;effectif autoris&eacute;. Il estime que la Mission a besoin notamment d&#8217;un bataillon sp&eacute;cialis&eacute; en convoi de combat et d&#8217;une unit&eacute; d&#8217;h&eacute;licopt&egrave;res arm&eacute;s pour le secteur nord, ainsi que des sp&eacute;cialistes de la formation, de l&#8217;encadrement et de l&#8217;&eacute;quipement pour la neutralisation des explosifs. Concernant la mise en &oelig;uvre de l&#8217;accord de paix, Ban Ki-Moon a d&eacute;plor&eacute; la lenteur du processus. Pourtant, lors d&#8217;une r&eacute;cente visite au Mali, le SG des Nations unies avait exprim&eacute; au Pr&eacute;sident malien sa satisfaction &laquo; des progr&egrave;s r&eacute;alis&eacute;s dans la mise en &oelig;uvre de l&#8217;accord de paix &raquo;.<\/p>\n<p>Par ailleurs, des informations font &eacute;tat du massacre de 20 personnes, toutes des civiles, par des &eacute;l&eacute;ments arm&eacute;s accus&eacute;s d&#8217;&ecirc;tre proches de la CMA. Ces faits se seraient produits dans les localit&eacute;s de Sehene dans la toute nouvelle r&eacute;gion de M&eacute;naka et &agrave; Intakabart dans celle de Gao. Les assaillants &agrave; bord de v&eacute;hicules lourdement arm&eacute;s auraient surpris les paisibles populations en train d&#8217;abreuver leurs animaux autour des puits.<\/p>\n<p><em>Liens pour plus d&#8217;informations:<\/em><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/attaques-au-mali-52-militaires-maliens-sont-morts-ces-3-derniers-mois\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/attaques-au-mali-52-militaires<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/application-de-laccord-pour-la-paix-le-satisfecit-de-ban-ki-moon-a-ibk\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/application-de-laccord-pour-la-paix<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/construction-dune-paix-durable-au-mali-un-livre-blanc-sur-la-securite-en-gestation\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/mali-web.org\/nord-mali\/construction-dune-paix-durable<\/a><br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali\/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali\/167624-r%C3%A9gions-de-gao-et-m%C3%A9naka-la-cma-accus%C3%A9e-d%E2%80%99avoir-ex%C3%A9cut%C3%A9-une-ving.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/malijet.com\/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali<\/a><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><em>The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>26th September &#8211; 10th October 2016 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":508,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-591","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Cordoba Update 17\/2016 - Cordoba Peace Institute | \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628\u064a\u0629<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cpi-geneva.org\/ar\/the-cordoba-update-17-2016\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ar_AR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Cordoba Update 17\/2016 - 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