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1) LIBYA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb 10-24.11.2014: Bernardino Leon’s Balancing Act<\/strong><\/p>\n Following the Supreme Court’s ruling of Nov. 5th which annulled the House of Representatives’ elections, UNSMIL announced that it “[took] note” of the decision and that it would be “studying it closely.” This wording and subsequent declarations by Bernardino Leon seem to have complicated Leon’s relations with Omar Hassi who leads the Tripoli-based government of national salvation. Tripoli increasingly feels that in the light of Leon’s public declarations and performance, especially after the Court’s ruling, he has failed to remain impartial in his capacity as UN envoy tasked with finding a peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis. It was therefore not surprising to see a protest outside UNSMIL’s office in Tripoli early this week. On the ground, the humanitarian truce announced in Benghazi by UNSMIL on 19 November did not hold, while battles rage on in the second largest town of this divided country. In Tripoli, Khalifa Hafter’s forces operated an air strike on the Maitiga airport while their allies in Zintan launched an offensive on Kikla and managed to take control of it to the detriment of Libya Dawn forces. This first air strike on the civilian airport by the Hafter forces is decoded in Tripoli as a desperate measure to force a negotiated solution to the crisis. It is in this context that Leon has apparently proposed a national unity government to be headed by Mustafa Abushagur.<\/p>\n http:\/\/unsmil.unmissions.org\/Default.aspx?tabid=3561&ctl=Details&mid=8549&ItemID=1992314<\/a> 2) TUNISIA<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>24.11.2014:Presidential Elections: Not without Surprises<\/strong><\/p>\n As was expected, Mouncif Merzouki and Beji Caid Esebssi emerged as the top two favourites of voters in the first round of Tunisia’s presidential election. Partial and unofficial results show that Essebsi obtained around 39.46 % and Merzouki 33.43% of votes cast. Hama Hamami, Popular Front, obtained 7.82 %, Hechmi Hmadi 5.75%, and the businessman Slim Riahi 5.55 %. With 27 candidates, Caid Essebsi and Nidaa Tounes, could not seal a victory from the first round since different dynamics have operated since last month’s legislative elections. It is clear that Ennahdha’s base (30% in the October 26 elections) has weighed in favour of Merzouki, despite the fact that the movement remained officially neutral and abstained from giving official voting instructions to its members. Two kingmakers are in a position to negotiate. Slim Riahia, leader of the National Union (15 seats in the last legislative elections) has not yet announced which candidate he would support in the second round, in late December. Hama Hamami’s Popular Front has already announced that it would not support Merzouki in the second round but would not necessarily back Caid Essebsi.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.isie.tn\/<\/a> 3) EGYPT<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>18.11.2014 : Demande de Dissolution du Parti Al-Nour<\/strong><\/p>\n Malgr\u00e9 son soutien \u00e0 la feuille de route impos\u00e9e par l’arm\u00e9e en \u00e9t\u00e9 2013, le parti Al-Nour fait face \u00e0 une campagne m\u00e9diatique de d\u00e9nigrement et \u00e0 une action en justice demandant sa dissolution. L’action en justice se base sur l’argument que le parti s’opposerait \u00e0 la constitution qui interdit les partis \u00e0 base religieuse. Des observateurs se montrent sceptiques quant aux motivations qui se cachent derri\u00e8re cette action et soup\u00e7onnent la peur d’une victoire du parti Al-Nour aux \u00e9lections parlementaires pr\u00e9vues pour mars 2015.<\/p>\n http:\/\/arabi21.com\/Story\/789847<\/a> 4) YEMEN<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>22.11.2014 :Les Signes d’une Scission dans leParti du Congr\u00e8sG\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Peupleau Y\u00e9men<\/strong><\/p>\n L’ancien pr\u00e9sident y\u00e9m\u00e9nite et chef du parti du Congr\u00e8s g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du peuple, Ali Abdullah Saleh, a limog\u00e9 le pr\u00e9sident y\u00e9m\u00e9nite actuel Abed Rabbo Hadi de son poste de premier vice-pr\u00e9sident du Parti en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la r\u00e9solution du Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 imposant une interdiction de voyage \u00e0 son encontre et le gel de sa fortune. Selon des analystes, la lutte entre Saleh et Hadi soul\u00e8ve la menace d’une scission du parti entre le nord et le sud, alors que des dirigeants du parti au sud rejettent la destitution de Hadi.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.aawsat.net\/2014\/11\/article55338527<\/a> 5) SAHEL<\/strong><\/p>\n Mali :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>20.11.2014 :Third and Last Round of Negotiations in Algiers<\/strong><\/p>\n A third and last round of negotiations officially started in Algiers last Thursday between the government of Mali and participating armed groups. Also present were the MINUSMA, African Union, Economic Community of West African States, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, European Union, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. While the mediators are pushing for a quick solution, the discussions started in a tense climate due to several diverging opinions related to the document proposed by the mediation team. Despite strong commitments from parties to the negotiations to find a solution and restore peace and stability in Mali, both sides stand firm on their positions. The Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, rejects the inclusion of the term “Azawad” in the agreement as well as the idea of federalism. From their side, representatives from the Azawad Movements Coalition\u2013 which includes the MNLA, HCUA and MAA \u2013 stated they would not agree with a solution that would merely proposes decentralization. They also insisted about the necessity to break the taboo of “Azawad” and mention it in the final agreement.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.maliweb.net\/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-au-nord\/pourparlers-intermaliens-dalger<\/a><\/p>\n Niger :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>22.11.2014:Strengthened Collaboration between Mali and Niger<\/strong><\/p>\n The President of Mali, S.E Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, undertook last Saturday a visit to Niger where he met with his counterpart, S.E Issoufou Mahamadou. Both men reaffirmed the strong links of cooperation and fraternity that unite their countries for cultural reasons and also because of the similar threats they face. The visit was also an opportunity for the two Presidents to discuss the security situation in the Sahel, the negotiations currently held in Algiers between the government of Mali and armed rebel movements as well as the means of reinforcement of their links of solidarity.<\/p>\n http:\/\/fr.africatime.com\/niger\/articles\/visite-officielle-de-travail-et-damitie-du-president-de-la-republique-du-mali-au-niger<\/a><\/p>\n Nigeria :<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00bb <\/strong>24.11.2014 :L’Approche des Elections Pr\u00e9sidentielles et L\u00e9gislatives Accompagn\u00e9es des Violences<\/strong><\/p>\n Tandis que les \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielles et l\u00e9gislatives de f\u00e9vrier 2015 se rapprochent, International Crisis Group (ICG) juge quela situation politique ne cesse de se d\u00e9t\u00e9riorer, faisant craindre l’\u00e9clatement de nombreuses violences. Samedi 22 novembre, une cinquantaine d’agents de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 venus d’Abuja ont saccag\u00e9 le centre de donn\u00e9es du principal parti d’opposition du Nigeria apr\u00e8s en avoir bloqu\u00e9 l’acc\u00e8s. Cet incident survient apr\u00e8s celui de jeudi 20 novembre, o\u00f9 les forces de l’ordre avaient tir\u00e9 des gaz lacrymog\u00e8nes contre des d\u00e9put\u00e9s de l’APC (All Progressives Congres), une coalition d’opposition.<\/p>\n http:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/en\/regions\/africa\/west-africa\/nigeria\/220-nigeria-s-dangerous-2015<\/a> The views and perspectives contained in the Weekly Update are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 11 – 24 November 2014 Cordoba Foundation of Geneva<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":5093,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-452","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newsletter"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nhttp:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Mustafa_A.G._Abushagur<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/zoomtunisia.tn\/article\/top\/20673.html<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.kapitalis.com\/politique\/25986-l-isie-confirme-la-victoire-de-caid-essebsi<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/english.ahram.org.eg\/NewsContent\/1\/64\/115574\/Index.aspx<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.yemenfox.net\/articles.php?id=2300<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/ARTJAWEB20141121171355\/pdp-icg-boko-haram-nigeria<\/a>
\nhttp:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/Article\/DEPAFP20141123174054\/apc-opposition-nigeriane<\/a><\/p>\n
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